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WELCOME FROM THE EMC CHAIR 
__________________________________________ 
 
Derek S. Reveron 
EMC Informationist Chair, U.S. Naval War College 
 
This fifth maritime-centric EMC Chair symposium builds on the 2016 release of Design for Maintaining Maritime 
Superiority, which noted the “U.S. Navy has been a cornerstone of American security and prosperity.” The 
symposium will consider future directions of U.S. foreign policy and reflect on demands the country places 
on the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to advance and defend national interests. Participants from 
DOD, academia, and the policy community will convene in Newport to discuss the implications for sea 
power as the Design challenges the Navy to “Deepen operational relationships with other services, agencies, 
industry, allies and partners – who operate with the Navy to support our shared interests.” Participants will 
consider the impact of technology, contested seas, and maritime partnerships on sea control. 
 
In an effort to share expertise with the Fleet and national security community beyond this event, the 
succeeding pages contain the working papers participants prepared in advance of the symposium. The six 
panels are: 
 
• Panel 1: The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy 
The 2016 “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority" maintains that U.S. interests lie beyond its 
shores. With a new presidential administration, panelists will explore the question of what U.S. interests 
are and how to best serve them, particularly but not only in reference to U.S. maritime power. Panelists 
consider competition and cooperation in East Asia, U.S. interests and any possible role in containing the 
escalating conflict in the Middle East, and U.S. grand strategic choices, particularly regarding military 
posture and diplomatic and military partnerships. Finally, the panelists will reflect on future directions of 
foreign policy. 
 
 
• Panel 2: Seapower and Great Power Dynamics 
While there are important forms of cooperation among the US, Russia, China, and India, the four powers 
will independently shape the international security environment. With significant investments in maritime 
capabilities, the four navies are increasingly operating outside their geographic seas and the “Design” 
notes “the United States is facing a return to great power competition.” Panelists will explore three key 
questions. First, how will regional rivalries manifest in the maritime domain? Next, what are the prospects 
for high seas cooperation among Russia, China, and India? Finally, what are the implications for the 
United States? 
 
• Panel 3: Echoes of the First World War in the Twenty-First Century 
Within hours following the formal declaration of war against Germany in April, the President of the 
Naval War College, Rear Admiral William S. Sims, stood among the first American commanders to arrive 
at the European front. Out of necessity, Sims subsequently assumed the role of senior U.S. Navy officer 
in European waters. He simultaneously pioneered efforts to negotiate joint wartime collaboration with 
U.S. Army General John Pershing within the temporary wartime context of the American Expeditionary 
Force (AEF). By July, Sims also served as the ranking U.S. Navy representative to the Anglo-French 
Allied Naval Committee. Drawing from British naval traditions, Sims referred to his headquarters as the 
“London Flagship” and set key foundations in shaping U.S. Navy concepts of strategy and command. 
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Placing our discussion into the contemporary context, Sims essentially became the first Combined / Joint 
Maritime Component Commander in American maritime history. Looking to the past for the purposes 
of examining U.S. Naval strategy in the twenty-first century, our panel will encourage contemporary naval 
thinkers to consider how Sims and his London Flagship offer a useful perspective on strategy, operations, 
and intelligence.  
 
• Panel 4: Geo-economics and Maritime Security  
The neat division of the world into largely self-sufficient states defined by clear geographic borders has 
been upended by the processes of globalization, which have created new connections among states while 
simultaneously opening up divides within them. Forging—or forcing—economic connectivity seems to 
be the driving force for international politics in the 21st century. Geo-economics argues that states seek 
control over the nodes of the global economy as a source of power and influence. In this new context, 
the principal drivers of conflict—or conciliation—will be battles over the management of connections: 
whose hand will turn the various spigots that control and channel the flows of economic activity, whether 
pipelines, canals, trade routes or internet connections. Given the extent to which the global economic 
order depends on reliable access to the maritime domain, naval power is essential to keeping the arteries 
of the international economic system open. 
 
• Panel 5: Technology, Innovation, and Force Structure  
The U.S. Navy has been at the forefront of science and technology. In the 19th century, it was LT Albert 
Michelson who measured the speed of light on the shores of the Severn River at the Naval Academy. In 
the 20th century, it was Admiral Hyman Rickover who pioneered nuclear propulsion. As we enter the 21st 
century, the “Design” sees we need to “optimize the Navy intellectual enterprise to maximize combat 
effectiveness and efficiency. Reinvigorate an assessment culture and processes. Understand the lessons of 
history so as not to relearn them.” To examine future technology, innovation, and force structure, 
panelists will examine the ability of institutions to adapt/innovate, offer historical perspectives on 
innovation and force structure, consider how ethical concerns may or may not play out in the 
development of technology by the US and potential adversaries, and discuss the shift in importance from 
platforms to payloads across the military enterprise.  
 
• Panel 6: Sea Control 
Sea control comes in many varieties. Alfred Thayer Mahan exhorted commanders to win "command of 
the sea," meaning "overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from it, or allows it to 
appear only as a fugitive; and which, by controlling the great common, closes the highways by which 
commerce moves to and from the enemy’s shores." Julian S. Corbett agreed with Mahan that absolute 
maritime command was desirable, but he also allowed for more limited forms of control. A navy might 
get by with control of a finite sea area for a limited amount of time, for example. Jeune ecole theorists such 
as Théophile Aube settled for even less, designing strategies and forces to deny control of important 
expanses to opponents. The panel will explore the future of sea control through the Design for Maintaining 
Maritime Superiority to ensure "Operations short of conflict should be designed to contain and control 
escalation on terms favorable to the U.S."  
 
 
Events like these are possible through the generosity of the Naval War College Foundation, the hard work of 
our Protocol & Events Department, and the commitment to academic excellence by the Department of the 
Navy and the U.S. Naval War College.  
 
 
PANEL 1: THE FUTURE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
 
RETAINING STRATEGIC INFLUCENCE IN ASIA: CHINA, MARITIME POWER, 
AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
__________________________________________ 
 
Patrick M. Cronin 
Center for New American Security 
 
The loss of U.S. global maritime dominance would put at risk fundamental national interests, essentially most 
of what we take for granted. Certainly, it would call into question the ability of the United States to command 
offshore lines of communication, and thereby execute operational plans to counter provocation and 
proliferation, preserve the independence of democratic allies and partners, ensure the free flow of commerce, 
and keep potential adversaries on their back foot and far from our shores. 
 Yet to all appearances American maritime power is steadily eroding. Partly this is a natural 
consequence of rising new centers of power resulting from a worldwide redistribution of wealth and 
technology.1 But it is not the generalized maritime challenge so much as the particularized threat posed by the 
rise of China’s blue water navy— and its ancillary enabling capabilities, all backed by comprehensive 
instruments of power—that should arrest the attention of U.S. officials and, to the extent they still exist, 
strategic planners.2 The United States is being outmaneuvered in China’s Near Seas, and the resulting pressure 
to fall back could result in severely limiting future U.S. power in the world’s most consequential region, what 
Nicholas Spykman called the “Asiatic Mediterranean.”3    
 A decision to resist or effectively counter China’s strategy of indirection and emergence as a maritime 
power must be addressed within the larger context of U.S.-China relations. Is it possible to fashion a 
sustainable and successful American foreign policy that seeks to preserve U.S. national and especially 
maritime power, without falling prey to the myriad pitfalls put forth by scholars (the Thucydides’ trap, 
security dilemmas, inadvertent escalation, regional polarization that would result from forcing allies and 
partners to choose between China and the United States, etc.)?4 
 A forceful response that does not catalyze world war is indeed possible, and I have dubbed this 
approach to be one of “cooperation through strength.”5 It is based on maintaining a balance of power as 
articulated by realists in U.S. foreign policy, such as Henry Kissinger, Robert Zoellick, Richard Armitage, 
Robert Kaplan, and by Kurt Campbell, and Michael Green, among others.6 While they might not agree with 
all my arguments, I think it is possible to craft a mainstream foreign policy in which bounded competition 
and peace-through-strength are core principles. If such an American strategy can develop and take hold, it 
will spring from these mainstream realists and others like them.  
 The alternative to shoring up our economic, diplomatic, and military power in the Indo-Asia-Pacific 
region—something dubbed the pivot or rebalance in the last administration—is to give China unimpeded 
strategic influence to shape the most populous and increasingly most powerful region of the world to its 
liking and often at the expense of U.S national security interests and prosperity. This is a significant 
competition, because it represents a struggle over the global operating system that was largely devised and 
sustained by the United States after World War II.7   
 
 But even if we agree that we should be preparing for heightened competition with China, then we 
should admit that we have been careless, haphazard, and ill-organized and ill-prepared to run that race. We 
have not yet taken the challenge seriously and as a result we have not thoughtfully, let alone brutally, 
prioritized our policies, budgets, and organizations to give us a better chance of success.  
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 Where is the serious debate about how the United States can intelligently tackle its foremost long-
term competitor?  Instead, we seem to be satisfied with annually adjusting downwards our expectations, 
acquiescing to creeping (and ordinarily breathtaking) assertions of Chinese sovereignty and mounting Chinese 
capabilities supported by propaganda, capital, and law fare. As a Nation, we seem satisfied with losing 
influence provided it happens in phases.  
 Assuming we wanted to be serious and self-interested, we would wish to craft a strategic vision in 
which one of the central priorities would be how to compete with China over the long term. Some Chinese 
have been said to drop the pretext of creating a new type of great power relations with the United States, and 
instead opted to accelerate China’s leading role, centered on economic rubrics such as “One Belt, One Road” 
and the development of maritime power that dominates the San Hai (the Three Seas—Yellow, East China 
and South China) but includes a global reach by ensuring access to two major oceans.  
 So, too, the United States should forego the liberal conceit of thinking that we will persuade China 
into convergence, or that we can ever provide Beijing with sufficient strategic reassurance to give up on 
competition. We should instead embrace a realistic U.S.-China relationship in which both heightened 
competition and cooperation are adjustable elements.8   
 Geopolitical competition with China should not and cannot mean containment of the world’s second 
largest economy. But it should mean that the United States adopts an overall foreign policy designed to 
preserve a favorable economic, political, and military order. That means defining a national economic policy 
that supports higher growth and parallel investment in the sinews of comprehensive power. It also means 
keeping pace with joint military power -- but especially in maritime and air power – supported by nuclear 
deterrence, ballistic missile defense, and superior space and cyber systems. Finally, it means maintaining active 
and compelling diplomatic engagement, including inter alia the retention of effective allies and the fostering 
of a broad network of capable security partners to check Chinese adventurism or aggression.  
 Provided we invest sufficiently in the maintenance of deterrence (and granted this becomes more 
complicated in a future of artificial intelligence and autonomous defenses), the bounded military competition 
will mostly remain a battle over gray-zone situations in the contested peacetime environment.9  Seeking 
cooperation where we can and conflict-avoidance where we must, we can help to narrow down the salient of 
geopolitical competition. Further, because we can live with a non-zero sum, general balance of power, we can 
decide when and how to press our advantages, and hold at risk China’s strategy of slow-motion hegemony 
and key vulnerabilities to include a critical dependence on chokepoints.  
 I do not believe we can separate Vladimir Putin’s Russia from pursuing a global foreign policy in 
cooperation with China. The best way for Putin to resurrect Moscow’s stature to where it was during the existence 
of the Soviet Union is for him to work with China to weaken America’s residual dominance over the international 
system. But there are specific areas where cooperation at China’s geopolitical expense may be possible (missile 
control regimes, for instance), and over time (and after Putin) further areas of cooperation may emerge. 
 Dan Blumenthal’s idea of ensuring that China must contend with “unsafe zones” at sea suggests the 
need to preserve or build American maritime advantages in submarine warfare, ASW, ISR, and distributed 
fires—something made more feasible when done in tandem with capable allies and serious partner capacity-
building programs designed to allow dispersed access, a network of counterweights, and sowing political-
military uncertainty to induce greater caution on the part of Beijing officials.10  
 This competition with China will not be limited to the Indo-Pacific region, but over the next two 
decades the biggest implication of China’s blue water navy capabilities could well be its potential for complete 
dominance of the Yellow and East and South China Seas. An India that fails to develop faster, and 
furthermore the breakdown of U.S.-India cooperation, perhaps accelerated by a future China’s distant 
operations that pin down U.S. security forces to a fortress American posture focused on homeland security, 
would expose both the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific to Chinese domination.  
 The U.S. Armed Forces, especially the U.S. Navy in tandem with allies, would have to find a way to 
check China from dominating the Near Seas bounded by the First Island Chain, and be able to hold the 
chokepoints leading out to the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans. This geostrategic maritime capability 
would have to retain qualitative edges in key areas such as submarine warfare and ASW. It would have to 
depend upon an industrial base necessary to sustain and maintain sufficient numbers of qualitatively superior 
forces necessary to check a technological peer with greater numbers of forces.  
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 While there is no one scenario for how this might be executed, it would at a minimum require joint 
and combined military power to be able to mobilize quickly to threaten critical chokepoints that in turn 
would compel China to find non-military paths to achieve its objectives. It would also require being willing to 
assume sufficient risk at sea to engage in quick, short skirmishes that reinforce this standoff without 
escalating into wider conflict or collapsing global markets. This is, of course, generally a page from the Cold 
War playbook, albeit with electronic warfare increasingly important and space and cyber warfare added to the 
mix. 
 Paul Giarra has written trenchantly about how to think about and possibly counter China’s maritime 
salient and search for guaranteed control over vital chokepoints leading out of the South China Sea.11 The 
strategy envisioned in Giarra’s thinking would require a top-down decision to prioritize sustainability and 
resilience. It would not allow budgets to drive the strategy, but to find a way to pursue a strategy despite fiscal 
constraints. The military costs would not be small but would require both near-term sustainment and long-
term technologies that preserve competitive capabilities in critical areas. Robert Work’s emphasis on a Third 
Offset strategy highlights the need for innovative defense acquisition, but pursued in isolation could 
constitute our own Assassin’s Mace, lulling us into a false sense of security that we could win a short, sharp 
war, as though a more assertive, confident, and powerful China will always back away at the first blush of 
high-tech pressure.12   
 The Trump administration’s call for a larger defense budget, which in and of itself appears politically 
difficult, would be but the first of many necessary steps – including the purchase of such basics as more naval 
munitions, that will be required to retain maritime power both ready and credible to contest gray-zone 
situations and, if necessary, to wage war at sea.13  
 However, at the present we are victims of our own historical success, because over the last 75 years 
when we had to fight at sea we prevailed, both in 1941-1945 and throughout the hotly-contested Cold War 
competition with the Soviet Union. We have come to assume without convincing scrutiny that we can 
dominate and hold and exploit the First Island Chain and reach the Asian landmass at will. But as suggested 
above, that assumption is increasingly open to question and provides a dangerous basis for future planning.14 
This is where a deliberate campaign of net assessment and red team gaming must ensue. 
 Yet our Services and Beltway braintrust seem determined to let budgets drive our strategy. This is a 
warning sign that we are preparing to fail. We must instead be determined to succeed, to be unremitting in the 
pursuit of brutal prioritization of our finite national assets. We should be determined to compete in the 21st 
century’s most vital maritime theater, as foreseen by Nicholas Spykman as the Mediterranean of Asia with all 
the centrality that metaphor implies. The alternative will be to draw back east of Hawaii, focus on the 
homeland and Western Hemisphere, and allow others to drive the world’s future at the expense of freedom, 
prosperity, and our fundamental security. 
 
Notes: 
                                                
1 For instance, see Global Trends: Paradox of Progress (Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, January 2017), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/images/globalTrends/documents/GT-Main-Report.pdf. For two recent discussions of the 
distribution of power to and within Asia see Gideon Rachman, Easternisation: War and Peace in the Asian Century (London: 
The Bodley Head, 2016) and Enrico Fels, Shifting Power in Asia-Pacific?  The Rise of China, Sino-US Competition and Regional 
Middle Power Allegiance (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2016).  
2 See Patrick M. Cronin, et al., Beyond the San Hai: Strategic Implications of China’s Emerging Bluewater Navy (Washington, 
D.C.: Center for a New American Security, forthcoming May 2017). 
3 Francis P. Sempa, “Nicholas Spykman and the Struggle for the Asiatic Mediterranean,” January 9, 2015, 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/nicholas-spykman-and-the-struggle-for-the-asiatic-mediterranean/.   
4 Among the numerous scholars issuing such warnings are: Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China 
Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, forthcoming May 2017); Amitai Etzioni, Avoiding 
War with China: Two Nations, One World (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, May 2017); Jonathan Holslag, 
China’s Coming War with Asia (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2015); and Hugh White, The China Choice: Why America Should 
Share Power (Collingwood, Australia: Black Inc., 2012). 
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5 Patrick M. Cronin and Robert D. Kaplan, “Cooperation from Strength: U.S. Strategy and the South China Sea,” in 
Patrick M. Cronin, ed., Cooperation from Strength: The U.S., China and the South China Sea (Washington, D.C.: Center for a 
New American Security, January 2012), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_CooperationFromStrength_Cronin_1.pdf.  
6 See especially Michael J. Green, By More Than Providence – Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783 
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press), 2017. 
7 See Kurt M. Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia (New York, NY: Twelve, 2016). 
8 I base this argument on many sources, including the influence of classical Chinese strategic thinking. For instance, see 
Derek M C Yuen, Deciphering Sun Tzu: How to Read the Art of War (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
9 Concerns about how war could be catalyzed by artificial intelligence, autonomous machines, and other technologies are 
the subject of many current researchers. For example, see Fred Kaplan, Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War 
(New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2016), and the fictional treatment of the nonfictional subject by P. W. Singer, 
Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2016). 
10 Daniel Blumenthal, “A Strategy for China’s Imperial Overstretch,” The American Interest, March 1, 2017, 
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/03/01/a-strategy-for-chinas-imperial-overstretch/.  
11 See Paul S. Giarra, “China’s Maritime Salient:  Competitive Strategies on the Oceanic Front for the 21st Century,” in 
Thomas G. Mahnken, ed., Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2012). 
12 For a superb consideration of the alternative to a short, sharp war, and its requirements, see the Office of Net 
Assessment’s 2016 Summer Study, “Protracted Great Power War:  A Scenario-based Approach.” 
13 Reporting on China’s stated official reduction of defense spending juxtaposed against Washington’s desire for military 
budget increases misses vital context to include China’s ability to close the qualitative and quantitative gap in U.S.-China 
defense capabilities. For instance, see Emily Rauhala, “As Trump Pushes for Bigger U.S. Defense Budget, China Slows 
Growth Rate of Its Military Spending,” The Washington Post, March 4, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/as-trump-pushes-for-bigger-us-defense-budget-china-slows-growth-rate-of-
its-military-spending/2017/03/04/ace6105c-0094-11e7-a51a-e16b4bcc6644_story.html?utm_term=.202c8acfbf73. 
14 Certainly, the briefings emanating out of U.S. Pacific Command point to how much China has improved its ability to 
contest sea control over the past two decades, moving in that time from its coastal waters to beyond the First and event 
Second Island Chains. 
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PANEL 1: THE FUTURE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
 
THE TRAJECTORY OF TECHNOLOGY AND THE DESIGN FOR MAINTAINING 
MARITIME SUPERIORITY 
__________________________________________ 
 
Eugene Gholz 
LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin 
 
 
The United States shapes, monitors, and reacts to events around the world every day – things that require 
minor (and sometimes major) military and foreign policy actions to implement the established U.S. strategy. 
Proponents of all of the major strategic alternatives for the United States agree that events that happen 
elsewhere can affect our security and prosperity at home. But the strategy question is how best to invest in and 
posture our military (and diplomatic and intelligence) assets in a globalized world. Sometimes, the 
accumulation of changes, notably in technology, suggests a desirable strategic adjustment. 
Today, the United States pursues a grand strategy of “deep engagement,” presuming the best way to 
respond to global events is by trying to influence or even control them through forward presence and a 
network of alliances. The principal alternative available to the United States is a strategy of “restraint,” 
patrolling the global commons without regularly penetrating the contested zones near other countries’ 
homelands and allowing wealthy, capable allies more of a role in their own defense. 
The trajectory of technology toward improved sensors and cheaper, faster computer processing 
power, noted in the Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, reinforces the argument for restraint. Sensors 
and processors indeed have vast, complex implications for society and commerce, but their specifically 
military implications (not discussed in the Design) are most important for strategy. For the U.S. military, their 
most immediate implications are for the U.S. Navy’s ability to approach the coasts of other great powers. Sea 
clutter and the vastness of the ocean offer less and less concealment, and modern weapons can relatively 
cheaply exploit the improved surveillance and targeting, as it is now cost-effective to put sophisticated data 
processors on munitions themselves. Great powers can afford to build anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) 
systems in sufficient numbers to overwhelm even a sophisticated approaching fleet, because the fleet’s 
magazine size and rate of fire will always be limited relative to a great power’s land-based forces (though not 
relative to a minor power’s land-based forces).1 Meanwhile, despite rapidly improving technology, it remains 
much more challenging for a naval force to find and identify mobile targets on land in the midst of complex 
terrain and the much higher density of non-military activity. In international relations terms, the defensive 
advantage of land forces fending off sea-based forces is increasing. 
The current strategy of deep engagement reacts by doubling down on U.S. investment in shipboard 
defenses – charging into the teeth of the technology trajectory – and by developing strike systems and 
operational concepts that seek to blind adversaries (attacking their radars and other sensors) and to “shoot 
the archer, not the arrow” (if they can find launchers and hit them fast enough, exploiting the very high end 
of new technology to improve sensing of mobile land targets). These investments are not only expensive and 
uncertain in their payoff but are also quite risky in international relations terms: the temptation to “shoot the 
archer” means launching strikes against an adversary’s homeland, which in almost any scenario would 
constitute a substantial political escalation of a conflict. And that temptation is inherent for the United States 
in any deep engagement posture: any U.S. Navy “presence forces” sailing near other countries’ coasts will 
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always have some capability to attack, backed by the superpower-scale might of the United States, and in a 
crisis, those forces might choose to strike first against land-based mobile launchers. Other countries 
understand the temptation to shoot the archer and will therefore strive to reinforce their maritime contested 
zones – and that will feed back into U.S. force’s temptation to strike early in a crisis to defang the A2/AD 
forces. That dynamic is often called a spiral of instability. 
Concurrently, the same technology trajectory reduces the costs and risks associated with U.S. allies 
contributing more to their own defense.  U.S. allies can deploy their own A2/AD systems, making it harder 
(more costly) for potential adversaries to overwhelm them. Some U.S. allies like Japan have the resources and 
technological skills to produce substantial defenses on their own, but even in those instances (and surely in 
the cases of smaller U.S. allies), the United States can serve as a backstop, helping fund their efforts create 
robust contested zones around their home territory without routinely deploying U.S. forces as the allies’ 
primary line of defense.  Even in relationships fraught with long-term animosity, like the relationship between 
Japan and China, encouraging Japan to invest in clearly defensive systems like mobile land-based anti-ship 
cruise missiles (with their limited range) will calm spiral dynamics associated with the security dilemma: 
reducing the direct role of U.S. forces in the potential adversaries’ littorals – the role of superpower forces 
that the potential adversary might reasonably fear inherently embody significantly more offensive potential 
than any A2/AD forces that U.S. allies could deploy – would be a net calming influence on international 
politics. 
The U.S. Navy would retain important presence missions and, should deterrence fail, warfighting 
missions, if the United States adjusted its strategy and operational concepts to better account for the defense-
oriented trajectory of military technology. In peacetime, the Navy claims an important role in protecting 
international commerce, ever more important because of globalization.  Commerce mostly transits the blue 
water outside maritime contested zones, and countries that want to participate in trade can, and in practice 
have an incentive to, use their own forces to protect commercial ships sailing to their ports. 
Unlike the potential missions that force the United States into foreign contested zones near the 
shore, commanding the commons is not getting dramatically harder, costlier, and riskier as a result of the 
trajectory of technology. Even in a warfighting scenario, U.S. military superiority in the commons remains 
nearly unchallenged, based on fully integrated battle groups, composed of more ships and better ships than 
other countries can field. Other countries cannot counter U.S. blue-water advantages with overwhelming 
numbers of ships or munitions, as they are just as limited by the capacity and cost as the United States.2 
As ever, the United States will benefit from investing in a strong, modern Navy, but a learning organization – 
the explicit aspiration of the Design – adjusts its investments and activities in response to changing 
circumstances, seeking the best way to achieve its goals. Today, that best way is restraint: avoiding 
increasingly high-cost, high-risk missions near other great powers’ coasts, leveraging allied capabilities to 
create their own A2/AD envelopes, and achieving American security and prosperity through lower-cost, 
lower risk command of the blue-water commons. 
 
 
Notes: 
 
1 The A2/AD sensor advantage is weaker against undersea systems, though it is still on a trajectory of significant relative 
improvement. On the other hand, submarines’ size and speed constraints are much greater than those for surface ships, 
so the strategic effect of changes with a lower technological impact undersea can be as great as the effect on the surface. 
2 Indeed, in the deep water, the trajectory of sensor and munitions technology may well even offer the opportunity to 
expand (rather than contract) the relative U.S. advantage in anti-submarine warfare as it gets harder for adversary 
submarines to remain concealed as they approach a U.S. strike group. 
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PANEL 1: THE FUTURE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
 
ENERGY COMPETITION IN MARITIME EAST ASIA: A RED HERRING FOR U.S. 
FOREIGN POLICY 
__________________________________________ 
 
Emily Meierding 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Over the last few years, maritime disputes in East Asia have been perceived as an increasing threat to 
international security. China and Japan’s dispute over the East China Sea heated up in 2012, when Tokyo 
nationalized the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In the South China Sea, China’s artificial island building, 
since 2014, has heightened regional tensions. Concerns are widespread that these territorial contests could 
escalate into outright militarized conflicts, which could draw in the United States, either through its 
commitments to regional allies or through direct great power competition with China. 
This essay focuses on one component of East Asian maritime disputes: energy resources. Oil and 
natural gas fields are at stake in the East China Sea and South China Sea and many journalists and 
policymakers have suggested that these valuable resources play a major role in driving the territorial contests. 
As former US Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus asserted: “It’s not those rocks in the water, it’s what’s 
underneath them...the minerals and the oil and gas.”1 
I argue, in contrast, that oil and gas resources are quite benign, in comparison to other issues at stake in 
East Asian maritime disputes. Energy resources can encourage competition, especially for countries that share a 
history of hostility. However, these contests rarely escalate into outright militarized confrontations and, when such 
incidents occur, national leaders quickly contain them. In addition, in the East and South China Sea disputes, oil 
and gas have inspired some interstate cooperation. Consequently, when attempting to manage these contests, US 
civilian and military officials should focus their attention to other issues: in particular, nationalism, regional power 
struggles, and great power competition between the United States and China. 
To elaborate on this argument, the essay briefly outlines the East China Sea and South China Sea 
disputes, discusses how energy resources have influenced the contests’ trajectories, and highlights 
implications of these dynamics for US foreign policy under the Trump administration. 
 
The Disputes 
 
There are technically four claimants in the East China Sea dispute: China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. 
However, the dispute is currently centered on China and Japan. The states’ territorial contest emerged in the 
late 1960s, but has evolved to encompass a wide range of issues, including continental shelf and maritime 
boundary delimitation, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands sovereignty, offshore energy resources, fisheries, control 
over airspace, and control over sea lanes. In addition, the dispute has become a vehicle for both countries to 
express their displeasure over other activities. China, for example, has initiated dispute incidents in response 
to Japanese leaders’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine, the publication of controversial textbooks, and joint Japan–US 
military exercises.2 
In the South China Sea, six participants are competing over offshore areas: China, Taiwan, the 
Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam. The contests that pose the greatest threat to international security 
are those between China and Vietnam and China and the Philippines. The South China Sea dispute has 
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existed since at least the 1930s, although it did not intensify until the 1990s. It also involves numerous 
contentious issues, including maritime and continental shelf boundaries, the Spratly Islands (contested by four 
claimants), the Paracel Islands (contested by China and Vietnam), energy resources, fisheries, and control 
over airspace and sea lanes. In addition, the South China Sea has become the primary locale for competition 
between China and the United States over maritime power, authority, and influence in East Asia. 
 
The Roles of Energy Resources 
 
The East and South China Seas both contain oil and gas resources. However, the precise amounts at stake in 
each area are uncertain. The Chinese government consistently offers the most optimistic assessments of the 
seas’ hydrocarbon endowments. In contrast, figures provided by the International Energy Administration 
(IEA) are far more conservative. Regardless of the precise amount of resources at stake, however, levels are 
sufficient to pique substantial littoral states interest. 
In both disputes, energy resources have encouraged competition. The East China Sea dispute 
emerged in the late 1960s, after a UN-sponsored research program reported that the continental shelf 
between Taiwan and Japan might be “one of the most prolific oil reservoirs in the world.”3 Over the next two 
years, all four of the sea’s bordering entities claimed parts of the continental shelf. Similarly, the South China 
Sea dispute intensified in the 1990s, during the period when China was becoming a net oil importer, 
heightening the state’s need for reliable energy supplies. 
However, in spite of this amplified competition, oil and gas resources have not encouraged much 
militarized conflict in either dispute. In the East China Sea, China and Japan have engaged in only one 
“militarized interstate dispute” (MID) over gas fields (2005). In contrast, there have been over a dozen 
militarized incidents around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 200-300 miles to the southwest, and an additional 
two related to sea lanes. China and Japan’s 2005 gas confrontation was also fairly mild; the PLA(N) moved 
ships into areas near Chinese gas platforms, but no shots were fired. In the South China Sea, China and 
Vietnam have engaged in several militarized incidents concerning oil exploration, including the notorious 
2014 clashes over a Chinese drilling rig.  However, national leaders were quick to contain this confrontation 
and later reiterated their commitments to peaceful dispute resolution. 
In comparison to the other issues at stake in East Asian maritime disputes, energy resources have not 
been very provocative. Moreover, they are unlikely to become more contentious in the future. The amounts 
of oil and gas at stake in both seas are moderate. The costs of exploiting many of these resources are also 
high, due to their geographical locales. And, oil and gas prices are likely to remain low, for at least the next 
five years. Even when prices rise, fighting for oil will not be an efficient way of obtaining additional resources. 
Within both disputes, energy resources have also inspired international cooperation. In 2008, China 
and Japan established the Principled Consensus on the East China Sea and Other Issues, which created a small joint 
development zone along the states’ maritime median line and permitted Japan’s participation in development 
of a Chinese gas field. In the South China Sea, during the mid-2000s, national oil companies from China, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam jointly surveyed for potential hydrocarbon resources around the Spratly Islands. 
This collaboration collapsed in 2008 because of Philippine domestic politics. However, other regional leaders 
have continued to promote joint oil and gas development as a means of moderating East Asia’s maritime 
disputes.4 
 
U.S. Foreign Policy 
 
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has personal experience with the South China Sea dispute, through his former 
career as CEO of Exxon Mobil. In 2009, the company acquired rights for gas exploration off Vietnam’s 
central coast, in areas that are also claimed by China. Beijing protested the concessions but, with Tillerson at 
its helm, Exxon Mobil rejected pressure to terminate the agreements. Tillerson also flew to China in the midst 
of the 2014 Sino–Vietnamese rig confrontation to meet with Chinese oil company executives. Such 
encounters may encourage Secretary Tillerson to view East Asian maritime disputes through an energy lens.  
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However, this will not be a constructive strategy. As indicated by the discussion above, in these 
contests, energy resources are a red herring. They inspire competition. However, they do not pose a serious  
threat to international security, as they do not provoke significant militarized conflicts. Moreover, although 
claimant states have engaged in some hydrocarbon cooperation, these achievements have not helped states to 
resolve their broader territorial disputes. Consequently, focusing on oil and gas will not advance the United 
States’ foreign policy aims of preventing crises or facilitating dispute resolution. In East Asian maritime 
disputes, energy resources are neither casus belli nor silver bullet. 
Consequently, U.S. foreign policy should focus on more contentious issues, including the United 
States and China’s competition for maritime authority in East Asia and regional power struggles, particularly 
between China and Japan, rather than being distracted by energy competition.  
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 
 
1 Columbia Center for Global Energy Policy, interview with Secretary Mabus (podcast), 29 May 2015. 
2 Krista E. Wiegand, “China's Strategy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: Issue Linkage and Coercive Diplomacy,” 
Asian Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2009). 
3 K.O. Emery et al. “Geological Structure and Some Characteristics of the East China Sea and Yellow Sea,” 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Committee for Co-Ordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral 
Resources in Asian Offshore Areas (CCOP), Technical Bulletin, Vol. 2, p. 3043. 
4These include former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak, and, periodically, the 
Philippines’ President Rodrigo Duterte. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EMC	Chair	Conference	Paper 
 
12 
The	views	expressed	in	this	paper	are	those	of	the	author	and	do	not	reflect	the	official	policy	or	position	of	the	Department	of	the	Navy,	
Department	of	Defense,	or	the	U.S.	Government.	 
 
 
 
PANEL 1: THE FUTURE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
 
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AMIDST REGIONAL DISORDER 
AND ENTANGLED ALLIANCES 
__________________________________________ 
 
Lawrence Rubin 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the end of the Cold War and especially since 9/11, a cascade of crises in the Middle East has challenged 
a number of core U.S. national security interests including: protecting the homeland, preventing the spread of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), ensuring the secure and stable supply of oil, and advancing 
democratic reform. Most recently, the Arab uprisings have reset a regional order and produced intractable, 
internationalized civil wars. Meanwhile, Iran’s regional ambitions and the future of ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria) present serious challenges to the state system and to U.S. regional allies. 
The Trump administration has highlighted two foreign policy objectives related to U.S. national 
security interests in the Middle East: first, eradicating “radical Islamic terrorism” and defeating ISIS and, 
second, preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. Although the Trump administration has not 
articulated its vision for the Middle East yet, this essay examines some of the threats and opportunities the 
United States will face in the region. The main point is that the region’s disorder and divergent threat 
perceptions among allies and across issues will present challenges for the United States to achieve its 
objectives.  
 
U.S. interests in the Middle East 
 
The United States has a number of permanent national security interests in the Middle East that range from 
important to vital. These interests include preventing the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 
protecting allies and partners, ensuring the secure flow of oil, countering terrorism, and promoting 
democratic reform and human rights. The fundamental aim of these interests is to protect the homeland and 
ensure the prosperity of the nation. President Trump’s pledge to eradicate radical Islamic terrorism waged 
operationally through a war on ISIS and to renegotiate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 
indicates that his foreign policy objectives focus on counter-terrorism and preventing the spread of WMDs in 
the Middle East. The Trump administration’s mixed statements about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict do not 
provide us with much of an indication as to where this issue fits into his foreign policy plans except that this 
area will not likely be a high priority.  
The first objective is to destroy the Islamic State as part of a broader effort to eradicate radical 
Islamic terrorism. ISIS represents a foreign policy challenge and a domestic threat. The Islamic State poses a 
terrorist threat to the United States’ homeland through its direct and indirect assistance to lone terrorist 
actors. ISIS also threatens United States’ allies and the stability of the region through its acts as an insurgent 
group and quasi-state that challenges borders and threatens political stability. 
While the threat that ISIS poses to U.S. citizens should not be dismissed, the threat that ISIS poses 
to U.S. allies in the region and to the regional order is more significant. ISIS has challenged the regional state 
system and put pressure on neighboring governments by displacing large populations that strain the resources 
of neighboring states.  
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But it is the Islamic State’s capacity to destabilize neighboring regimes through its ideological appeal 
that presents both a current and future challenge. The Islamic State’s most powerful weapon is its ability to 
project its ideas and ideology. ISIS can do this not only by mobilizing individuals for violent action but also 
by challenging the legitimacy and political stability of local regimes through its messaging. However long the 
Islamic State endures in its current form, it has proven that its capability to project its ideas may be its greatest 
strength.  
Second, the administration will face the difficult task of containing Iran’s regional aspirations, 
including monitoring Iran’s nuclear program. During the campaign, President Trump threatened to tear up 
the Iran deal and Secretary of Defense Mattis called Iran, “the single biggest sponsor of terrorism in the 
world.”1 At this time, however, the extent to which the Trump administration will maintain the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) remains unclear. The JCPOA seems to still be in place even as Iran 
has conducted a number of ballistic missile tests that certainly fall outside the spirit of the agreement and the 
United States has responded by imposing new sanctions. Nonetheless, the most important flashpoint is how 
each side will respond to the other’s provocative moves given domestic opposition on both sides. For 
example, U.S. actions, either in the form of military responses to Iranian naval maneuvers or Iranian ballistic 
missile tests, may affect Iranian domestic political attitudes toward the agreement. These actions may in turn 
precipitate further U.S. action. Any of these moves run the risk of increasing domestic pressure in both Iran 
and the United States that may exacerbate a crisis.  
 
U.S. Foreign Policy Amidst Regional Disorder and Entangled Alliances 
 
There are two significant challenges to the Trump administration’s realization of its objectives. The first is the 
region’s social and political environment. After leading a relatively stable regional order of “moderate” Arab 
Sunni states against an Iranian led axis during the 2000s, the United States faces a region in political disorder 
where state-state alignments are shifting and the issues that caused the Arab uprisings remain unresolved. To 
provide some context, it has only been five years since the Arab uprisings swept the region and overturned a 
number of authoritarian regimes. Three of the states that faced massive protests - Yemen, Libya, and Syria - 
are still in the midst of brutal civil wars in which regional states and great powers are involved. War-torn Iraq 
is battling the Islamic State and will continue to face significant civil and political strife even after Iraq 
liberates its territory from the Islamic State. One of the biggest region-wide challenges is that many of the 
factors that facilitated the social uprisings - youth unemployment, corruption, and lack of hope - remain and 
will continue to fester. The counter-revolutionary forces may have subdued the revolutionary impulses but 
the political, social, and economic grievances that led to the uprisings remain unresolved.  
The second key challenge is that the United States must coordinate policy among allies that have 
divergent threat perceptions across issue areas. The core problem is that regional actors’ threat perceptions 
often diverge from each other and the United States. For example, U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Turkey may align 
over their desire to defeat ISIS but these U.S. allies do not prioritize threats the same way. While both Saudi 
Arabia and Turkey oppose ISIS, Saudi Arabia perceives Iran as a greater threat than Turkey does. Meanwhile, 
Ankara is more concerned about empowered Kurdish populations inside Turkey and on its borders than it is 
about ISIS. To further complicate this picture, Saudi Arabia’s arch rival, Iran, plays an important role 
supporting anti-ISIS, Shi’a militias in Iraq and is crucial to President Assad’s survival in Syria. 
The coalition to defeat ISIS does not carry over to other areas such as combatting Iranian regional 
influence. Iran’s support for Assad is what wrangles Arab Sunnis who want to see Iranian regional influence 
reduced. The important point is that U.S. regional allies and adversaries assess threats differently and will 
prioritize their own efforts according to their local threat environments. This will continue to be one of the 
biggest challenges for the United States.  
 
Yet one opportunity for the Trump administration is a reset with some U.S. partners. In contrast to previous 
administrations, the Trump administration is not interested in promoting political reform in the Middle East. 
This will provide the United States with greater flexibility in its regional relations. By not involving itself in the 
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domestic affairs of other countries, the Trump administration may remove a sticking point of bilateral 
relations with Arab authoritarian regimes that can sometime cause tensions. Lastly, the Trump 
administration’s public stance on Iran may reduce some Obama era fears about that Iran’s influence may 
grow unchecked. One caveat is that these opportunities may be mitigated by the effects of Trump’s travel ban 
that is seen as anti-Muslim and anti-Arab. 
 
The Future: Rethinking Success   
 
United States’ policy has focused on how to defeat the Islamic State and how to constrain Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions as well as its regional influence. Yet, there are no perfect solutions to containing Iran or physically 
defeating the Islamic State, especially in Syria. Indeed, there seems to be an assumption that once these goals 
are achieved, the region will become more stable. In fact, in the event that Islamic State is physically defeated 
in Iraq and Syria, it is unlikely that this defeat will remove the ideas and environment which make ISIS 
attractive. Radical Islamic terrorism and terrorism more generally will likely remain. Moreover, if the JCPOA 
remains in place, U.S. regional allies such as the Gulf States and Israel may not feel more secure if Iran 
continues to project power throughout the region. But if the JCPOA comes under threat, the absence of 
replacement may trigger regional threat perceptions. Many of these uncertainties will be affected on what role 
Russia willing to play in the region, particularly its evolving relationship with Iran and Syria. 
In sum, these open questions highlight that the United States should think very seriously about how these 
issues may be connected to each other and to broader regional political trends. The unresolved societal 
tensions that caused the Arab uprisings will continue to be a liability for returning to a stable regional order. 
Furthermore, the divergent threat perceptions among regional actors and between regional partners and the 
United States will prove a change to the most pressing issue: How will the region look in the future? 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 
 
1 “Iran is world's biggest state sponsor of terrorism, US says,” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38868039, 
February 4, 2017 
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PANEL 2: SEAPOWER AND GREAT POWER DYNAMICS 
 
CHINA AS A GLOBAL MARITIME POWER 
__________________________________________ 
 
Bernard “Bud” Cole 
Center for Naval Analyses 
 
With a focus on China, this paper will address three questions. First, how will regional rivalries manifest in the 
maritime domain? Second, what are the prospects for high seas cooperation among Russia, China, and India? 
Third, what are the implications for the United States of the previous issues?  
The most crucial regional maritime rivalries China is confronting concern contested territorial 
sovereignty, resource acquisition, and matters of national pride.   
 
I. Territorial Sovereignty.  
 
These are well-known and vital issues of national sovereignty and security from China’s perspective. Quite 
simply, Beijing considers the Yellow, East and South China seas to be areas of vital national security interest. 
That evaluation also may apply to Korea, Japan, and the other South China Sea claimants, of course, but none 
of those countries have China’s comprehensive national view of these “three seas” geographically, politically, 
and historically. 
--Does it apply to the United States? Has Washington ever spelled out our national security interests 
in those seas, other than as “freedom of navigation”? 
Countering this nationalistic view from Beijing is the centuries-old concept of the “maritime 
commons,” which views the “high seas” as an area of free access and transit. The United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) is the most recent attempt to delineate the “maritime commons” and the 
“high seas,” but even this near-universally ratified convention contains significant areas where clarity is 
lacking.  
This particularly is relevant when considering the “declarations” made by states when they signed and 
ratified the UNCLOS. China, for example, issued four declarations when it signed, and a fifth declaration 
when it ratified, the UNCLOS. In these declarations, Beijing essentially refused to agree with some very 
important treaty articles. These are as follows: 
 
Upon ratification (7 June 1996)1/: 
1. In accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 
People's Republic of China shall enjoy sovereign rights and jurisdiction over an exclusive economic 
zone of 200 nautical miles and the continental shelf. 
2. The People's Republic of China will effect, through consultations, the delimitation of the boundary 
of the maritime jurisdiction with the States with coasts opposite or adjacent to China respectively on 
the basis of international law and in accordance with the principle of equitability. 
3. The People's Republic of China reaffirms its sovereignty over all its archipelagos and islands as 
listed in article 2 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on the territorial sea and the 
contiguous zone, which was promulgated on 25 February 1992. 
4. The People's Republic of China reaffirms that the provisions of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea concerning innocent passage through the territorial sea shall not prejudice the 
right of a coastal State to request, in accordance with its laws and regulations, a foreign State to 
 
EMC	Chair	Conference	Paper 
 
16 
The	views	expressed	in	this	paper	are	those	of	the	author	and	do	not	reflect	the	official	policy	or	position	of	the	Department	of	the	Navy,	
Department	of	Defense,	or	the	U.S.	Government.	 
 
obtain advance approval from or give prior notification to the coastal State for the passage of its 
warships through the territorial sea of the coastal State. 
Declaration made after ratification (25 August 2006) 
5. The Government of the People's Republic of China does not accept any of the procedures 
provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes 
referred to in paragraph 1 (a) (b) and (c) of Article 298 of the Convention. 
 
Potentially more serious is the February 2017 report of Beijing’s revision of its “Maritime Safety 
Law” that would require all submarines to travel on the surface in “Chinese waters,” perhaps extending to the 
200nm EEZ limit.  
 
Other nations also issued such declarations, particularly with respect to requiring permission for 
armed vessels to operate in the exclusive economic zone and to the limits of the continental shelf, including, 
for instance, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, and Vietnam.  
  
[(b) The Government of the Republic of India understands that the provisions of the Convention do 
not authorize other States to carry out in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf 
military exercises or maneuvers, in particular those involving the use of weapons or explosives 
without the consent of the coastal State.] 
  
The three most important maritime territorial/sovereignty disputes for China are well known to this 
audience: the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and Taiwan. The first involves seabed resources and the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands sovereignty issue; the second also involves seabed resources and land feature 
sovereignty issues—although a more complicated level than those in the East China Sea; finally, in my view, 
the Taiwan sovereignty issue remains Beijing’s number one sovereignty concern, as it does for the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA).  
Second, other conflictual maritime issues include various fishing claims, both with specific nations, 
such as both Koreas, and globally, where China’s huge fishing fleet ignores both national and international 
restrictions and concerns. Finally, Beijing actively plays the “nationalism” card when addressing domestic and 
foreign issues. This of course is not unique to China, but given that country’s size and investment in so many 
contentious maritime issues, nationalism is a significant factor, especially with regard to relations with Japan. 
It is perhaps significant that while China has often been willing to compromise on continental boundary 
disputes, it has done so in only one case of a maritime dispute, in the Tonkin/Beibu Gulf. 
 
II. Prospects for High Seas Cooperation among Russia, China, and India 
 
High seas cooperation between China and Russia is occurring on a regular basis, evident in regularly 
scheduled naval and other military exercises between the two nations’ militaries. In September 2016, for 
instance, three Russian combatants and two supply ships joined ten PLAN ships in a week-long exercise in 
the South China Sea. Moscow has endorsed all of Beijing’s positions in maritime sovereignty disputes, 
although fisheries disputes remain.  
Indian and Chinese navy ships have conducted port visits in each other’s country, and to some third 
nations. They have not participated in any meaningful maritime exercises, however, and are not likely to do so 
in the near future. This is due to Sino-Indian disputes, as well as to the close Chinese-Pakistani alliance and 
Indian concern about the increasing PLAN presence in the Indian Ocean. 
That said, there may be future Indian-Chinese naval cooperation during emergency events such as 
Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) or disaster-relief operations. 
 
Russia and India, however, continue to maintain a close military relationship, based in large part on 
Moscow’s arms sales to New Delhi. These continue to include naval combatants from nuclear-powered 
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submarines to aircraft carriers. I note, however, that a counter move in the Indian navy exists in favor of 
shifting to U.S.-supplied naval weaponry and systems. That shift exists, to an extent, but remains nascent 
(SH3s, P8s, but not F/A-18s). 
The two nations’ navies continue to conduct a long-established series of naval exercises, most 
recently in December 2016. Yet, the prospects for high-seas cooperation between China and India are slight; 
those between China and Russia likely to continue and to increase in frequency and complexity; those 
between India and Russia also likely to continue. Two interesting factors cloud China’s relations with India 
and Vietnam. The first is Russia’s continuing status as India’s primary arms supplier and their generally good 
relationship, while the second is Russia’s similar role with Vietnam. The Russian-U.S. relationship, both at sea 
and in general, may well be on the verge of significant change, given the publicly expressed views of President 
Donald Trump.  
 
III. Implications for the United States  
 
The United States is intricately involved in how both of these slates of issues are resolved—or not resolved. 
In the first case, the U.S. relationships with all the nations disputing Chinese claims are significant. These 
involve, on one level, mutual defense treaties with South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia.  
At a lesser, but still important level are the U.S. defense relationships with Taiwan, New Zealand, and 
Thailand. Third are significant U.S. military (naval) relationships with Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Cambodia, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. (from Beijing’s perspective, when one considers, in addition to 
these treaties and relations the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, exercises with Mongolia, and 
relationships with Central Asian states, the U.S. is indeed “surrounding” China!). 
With respect to the second issue, the United States has established and continues to engage in 
cooperative maritime efforts with China. These range from the Northern Pacific Fisheries Patrol, which also 
includes Russia, to port visit exchanges, joint exercises in both U.S. and Chinese waters, and war-gaming 
exercises that include possible future maritime NEO and emergency relief operations in concert if not fully 
joint. 
Well-established cooperative programs exist between the USN and the PLAN. The first of these, the 
long series of Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) meetings, may be little more than a talk 
shop, but valuable nonetheless, for bringing together flag officers from each navy on a regular basis. The 
second established measure is much more important. The Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) is 
a more practical agreement, reminiscent of the Incidents at Sea agreement established by the United States 
and the Soviet Union to prevent unintended escalation of encounters between ships of the respective navies.  
The U.S.-China CUES pact has recently been supplemented by an addendum extending similar 
conditions and procedures to encounters in the air. This may prove a particularly valuable preventive step, 
reducing, if not eliminating, an incident like the 2001 EP3-J8II collision. 
Future prospects for these activities seems tenuous, however, given apparent attitudes in Xi Jinping’s 
Zhongnanhai and Donald Trump’s White House. And maintaining and hopefully expanding maritime 
relationships with Russia may well have to await the next Moscow ruler. 
 
Two primary problems exist for future U.S. maritime relations on the high seas (or in littoral waters, 
for that matter). The first is the continuing U.S. refusal to sign and ratify the UNCLOS treaty. Second, and 
much more important, is that maintaining U.S. maritime interests, which are global and vital, requires 
rectification of the current imbalance between USN resources and national tasking. 
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PANEL 2: SEAPOWER AND GREAT POWER DYNAMICS 
 
RUSSIA: A LAND POWER MEETS SEAPOWER 
__________________________________________ 
Thomas Fedyszyn 
U.S. Naval War College 
 
Russia’s great power status has always rested solidly on its foundation as the world’s largest and most 
formidable land power. In fact, both Peter and Catherine the Great, nominally the father and mother of 
Russia’s Navy, had to defy Russian culture and tradition as they built navies in pursuit of territorial expansion 
and great power status. Only in the “Gorshkov Era” of Soviet times (1956-1985) did the Russian navy ply the 
world’s oceans in great numbers, and even then, its vessel of choice was the submarine. The current chapter 
of Russian naval rejuvenation under Vladimir Putin is putting a new spin on how Russia uses its navy, 
although completely within the parameters set by his predecessors.  
 
To refresh… 
 
Throughout the Cold War and until 1989, the Soviet Navy was the quantitative equal of the U.S. Fleet in 
every element of naval power except carrier aviation. Her submarine force, while qualitatively inferior, 
outnumbered ours. Her ballistic missile submarines patrolled off our coasts and her attack submarines were 
routinely tracked as they transited the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap in large numbers. It all came to a 
screeching halt with the fall of the Soviet Union. The now Russian Navy was tied to the pier, submarines 
leaking radioactive waste, and surface ships unable to operate without frequent engineering breakdowns. The 
small number of ships built by Russian shipyards were mostly sold to clients in search of economical naval 
platforms. 
This changed abruptly in 2008 with the confluence of three events. First, Russia began its recovery 
from the global recession and the price of oil skyrocketed. This was Russia’s great enabler. Second, Anatoliy 
Serdyukov took over as Minister of Defense with a reform agenda aimed at professionalization and jointness, 
and, finally, the Putin-Medvedev team put together a military building and modernization 10-year plan that 
gave great emphasis to the Navy.  
Over this last decade, Russia’s navy has seen steady growth and qualitative improvements. Today, 
Russia is slowly beginning to deliver ships and submarines to its navy, along with exporting them to India, 
Vietnam, Egypt and Indonesia. But most importantly, the Russian Federation Navy (RFN) is going back to 
sea. Their submarines are once again patrolling the world’s oceans in limited numbers -- and we all know 
about their intelligence gatherers off our eastern seaboard. The Commander of NATO’s Maritime Command 
asserted that “Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic is currently equaling or surpassing Cold War 
levels.”1 The former Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, Admiral Mark Ferguson, characterizes the 
RFN as having developed an ‘arc of steel’ from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea.  
The admiral’s point was not that Russian seapower was equal to the U.S. and NATO navies on the 
high seas. Rather, that the Russian Navy had put us on notice in the Atlantic as well as developed the 
European equivalent of an ‘anti-access/area denial’ capability in those regions near the Russian homeland. 
Additionally, this naval capability could be used both to punish weak adversaries, to add to Russia’s 
international diplomatic presence and prestige and to showcase Russian naval technology for arms export, 
Russia’s second leading source of foreign currency after petroleum products. 
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Witness Syria 
 
In 2013, Russia established a ‘permanent flotilla’ in the eastern Mediterranean, to be manned by ships from all 
four of its fleets. After the Obama administration’s ‘red line’ pronouncement on Bashar al-Assad’s chemical 
weapons, only this Russian force was in position to escort the Norwegian vessels carrying Syrian chemical 
weapons to their destruction destination. The world acknowledged Putin’s naval diplomatic initiative. Then, 
as the Russian Air Force needed additional air defense for its base in Humaymim (Syria), the Black Sea Fleet 
cruiser Moskva assumed the role of air defense commander. Russian air forces were then augmented by the 
arrival of Russia’s sole aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, last fall. Finally, in an act that surprised most of the 
world, the Russian Navy launched multiple cruise missile attacks on so-called terrorist positions in Syria from 
over a thousand miles away, with Kalibr cruise missiles from both Buyan-M patrol boats in the Caspian Sea as 
well as diesel submarines in the Mediterranean. At a cost of probably less than the deployment of a U.S. Navy 
carrier strike group, Russia achieved significant diplomatic and military leverage in the Eastern Mediterranean 
while also creating significant interest in the sale of its cruise missiles, through the judicious and efficient use 
of its style of seapower. 
The speed with which the Russian Federation Navy (RFN) has moved in the “joint” direction is 
noteworthy over the last decade. In the Arctic Ocean, the Baltic and Black Seas, the RFN is now protected by 
ground-based air defense systems incorporating Russia’s latest S-300 and S-400 systems. Russian aviation 
units supporting all four fleets routinely practice locating and destroying naval targets. This, along with 
improved diesel submarines (largely operating in the Black Sea), is what Admiral Ferguson had in mind as he 
used his post-Cold War mantra, reminiscent of the “Iron Curtain.”  
Seapower, therefore can take many shapes and sizes in great power calculus. A historic land power 
whose second-rate economy is hardly dependent on the global commons ought to have no interest in control 
of the world’s oceans. Russia does not.  However, Russian seapower today provides Vladimir Putin with 
precisely the tools of national power that the leader of a land power requires. First, his growing fleet of 
ballistic missile submarines will provide a reliable second-strike nuclear deterrent force as his attack 
submarines keep NATO navies on edge. Second, the global presence of small numbers of his surface 
combatants provides diplomatic presence and prestige while also showcasing Russian weapons technology. 
Third, the RFN can conduct selective operations against limited opponents, as long as they are near Russian 
territory. Fourth, and most importantly, Russian seapower can control Russia’s flanks and deny naval entry 
into the region. The Russian Navy, without carrier-based aviation, can still act as a deterrent to encroaching 
foreign navies planning to reclaim recently annexed land (Crimea) as well to intimidate NATO Alliance 
partners into disunity.  
 
One Last Thought 
 
President Putin loves to use his navy. At a recent press conference, he boasted that Admiral Kuznetsov’s 
deployment to the Mediterranean was his “personal initiative.”2 Based on the frequency with which he 
attends naval events and dresses in its uniforms, it is not unreasonable that he identifies with his navy. After 
all, as a judo master, he may very well fashion himself the naval destroyer: sleek, lean, vicious, lethal, stealthy 
and a very impressive sight to witness. 
 
Notes: 
 
 
1 Janes Sentinel Security Assessment – Russia and the CIS, IHS, London, 2017, Executive Summary, p.9 
2 “Putin thanked Sailors and Industrialists for the Sortie of the Admiral Kuznetsov to the Mediterranean,” Press 
Conference 23 February, 2017, 
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=c35103f459&view=pt&search=inbox&th=15a703e8815181c1&siml=15
a703e8815181c1 
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PANEL 2: SEAPOWER AND GREAT POWER DYNAMICS 
 
REGIONAL HEGEMONY IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD 
__________________________________________ 
 
Rachael Gosnell 
U.S. Naval Academy 
 
As noted in the Chief of Naval Operation’s January 2016 A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, we are 
witnessing a return to great power competition. Yet this return is gradual and must be viewed in terms of 
aspiring regional hegemony in a multipolar world rather than a reemergence of the bipolar world order that 
dominated the post World War II era. While Russia and China have made significant military and economic 
advances, they remain largely regional powers aspiring to exert a sphere of influence on their neighbors, or 
near abroad. India, also an emerging power with impressive economic and military growth, receives less 
attention but will continue to be a significant factor in shaping the international security environment. This 
paper will examine these rising powers and briefly examine areas of potential conflict and cooperation. 
Russia has dominated the recent news cycle for a wide range of aggressive actions, ranging from 
interference in the US elections, to buzzing of the USS PORTER in the Black Sea, maneuvers in Ukraine, and 
a sustained combat role in Syria. Many have suggested these actions indicate a renewal of the Cold War, but 
we would be remiss if we presumed the resurgent Russian power of today followed a script from the Soviet 
Union’s Cold War strategy. An examination of early Cold War strategic documents and guidance, such as 
NSC-68 or George Kennan’s Long Telegram, presents stark differences in the motivations and objectives of 
Russian leadership, but does offer valuable lessons. Kennan’s insights formed the cornerstone of US policy 
against the Soviet Union; he argued that Soviet security behavior was shaped by internal political, ideological, 
and historical factors. Yet his description of Soviet “political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, 
wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal” applies equally to Putin’s Russia of today.1 It is 
imperative to first understand the motivations of present-day Russia and how it differs from the Soviet 
Union. Upon assuming the presidency from a beleaguered Boris Yeltsin at the turn of the millennium, 
Vladimir Putin made clear his intention to restore Russian power. He has methodically worked to do so, 
buoyed by large economic growth spurred by Russia’s gas and oil. As Russia worked to modernize its military, 
Putin became bolder in his foreign interactions, as seen most clearly in the 2008 Georgian invasion, 
participation in the Syrian conflict, and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 despite heavy international 
condemnation. 
  On 18 March 2014, Putin gave a speech to both houses of parliament at the Kremlin in which he 
declared “Russia is an independent, active participant in international affairs; like other countries, it has its 
own national interests that need to be taken into account and respected.”2  In this speech, Putin provided 
insights into potential alliances, noting “we are grateful to the people of China, whose leaders have always 
considered the situation in Ukraine and Crimea taking into account the full historical and political context, 
and greatly appreciate India's reserve and objectivity.”3 
Despite the recognition of both China and India in his Crimea speech, it is unlikely that a Russia-
China-India alliance will soon emerge. However, Russia has been working to build relations with these two 
countries, particularly China. The Chinese-Russian relationship has historically been a tenuous one, yet the 
signing of numerous gas and oil deals as well as an increase in joint naval  
exercises portends closer ties. In September 2016, China and Russia completed an eight-day naval exercise in 
the South China Sea. This included five Russian navy ships, ninety marines, and two helicopters to pair with 
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the ten Chinese ships, nearly twenty aircraft, and one hundred sixty marines; the drills included island seizing 
exercises.4 
China has long expressed a desire for regional hegemony and is pursuing a naval strategy that would 
enable this. ONI noted in 2015 that China has more than 300 surface combatants, submarines, amphibious 
ships, and missile-armed patrol craft; it further predicts a Chinese fleet of more than 400 ships by 2020.5 Yet 
numbers alone are poor indicators of a fleet’s might – one must factor weaponry, tonnage, capabilities, and 
operational experience. Clearly, the US has been the sole global blue water navy since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, but it is equally clear that the US absolute dominance on the high seas is coming to an end. 
While the Chinese naval fleet does not presently equal the US naval fleet, the PLA(N) is working to 
achieve greater capabilities and proficiency operating on the high seas. The construction of a base in Djibouti 
reflects the commitment to extended patrols. China is not the only nation reemerging as a blue water power - 
Russia has deployed numerous warships to the Eastern Mediterranean in support of Syrian operations and 
routinely deploys combatants and surveillance ships to the Western Hemisphere, as recently noted by the spy 
ship that transited international waters off the US eastern seaboard. 
Alarmists will note the more frequent deployments of Chinese and Russian naval vessels, but one 
must be careful to appropriately assess both their capability and proficiency. The US will continue to 
dominate the high seas in both areas into the near future. Current US defense spending levels are equivalent 
to the next seven countries combined – without factoring the Trump Administration’s newly announced 
proposed increase of $54B. In 2015, China spent just over $214B on defense, compared to Russia’s $91B and 
India’s $51B.6 While defense spending is notoriously challenging to account for, there is little doubt that the 
US massively outspends these aspiring powers 
While confrontation must never be discounted, the US must adopt a strategy of both cooperation 
and deterrence. Graham Allison’s famous examination of sixteen cases of rising powers rivaling a ruling 
power in the last five hundred years noted that war resulted in all but four of the cases.7  Though ‘Thucydides 
Trap’ portends that war may be more probable than peace, it is not inevitable, particularly in modern times. It 
is thus imperative to prepare for war – but also to seek increased cooperation to build trust and avoid 
miscalculations due to misunderstandings.  
There are numerous areas that could be more fully explored for cooperation between one or more 
rising powers. The Arctic represents an area of significant interest to Russia, the US, and even China given its 
potential economic value. The Arctic Council has provided a useful forum for increased dialogue and 
cooperation, but the US Navy and Coast Guard should also seek to include Russia and China in multilateral 
Arctic operations. Search and Rescue and crisis response provide low threat areas of cooperation that would 
also develop critical skills for any future emergency – which becomes increasingly likely as the traffic in the 
region climbs. 
 
Multilateral drills – particularly ones focused on humanitarian operations – present other 
opportunities for engagement. Russia and China were invited to participate in RIMPAC in 2012 and 2014, 
respectively. India and China participated in RIMPAC 2016, though Russia had not been invited and instead 
dispatched a spy ship to trail the exercises. Inviting all three countries to RIMPAC 2018 would offer an 
opportunity to build positive relations and improve cooperation. 
Cooperation is imperative on the high seas and multilateral agreements like the 2014 Code  
for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), signed by twenty-one Pacific nations at the Western Pacific Naval 
Symposium, serve an important purpose to open communications and establish standards of conduct. CUES 
was designed to prevent inadvertent escalation of tensions at sea, reminiscent of the 1972 US-USSR 
Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas (INCSEA). While INCSEA 
responsibilities were assumed by the Russian Federation, an increase in recent incidents between US and 
Russian forces at sea indicate that a revision of the agreement may be necessary. It should not be limited to 
just the US and Russia, but consideration should be given to inviting other countries to participate in drafting 
a new, relevant agreement. 
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While there are many additional opportunities for engagement, these represent areas that would 
present low-risk opportunities to improve relations while also ensuring a more effective response for 
humanitarian and crisis response in the future. Cooperation with Russia, China, and India can yield positive 
relations and present an opportunity to improve communications, reducing the risk of inadvertent escalations 
due to misunderstandings. Yet we must be mindful of Allison’s findings and continue with a realistic naval 
strategy to ensure supremacy if challenged. 
 
1 George Kennan. “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” Foreign Affairs. 1946. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct 
2 BBC. “Crimea Crisis: Russian President Putin’s speech annotated.” 19 March 2014. BBC News. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26652058  
3 Ibid. 
4 Sam LaGrone. “China, Russia Kick Off Joint South China Sea Exercise; Includes ‘Island Seizing’ Drill.” 12 September 
2016. USNI News. https://news.usni.org/2016/09/12/china-russia-start-joint-south-china-sea-naval-exercise-includes-
island-seizing-drill 
5 Ronald O’Rourke. “China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for 
Congress.” Congressional Research Service. 17 June 2016. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf p. 49-50. 
6 SIPRI. “Military Expenditure by country, in constant USD, 2006-2015.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-constant-USD.pdf 
7 Graham Allison. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-
trap/406756/ 
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PANEL 2: SEAPOWER AND GREAT POWER DYNAMICS 
 
TOP-DOWN PEACEMAKING: STATES, SOCIETIES AND PEACEMAKING 
BETWEEN REGIONAL RIVALS 
__________________________________________ 
 
Norrin M. Ripsman 
Lehigh University 
 
How do regional rivalries stabilize? While bitter rivalries can simmer for decades, punctuated by occasional 
wars, they sometimes terminate in peace treaties. My research investigates how these peace settlements come 
about and why some are stable and long-lasting, while others are fragile and/or short-lived. In particular, I 
examine whether peace is brought about and maintained by societal pressure on the state, or whether the 
state is the engine of peacemaking. I investigate these questions with an analysis of the universe of twentieth 
century peace agreements concluded between regional rivals that lasted for at least ten years. 
Two key theoretical possibilities are suggested by the international relations literature. A bottom-up 
approach, derived from liberal and constructivist theories, suggests that peacemaking can be achieved by 
changing societal attitudes or by altering domestic institutions to allow for societal input into policy. In other 
words, by creating common interests through economic exchange or common identities through participation 
in regional security institutions, or by democratizing the states in question, the conditions can be created for 
society to compel peacemaking. Alternatively, a top-down approach, informed by realist and statist theories, 
views peacemaking as the product of states pursuing their own interests, both domestically and 
internationally. External pressures, such the existence of more pressing threats than the traditional rival or the 
demands of a more powerful state, can compel states to make peace, as can the need to institutionalize a new 
regime or shore up a more established leadership’s precarious power position when facing an internal political 
or economic crisis. 
 My findings, published in Norrin M. Ripsman, Peacemaking from Above, Peace from Below: Ending Conflict 
Between Regional Rivals (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), are that each of these approaches explain 
only one phase of the peacemaking process. The transition to peace is a top-down process led by states for 
statist reasons, whereas stabilizing peace depends on engaging society in the post-agreement period with 
mechanisms inspired by bottom-up approaches. In every single twentieth-century case of successful 
peacemaking between regional rivals, peace was negotiated by states, often over the vociferous objections of 
the public and key societal groups. In contrast, at the time of the treaties there was no evidence of public 
pressure for peace, any common regional identities that overwhelmed bilateral hostility, nor – except in the 
case of the Sino-Japanese treaty, where it played only a minimal role – demands for peace from the business 
communities of either state. Thus the movement toward peace was top-down, with society playing no role 
whatsoever. 
 After a treaty is signed, however, societal buy-in determines whether a treaty becomes stable or not. 
Thus, it becomes critical to socialize the rival populations at this stage by engaging in economic and cultural 
exchange, embedding them in cooperative regional institutions, and linking the treaty to the broader 
democratic peace by democratizing the states in question. In this regard, states like France and Germany, 
which socialized the peace settlement in this manner, enjoyed a  
stable peace settlement that not only has been respected and unchallenged, but has largely been devoid of 
attempt at revision or high level bilateral crises. Peace settlements that were not socialized in this manner have 
been less than stable. Some, like the Israeli-Egyptian or Israeli-Jordanian treaties have endured for statist 
reasons, but while the basic security settlements have held and the treaties were not repudiated by either 
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party, they lacked underlying stability as demonstrated by frequent bilateral crises and attempts by one or both 
parties to revise the treaty. Finally, settlements like the Russo-Turkish treaty that were not socialized with 
mechanisms inspired by bottom-up theories simply unraveled when state interests changed. Societal, 
therefore, become critical for turning a surface-level statist peace into one that can enduring changes of 
government and state interests. 
 The lesson is that third party states and international institutions interested in promoting regional 
peacemaking need to tailor their strategies to the appropriate stage of the peacemaking process. Before a 
treaty is signed, strategies need to target the rival state’s leaderships, rather than society. At this stage, 
economic and other incentives that will benefit the state itself or its leadership could help encourage 
negotiations, as could pressure in the form of threats or economic sanctions that might exacerbate the 
leadership’s domestic difficulties. Furthermore, it would help if third parties could help prevent an escalation 
of conflict during the negotiation process, at that can undermine peacemaking efforts. Conversely, once a 
peace treaty is signed, the target societies are the appropriate focus of third party efforts. In particular, efforts 
to provide the rival societies an economic peace dividend, as well as measures that encourage bilateral contact 
are likely to be useful strategies to help cement the peace. At the same time, outside actors can assist in 
monitoring the treaty and reassuring both states and societies that peace will hold. 
 What are the implications of these findings for naval strategy?  To begin with, naval forces are not 
the principal tools through which peace can be promoted or maintained. Nonetheless, to the extent that naval 
forces can be used to support the third-party strategies mentioned above, they can play a supporting role. 
That means, in the first instance, to help monitor cease-fires and keep both sides’ militaries apart to create 
space for peacemaking. In addition, if power projection is needed in support of threats and great power 
pressure on the regional rivals, or if a blockade can enforce economic sanctions, naval power can be useful in 
the first stage. In the post-agreement stage, outside naval forces can participate in monitoring the treaty to 
help reassure both parties. Therefore, while naval strategy is not central to peacemaking, it can be used in a 
limited fashion to support the mission. 
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PANEL 3: ECHOES OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 
 
“SMASHING IDOLS”: LOOKING BACK AT SIMS FROM THE 21ST CENTURY 
__________________________________________ 
 
Benjamin “BJ” Armstrong 
U.S. Naval Academy 
 
Just as the First World War was beginning in Europe, Captain William Sowden Sims lay at anchor in 
Guantanamo Bay, sure that his career was coming to an end. He had been serving the U.S. Navy for over 
thirty years, but in a tropical melancholy he was convinced that he was about to be forced into retirement. 
Sims commanded the Atlantic Torpedo Flotilla, considered a backwater of a command and not the type of 
assignment from which his career could recover. Granted, he had re-invented the way the U.S. Navy used 
small combatants and he had inspired a staff process that would set a new standard for America’s maritime 
forces.1 But, he did not seem to think those accomplishments would matter to the Admirals who ran the 
Navy. Prior to becoming Commodore, he had been assigned to the Naval War College not once, but twice. 
He had back-to-back orders as both a student and then an instructor. Newport was where the personnel 
detailers in the Bureau of Navigation sent the riff raff and the officers that they did not want in the fleet. In 
the Cuban sun, Sims turned to his Chief of Staff and good friend from their War College days, Dudley Knox, 
and asked him to see if he could collect photographs from the lieutenants and lieutenant commanders who 
skippered the destroyers in his flotilla. He wanted something to remember them by as his next set of orders 
approached and he considered his looming departure from the Navy.2 
 With the centennial of the First World War upon us, we expect to look back at the conduct of the 
war itself and the aftermath. We see the photographs of Admiral Sims standing with Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy Franklin Roosevelt in London, or with Admiral Jellicoe and his British counterparts, and it becomes 
very easy to focus on his leadership at the London Flagship and achievements during the war. It is easy to 
forget that he was never really supposed to be there, and he was never really supposed to have the power that 
he amassed in London. Examining the path that led Sims to his eventual position as Commander, U.S. Naval 
Forces Operating in European Waters offers observations for the naval profession in the 21st century, 
alongside the strategic and operational lessons offered by study of the war itself.3  
 There were a number of times, over the course of William Sims’ forty years of naval service that it 
looked as if his career was ending. The first was of his own choosing; when in 1890 he tired of the navy and 
thought about leaving. Unsure that he wanted to make a career out of the navy, and feeling undervalued as a 
junior officer in a system that promoted slowly, he began searching for other options. Rather than leave the 
service completely, he applied for and received a furlough from the Secretary of the Navy. Today’s Navy calls 
these “career intermissions,” and Sims took off his uniform and went to Paris for a year where he lived a 
Hemingway-esque life several decades before Papa himself. He studied the French language and culture, 
spent time in the cafes, became a regular at the French theater, and befriended a pair of expatriate American 
artists who took him to visit their Bohemian friends across Europe.4 He came back from his year on furlough 
as a different man, and to a job as the Training Officer aboard a cadet training ship. Through teaching the 
mariner’s trade to a group of excited young men, he rediscovered why he wanted to be a naval officer and, 
refreshed, he continued in the service.5 
 The second near-end of his career occurred after the turn of the century when he decided, as a 
Lieutenant, that it was time to reform the U.S. Navy’s gunnery practices.  He needed to make some enemies 
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to do it. He angered plenty of officers senior to him, and the naval establishment nearly blacklisted him 
because of his insubordination. President Theodore Roosevelt saved him, to a certain extent. Roosevelt told 
the Navy to give him job of Inspector of Target Practice, where Sims fundamentally changed how the U.S. 
Navy trained for war. As a reward for his hard work at reform, Roosevelt then gave him command of a 
battleship, the USS Minnesota. But he was years ahead of his peers, and jumped several officers more senior to 
him on the navy list. He did not make friends from his special treatment.6 
 While in command of Minnesota, after Roosevelt had left office, Sims once again put himself in an 
uncomfortable position. At a dinner at London’s Guildhall in December of 1910, honoring the visit of several 
U.S. Navy ships to the United Kingdom, Sims gave a toast. It was a toast that “reverberated from Berlin to 
Washington,” when he suggested that the United States and Great  
 
Britain were, by nature and national character, natural allies who should come to one another’s defense if 
challenged by another power.  As 1911 was set to begin, there was only one other nation he could have been 
referencing: Imperial Germany. The toast, and its hearty reception by the Londoners and Naval Officers 
crowded into the hall, caught the attention of the newspaper reporters present. The proposal by a U.S. naval 
officer, that the Americans and British should ally themselves, was directly at odds from the official policy of 
the Administration of President Taft and countered the view of many Americans who still saw Britain as a 
potential adversary. The Department of the Navy formally censured Commander Sims, and relieved him of 
command of Minnesota. The leadership sent him into “genteel exile” in Newport, at the War College, which 
had become a place to stash underperforming officers or those who could not return to sea duty.7 
 Sims’ career, enroute to his wartime command and leadership, rode through crests and troughs. He 
burned many bridges and made plenty of enemies in the service during the process. But he also inspired many 
officers who served under his command. For a portion of the junior officer corps going into the Great War, 
he had become a role model and an exemplar of effective leadership. He was a proponent of the adoption of 
mission command, connecting it to both the legacy of Admiral Nelson and the German ideas of auftragstaktik, 
and firmly believed in giving junior officers authority and responsibility. His legacy stretched across the 
interwar years as officers who had served with him like King, Halsey, and Stark rose to positions of senior 
leadership. Even after World War II, Captain B.B. Wygant wrote an article for Proceedings recalling his own 
service under Sims and suggesting he was the proper role model for the Navy as it entered the Cold War Era.8  
 Naval professionals look at the track, which brought William Sims to the docks at Liverpool 
immediately following the American Declaration of War in 1917, and see much that reminds them of the 21st 
century. Career Intermissions are again a part of naval personnel policy, even if it may be a small program 
with a questionable future. The adoption of mission command across the joint force was one of Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs Dempsey’s key efforts. Some also might see the return of war gaming to a larger part of the 
curriculum at the Naval War College in recent months as a Simsian effort. Yet the despite these clear parallels, 
the fundamental question remains unaddressed. How does an officer survive a promotion and personnel 
system that has a little tolerance for risk and a low, or no, defect mindset?  Sims repeatedly ended up with 
positions that should not have  
 
been career enhancing. He made many enemies in the service. Part of what we see from an effort to brief 
Sims’ personnel record is the hard work needed to do even the less glamorous jobs well. Part of what we see 
is the role of contingency in the study of history, or put another way, the place of luck and timing. But even 
admitting to those elements of the history, it is still hard to say that today’s naval officer corps would tolerate 
a modern version of William Sims, or that he would be allowed to survive - even in backwater orders - to be 
available when he suddenly become the right man, at the right place, at the right time. 
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1 Frank A. Blazich, Jr., “’The Ablest Men’ American Naval Planning Section London and the Adriatic, 1917-1918, The 
Northern Mariner, Vol. 26, No. 4 (October 2016), 383-405.  
2 William S. Sims Papers, Box 69: Dudley W. Knox, 1912-1928. Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 
3 For more on the World War I specifics see: David Kohnen, “U.S.Navy’s Great War Centurion,” Naval History, Vol. 31, 
No. 2 (April 2017). Chuck Steele, “America’s Greatest Great War Flag Officer,” Naval History, Vol. 27, No. 3 (June 
2013). 
 
4 BJ Armstrong, “How Did the Navy’s Greats Become Great: The Power of Career Intermissions,” War on the Rocks (14 
May 2015): https://warontherocks.com/ 
5 Elting Morison, Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1942), 29-31. 
6 Benjamin Armstrong, “Armaments & Innovations - Continuous-Aim Fire: Learning How to Shoot” Naval History, Vol. 
29, No. 2 (December 2010). 
7 Michael McMaster and Kenneth Hagan, “His Remarks Reverberated from Berlin to Washington,” U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, Vol. 136, No. 12 (December 2010), 66-71. 
8 Benyaurd B. Wygant, “Admiral Sims as I Knew Him,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 77, No. 10 (October 1951), 
1089-1091.  
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PANEL 3: ECHOES OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 
 
A CENTURY OF PERSPECTIVE ON NAVAL STRATEGY 
__________________________________________ 
 
Nicholas Jellicoe 
 
 
A hundred years ago today, America entered the First World War. An allied victory was not a foregone 
conclusion and many in the business lobby were hostile given British practices of shipping interception and 
inspection in the North Sea. Germany’s strategic mishandling of the submarine offensive reversed these 
opinions.  
Successful strategic planning depends on context. The current lack of clarity from Washington  
is causing inevitable obstacles for the successful implementation of CS21R. U.S. policy towards both rivals 
and partners is vague: witness flip-flops on “One China” and on the Israel “Two state” policies. The need for 
secretary of Defense Mattis and secretary of State Tillerson to underline unquestioned U.S. backing for 
NATO and Europe came after the BREXIT vote when a key underpinning of European co-operation was 
eroded and an important component of NATO already weakened. Turkey or the Philippines’ recent behavior 
is equally dangerous. Now is the time to push hard – in partnership with NATO – for restructuring and 
reform, to build on, rather than erode the alliance. 
 
Lessons from Jutland    
 
Centuries prior to Jutland, Britain possessed a well-oiled global maritime fighting machine. The Royal Navy 
had a vast infrastructure and a total belief in its own invincibility. Unchallenged for a hundred years, it was 
steeped in tradition when it had its nose bloodied by its younger German rival. Tradition had become a 
millstone against a relatively “legacy-free” opponent. In peace, the RN had developed into a bureaucratic, 
seniority-based institution. Command initiative and tactical risk were almost non-existent. Today - after years 
of relative inaction - the USN faces similar threats.     
The successful maintenance of economic blockade through sea power was a key British war objective 
in 1914. Despite Jutland’s controversial tactical disappointment, the battle still changed the war’s outcome. 
Unrestricted submarine warfare provoked U.S. entry into the war. The German Navy may still have had the 
impact of a “Fleet in being”, but its demoralization led to its eventual mutiny and its final act of self-
immolation in Scapa Flow in 1919. Anglo-American naval parity quickly followed. None of these outcomes 
could have been predicted a week after Jutland.     
 
The Role of History 
 
History gives a wider context to the study of military strategy, historians and strategists each playing a role. 
The view from the outside can bring wider clarity, which the inside-out perspective might overlook. The 
outside view – the historian’s view - may be less expert, less knowledgeable but may see a wider horizon. A 
healthy overlap, a balance, is needed. The inevitable politicization of today’s War on Terror could lead us 
back to a McNamara-like obsession with body-count numbers, sound-bytes, and media-friendly metrics. 
We’re largely missing strategic metrics in the public discussion. A painful reminder is that the Napoleonic 
wars continued for ten years after Trafalgar; the First World War continued for two years after Jutland.  
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Under Fisher’s far-sighted stewardship, the RN’s strategic focus shifted from the Mediterranean to 
the North Sea to face Germany, the new economic powerhouse of Europe, and then widened to also include 
the Atlantic with the submarine war of 1917. The U.S. is similarly shifting focus in the first part of the 21st 
century from the Atlantic to the Pacific where it faces accelerated naval growth from an increasingly 
economically powerful China.  
  China is the serious long-term threat. Russia is the short-term one. Name the world’s top ten 
technology, banking or communications companies. Not one is Russian. They’re Chinese. Russia’s 
floundering economy uses external conflict for internal political gain. A Lager mentality. Fighting a common 
outside enemy to unite (or quash) diverse internal opposition. Despite China’s “nine dotted line” strategy and 
huge PLA/N investments, one question may be: is the U.S. shift to the Pacific premature? Arguably, we face 
an equal, but more immediate threat in the Mediterranean and Baltic regions. We might also face a new 
medium-term threat in the Arctic sea where increased commercial conflict over oil, mineral, and fishing rights 
plus a new channel through which China’s navy can threaten, represents a more potential for conflict.   
 
Jellicoe and the U.S. Navy 
 
When political support is not seen as being stable, personal contacts within the military become more 
important for intelligence, planning and training. Jellicoe and Sims’ friendship went back to China, to 1900. 
Jellicoe not only trusted Sims, he also knew – I suspect – that he could use the friendship as a conduit 
through which to speedily obtain urgently needed U.S. resources. Intelligence was never held back (though 
Admiral Benson, whose unfavorable opinions towards the British were as strong as Sims’s favorable opinions 
were, often doubted this). Jellicoe probably “laid it on” (in much the same way as he did in early 1917 with 
Lloyd George’s War Cabinet. He felt most cabinet members did not understand just how close Britain was to 
defeat at that point of the war). Operations are driven by intelligence. During Jellicoe’s time at the Admiralty, 
Intelligence-sharing was encouraged and Sims’s friendship with Reginald “Blinker” Hall (who became DNI in 
1914) gave Sims further, unparalleled access to Britain’s Room 40, its naval intelligence group. The current 
feud between the Executive branch and the Intelligence Community is, therefore, extremely dangerous. 
A mere 26 days after the battle, Sims received Jellicoe’s written evaluation of Jutland and was able to 
use this knowledge to brief SECNAV Daniels. Sim’s priority in 1917 was to provide resources as fast as 
possible. The first group to arrive in Queenstown on May 6th were the best available, war-ready ships the 
USN possessed. The USN hadn’t been ready for war and other ships had to make up for the shortfall in 
crews. Today, how ready – really ready – are we? One hears so many stories of hardware malfunctions, lack of 
realistic battle training and bureaucratic inertia that it’s difficult to feel confidence from the outside.       
Personal relationships between rival services give insight into an adversary’s people, technologies and 
tactics. The working relationships between the U.S. Coast Guard and their Chinese counterpart is an 
opportunity on which to expand to foster stronger relationships between USN and NATO navy officers and 
their counterparts in the PLA/N. Sims accepted the RN’s existing command structure and put his own ships 
under their direct command to avoid any time-wasting. He also accepted British war doctrine given Britain’s 
two and a half years’ war experience. It made sense. Are we as pragmatic and flexible today as Sims was then? 
Credibility is key to effective deterrence. After only ten years, Jutland signaled the slow decline of the 
Dreadnought although both our navies’ reliance continued without clear alternatives. The carrier age was born 
in 1918-1919 but only really came of age twenty years later in the Pacific. It is interesting that both ship-types 
share many of the same questions of prestige, cost, public profile and risk. The low cost, range and killing 
power of today’s ship-killer missile threat might constitute a higher credible threat to our navies than we care 
to admit. Much like the maligned idea of submarine warfare in 1914, or the torpedo that might have failed to 
deliver the goods at Jutland, but in later years fully developed into a lethal weapon.  
Jutland’s real value was its controversial outcome. Many nostalgically look back to Nelson: navy men 
like Lord West, Andrew Gordon, Roskill and, even one of your own, Holloway Frost. Others talk more to 
the strategic context of the battle, like historian Arthur Marder. There’s great emotional and media appeal to 
talk of “engaging the enemy more closely” versus Jellicoe’s more cerebral command style. I often wonder 
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what a Jellicoe-Beatty team might have been like had JRJ been Beatty’s Chief of Staff instead of his C-in-C. 
Beatty’s intuition tempered by Jellicoe’s intellect might have been a superb combination. I also wonder 
whether we would have ever have had the degree of soul-searching and consequent reform had Jutland been 
a more easily understood “victory”.  
 
The Second Trafalgar 
 
The challenge last year, in Jutland’s Centenary year, was how to communicate the battle’s significance and 
place in British maritime tradition. We wanted to pass its history onto a new generation.  Did we succeed? 
Not entirely. But we made strong progress. 
I do not feel that the Royal Navy fully grasped that Jutland was the obvious hook that could be the 
opportunity for, or the event around which the service could explain its current role to the public and  to use 
this to lobby for a larger share of defense dollars. Britain is a country that has largely forgotten its maritime 
tradition. The naval role in a globalized, “Just-in-time” economy is now more important than ever. There was 
a high risk that Jutland was going to be overwhelmed by a tsunami of media attention to the land war, to 
Gallipoli, the Somme, to Verdun. To the generation lost in the filth and intimate brutality of trench war. The 
war at sea left no scars. The battlefield of the sea washed away the evidence. The slow strangulation of the 
German war economy was not easily understood, held little glamour and equally difficult to communicate to a 
nation whose understanding of war was romanticized and fed by a media which contributed to the unrealistic 
expectations of a “decisive battle” at sea. 
The fundamental communication consideration today is language: to preserve history with a new 
generation, we must engage audiences digitally, be visually and graphically enticing. Look at how your own 
children consume media. Not how you do. While I hate to say it, the printed word is increasingly irrelevant. 
My simple 24-minute Jutland animation that was shown here last year when Jutland was gamed made – 
literally - 200 times more impact than my book. For both the layman and, I dare say, even some in the 
military, this complex battle and its consequences were finally easier to grasp. Museums in Germany, the UK 
and Denmark that had never even met, partnered and found a new way to share content, artifacts and tools. 
This is the new way going forward to recount history and its lessons. 
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PANEL 3: ECHOES OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 
 
ECHOES OF THE “LONDON FLAGSHIP” IN RECENT (1999-2017) BOOKS AND 
ESSAYS 
__________________________________________ 
 
Nat Sims, MD 
Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, MA 
 
Popular media coverage of the First World War centenary typically omits mention of naval events or 
the key role of coalition warfare in the outcome.  As the centenary of 1917’s Atlantic crisis of unrestricted 
submarine warfare approaches, the lay reader must search diligently for information about naval aspects of 
the war.  A search of Google Images for “World War 1 remembered” shows only land war related items.  
BBC.co.uk has links to interactive guides about WWI,1 but there is only one BBC interactive guide with naval 
aspects, titled “Jutland, Orkney & an ideal navy base”2 with links to further information about the Battle of 
Jutland, Dazzle Camouflage, and the Scapa Flow Museum.  Further searching reveals that the National 
Museum of the Royal Navy at Portsmouth Historic Dockyard has a Jutland Exhibit: “36 Hours: Jutland, 
1916, the Battle that Won the War”.  A web-site - Centenary News - has a link to an Irish Examiner (02-08-
17) article disclosing planned centenary events in Queenstown (Cobh; Cork) for 4 May 20173.  The Royal 
British Legion web site has a “Jutland 100”4 section, with further links to the spectacular Jellicoe Jutland 
battle animation and web-site5.  Wikipedia, and the naval history wiki “The Dreadnought Project” are rich 
resources, and rewards may be high for targeted topic searching, but piecing multiple discrete factual objects 
together into a broad overview or analysis will be challenging.  Examples of productive Wikipedia search 
topics include, for example: “Rodman 6th Battle Squadron,” “Rodman Battleship Division 9,” “Sir Lewis 
Bayly,” “Convoys in World War I,” “Seymour Expedition Jellicoe,” and the like.  On Wikipedia, a search for 
“London Flagship” returns no results.   
A general search-engine query for “London Flagship Sims” yields an article by David Kohnen of 
NWC on the USNWC “MOC Warfighter” web site, titled: “History MOC Warfighters Should Know, The “London 
Flagship”: Estimate of the Situation for U.S. Navy Operations in a World at War”6  Happily, references in the Kohnen 
article provide a roadmap of links to legacy scholarship and memoirs:  
 
1919 Hunter:    Beatty, Jellicoe, Sims and Rodman: Yankee Gobs and British Tars as Seen by an “Anglomaniac;”  
1920 Sims:    Victory at Sea;  
1921 Hale:    Naval Investigation;  
1921 Kittredge:    Naval Lessons of the Great War;  
1922 Taussig:    Destroyer Experiences during the Great War;  
1934 Chatterton:    Danger Zone: the Story of the Queenstown Command 
1939 Bayly and Voysey:   Pull Together!: the Memoirs of Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly;  
1942 Morison:  Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy;  
1984 Hattendorf et al: Sailors and Scholars;  
1984 Trask:  Introduction, Victory at Sea, 1984.   
1996 Still:   The Queenstown Patrol, 1917: The Diary of Commander Joseph Knefler Taussig, U.S. Navy, and the like. 
 
 
Of these, Victory at Sea, Naval Lessons, Sailors and Scholars and several others are available freely online; 
the Morison biography is not yet available as an eBook or online resource. 
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 Our panel, “Echoes of the First World War in the Twenty-First Century” at the 5th EMC Chair 
Conference asks us to assess the extent to which Sims and the “London Flagship” set key foundations in 
shaping U.S. Navy concepts of strategy, command, operations, intelligence, and combined and joint 
operations.   
 
We may therefore ask at least two specific questions, using contemporary (1999-2017) scholarship 
as a source of truth:  
 
** first, were the methods, structures, and key principles of coalition naval warfare that were developed ad hoc by 
Sims and the US Navy at the London Flagship in 1917-1918, emulated during World War II and 
subsequent conflicts; and,  
 
** second, are the methods, structures, and key principles relevant today, or at least, does the 1917-1918 
experience offer a useful perspective, 100 years on, to the lay reader, as well as to the specialist naval historian or 
educator, on how 21st century naval operations should be conducted? 
 
 To answer these questions, we have identified ten significant new [written since 2009] 
“centenary scholarship” resources on the naval aspects of the First World War, as resources. 
 
We list them here, as follows, with brief commentary, divided into  
 
*A* five general books on broad topics, such as Sondhaus: “The Great War at Sea”,  
 
*B* two articles specifically about Sims as an iconic and significant leader, such as Hagan: “William S. Sims: 
Naval Insurgent and Coalition Warrier”, and  
 
*C* three recent articles by David Kohnen, particularly "The US Navy Won the Battle of Jutland" and "The Navy's 
Great War Centurion". 
 
The five general texts are, most recent first: 
 
1 - Lisle A Rose:  America's Sailors in the Great War:  Seas, Skies, and Submarines (2017). 344 pages; 
compelling and highly readable narrative, richly referenced, including to primary sources.  New analysis of 
primary sources clarifies the specific process by which the British Admiralty ‘converted’ to convoying.  In 
addition, the book provides a comprehensive examination of the debates and processes by which the Wilson 
administration and Washington-based naval leaders managed the dilemmas associated with supplying 
resources to coalition warfare.  This included the need to set aside key Mahanian doctrines.  Among many 
other highlights, are marvelous narratives of the journeys of Taussig and of Rodman, with their small fleets, 
to European waters under challenging weather conditions.  Reference to Sims, and to the London Flagship, 
occurs in nearly all chapters.  There is a strong focus on naval aviation. 
 
** “Literally within hours of the president’s request to Congress [for declaration of war] and while Sims was still at sea on his way to London, an 
Anglo-French mission composed of top-level military and naval officials stationed in the Western Hemisphere was pulled together under instructions from 
Paris and London and sailed toward the United States.  By April 11 the Allied representatives were in conference at Norfolk with Daniels, Benson, Mayo, 
and other senior naval officials.  A few days later, the meeting moved on to Washington.  The Americans “possessed only the vaguest notion of the military 
and naval situation in Europe.” Wilson had wanted it this way in order to maintain his self-defined status as grand mediator …. What the besieged Allies 
wanted most and immediately from their new associate were destroyers.  The Americans were initially cold to the plea, for they did not wish to weaken the 
battle-fleet screen.  …. When the Americans continued to stand firm, Browning pleaded for just one ship “to have a great moral effect.”  It was [Vice 
Admiral, Henry T.] Mayo who broke the logjam that Daniels and Benson had created.  When Daniels turned to his Atlantic Fleet commander and asked 
if at least one destroyer could be spared, Mayo replied, “We can send a division [six ships] and should not send less than that.”  On 
April 13th, “specific terms of an agreement were drafted in Admiral Benson’s office.”  Six destroyers were to be sent 
posthaste to Europe … Beyond these points, Daniels and Benson would not go.  They and most of their subordinates were steeped in the Mahanian 
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dictum that “the United States should not divide its battle fleet” and that the navy’s primary function was to guard the American coastline.  Soon enough, 
however, events forced a dramatic turn. 
 
** “Convoys, in fact, had been in use since the earliest days of the war, albeit on a limited basis … protection of the Grand Fleet from U-
boat attacks during its periodic sweeps of the North Sea depended absolutely upon its screen of swift, fast-acting escorts ... Why could not British 
merchant ships, sailing collectively as its battleships were doing, be escorted in the same way?  Once he grasped this point, Sims 
threw his considerable and ever-growing weight on the side of the convoy enthusiasts, making his argument with a force and 
frequency that the British dared not ignore.  After all, the American admiral held in his hands the number of destroyers that could 
make the system work.   
 
** “Even as he worked the convoy issue with colleagues in the deeply divided British Admiralty, Sims, joined enthusiastically by Ambassador Walter Hines 
Page, began bombarding the White House and Navy Department with cables [the first on April 14, 1917] insisting that the fleet release a substantial part 
of its destroyer force for duty in European waters … The message was not well received.  Wilson shared with his navy subordinates a keen 
commitment to Mahanian principles, grounded in an obsession with maintaining fleet integrity in anticipation of major 
offensive actions.  Dribbling away fleet resources in attempts to prop up a wartime associate could prove feckless.  Moreover, the president soon developed 
a skepticism about the Royal Navy that closely reflected that of David Lloyd George. 
 
** “… [The Royal Navy] experimental convoy from Gibraltar … Results were spectacular.  On May 20, every ship arrived in England without incident.  
Just four days later [May 24, 1917], the Royal Navy organized the first convoy from the New World that sailed from Hampton Roads 
…. without incident.  … Despite open reservations about British abilities and intentions, the White House and Navy 
Department proved game to try the system.  The Allies, in turn, had their own reservations about American abilities …” 
 
** “Just hours after agreement had been reached [April 13, 1917] with the Anglo-French delegation in Washington to send a division of destroyers to the 
war zone, an obscure lieutenant commander named Joseph Taussig, who commanded the half-dozen ships of Destroyer Division 8, US Atlantic Fleet, …… 
was telephoned at home.” 
 
** “At eight in the morning of April 23, 1917, Taussig’s little fleet sailed out of the Brooklyn Navy Yard for Boston … Taussig and his captains… were 
prepared for the refueling exercise that would guarantee them passage all the way to Ireland … Taussig – a veteran of Sims’s rigorous Atlantic 
destroyer flotilla – allegedly replied [to Bayly] “We are ready now, sir ….!”  The American lieutenant commander and his British overseer quickly 
established a smooth working relationship. “This principle of cooperation” remained steadfast as the American destroyer presence at Queenstown grew … 
“an American unit” commanded by Sims in London but always subordinate to British direction.” 
 
2 - William T Johnsen: The Origins of the Grand Alliance: Anglo-American Military Collaboration 
from the Panay Incident to Pearl Harbor (2016).  400 pages; begins with a ~20-page chapter titled “Lessons 
Lived, Learned, Lost: Episodic Progress in U.S. and British Experiences in Coalition Warfare, 1900-1918”. The chapter 
mentions Sims ~35 times.  Sims is again mentioned in Chapter 6 “Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Inching 
Towards Collaboration, Autumn 1940”.  Organizational Charts by Kittredge are in Chapter 8: “Easier Said Than 
Done – Implementing the American-British Conversations-1 Report, April-July 1941, as are 17 photographs, including 
of Sims and Pershing.  The book contains detailed footnotes with extensive primary references. 
 
** “The assignment of Rear Admiral William S. Sims as the U.S. Navy representative in London may have been the most 
fortuitous circumstance that facilitated rapid amalgamation of U.S. and British naval forces.” 
 
** “As liaison methods follow naturally from command arrangements, the [Bailey - 1940] committee next noted that they had relied on the 
historical example of U.S. and British naval cooperation in World War I, in particular the Sims mission.” 
 
** “Hearkening back to Admiral William Sims’s position in World War I, Ghormely would command all naval forces in 
northern Europe if the United States entered the war.  Ghormley arrived in England on or about 20 April [1941].” 
 
3 - Lawrence Sondhaus:  The Great War at Sea; a Naval History of the First World War (2014).  ~420 
pages, highly readable, richly referenced, including to primary resources.  The principal chapter dealing with 
the London Flagship is “8. Submarine warfare: The great gamble, 1917-18”. 
 
** “Rear Admiral William S. Sims, well-respected head of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, soon became the central figure in overcoming 
Anglo-American naval differences.  The Canadian born Sims, the navy’s leading anglophile, had distinguished himself at sea most recently as a destroyer 
flotilla commander (1913-15), but had served earlier as naval attaché in Paris and St. Petersburg, and thus was well suited to play an inter-Allied 
diplomatic role.  He was already on his way to Britain when the United States entered the conflict…. 
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** “A recent, exhaustive account of British naval staff work during the First World War rejects the notion that convoy policy changed 
decisively with Lloyd George’s visit to the Admiralty on April 30, and makes the case instead for a gradual transformation from 
December 1916 onward, after the changes that brought the new prime minister to Downing Street and Jellicoe to the post of First 
Sea Lord.  Nicholas Black points out that Jellicoe approved the convoying of coal supplies to France on January 16, long before the Americans were a 
factor, and the convoying of Britain’s Scandinavian trade on April 21, before the supposedly decisive meeting with Lloyd George.  Finally, on April 27, 
again before the prime minister’s visit to the Admiralty, Jellicoe approved a memorandum written the previous day by the head of the Anti-Submarine 
Division, Rear Admiral Alexander Duff, which cited the success of the French coal convoys, along with the entry into the war of the United States, as reasons 
to adopt a convoy system.  Black’s account cites further evidence of Admiralty planning for “trial convoys” long before April 30.  He acknowledges, but 
also minimizes, the role of Henderson, and does not mention Sims at all.”  
 
** “Holtzendorff’s conclusion, late in 1916, that unrestricted submarine warfare was “the right means to bring the war to a victorious end,” and [was] also 
“the only means to that end,” was based on the assumption that, should the campaign fail, the result would be a continuation of the stalemate until a 
compromise peace, not defeat.  But by bringing the United States into the war while also failing to stop the deployment of the AEF 
to France, the great gamble doomed Germany to lose the war.” 
 
4 - Liam and John Nolan: Secret Victory: Ireland and the War at Sea (2009).  317 pages.  Secret Victory 
focuses on the role of Ireland, particularly Queenstown (Cobh, Cork) in the anti-submarine and convoying 
aspects of the First World War.  Secret Victory is written in a novelistic style that represents a thoughtful 
distillation of the legacy biographies and memoirs of the principal actors.  Sims and his assertive, efficient 
leadership and conduct of coalition warfare is featured, beginning with a chapter “The President’s Naval 
Aide” which gives a full life history of Sims, explaining his strengths and sources of power and leadership.  
There is no eBook available, but most of the book can be “pre-viewed” on Google Books. 
 
5 - Elleman and Paine, eds: Commerce Raiding: Historical Case Studies 1755-2009 (2009). Commerce 
Raiding is a 356 page book from the Naval War College Press, available as a free PDF download.  It contains 
16 chapters covering the period 1755-2009.  Two chapters, each of 15 pages, deal with submarine warfare in 
World War 1 (“Handelkrieg mit U-Booten”: The German Submarine Offensive in World War 1, by Paul Halpern – and 
– The Anglo-American Naval Checkmate of Germany’s Guerre de Course 1917-1918, by Kenneth J. Hagan and 
Michael T McMaster).   An additional two chapters deal with submarine warfare in World War 2.  All of the 
chapters are well referenced and use primary sources.  The Halpern chapter focuses on German strategy and 
decision-making. The Hagan-McMaster chapter focuses on Anglo-American cooperation.   Hagan and 
McMaster focus on how the key actors, Sims, Jellicoe, Bayly, and Pringle, worked effectively together to 
conduct destroyer and convoy-support operations in the east Atlantic.  They then turn to battleship 
operations involving the cooperation between Rodman and Beatty as US Battleship Division 9 traversed the 
Atlantic in November-December 1917, to become the 6th Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet.   The 
symmetrical cooperative arrangements wherein US destroyers were subordinated to Bayley, and US 
battleships were subordinated to Beatty, are emphasized, but the array of ~45 additional installations 
and capabilities supported by the U.S. Navy, are also enumerated. 
 
** “The cooperation of Sims and Bayly and that between Rodman and Beatty protected the convoys of troopships carrying the balance-tipping force of 
two million American soldiers “without losing a single man.”  But beyond the destroyers at Queenstown and the battleships at Scapa Flow, Admiral Sims, 
Commander, United States Naval Forces Operating in European Waters, directly or indirectly commanded naval detachments of varying 
sizes and compositions at Murmansk, in Russia, and in Brest and elsewhere on the coast of France; submarine chasers stationed at Plymouth, 
England; an American naval base at the British naval bastion at Gibraltar; more submarine chasers on the island of Corfu; the U.S. mine force in Scotland; 
all U.S. naval aviation bases; and six U.S. Navy port offices. Ultimately a total of 196 officers staffed Sims’s London headquarters. 
 
** “There had not been anything remotely approaching this scale of overseas commands and operations in the entire 
history of the U.S. Navy, and the whole complex apparatus was improvised.  There had been no prewar planning for co-
belligerency with Great Britain, and as a result there had been no anticipation of this array of installations and operations.  
In a relatively brief period between April 1917 and November 1918, two British admirals and two American admirals had 
overcome their navies’ historical distrust of one another in order to forge a victorious Anglo-American naval alliance. 
 
** “Highly personal and born in reaction to a lethal sea war of unprecedented magnitude, the alliance would fragment in 
1919.  It would lie shattered throughout the two interwar decades.  But as soon as Great Britain went to war with Nazi 
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Germany in September 1939 it was reconstituted and reshaped, often under the guidance of officers who had served in 
World War I as disciples of Beatty, Rodman, Bayly, or Sims.  Notable among the understudies was Cdr. Harold R. Stark, 
the personnel officer at Sims’s London headquarters.  He became Chief of Naval Operations in 1939, and the next year he 
wrote the comprehensive plan – known as Plan Dog …. For fighting Germany and Japan.  In April 1942, Stark was sent to 
London to establish a naval headquarters modeled on the “London Flagship” of 1917-18.” 
 
The two scholarly book chapters specifically about Sims are: 
 
1 - Hattendorf and Elleman: Nineteen-Gun Salute - Case Studies of Operational, Strategic, and 
Diplomatic Naval Leadership during the 20th and early 21st Centuries 266 pages.  (Chapter 1: "Radical, 
But Right - William Sowden Sims (1958-1936)" This collection of brief biographies of nineteen U.S. Navy 
admirals, from W. S. Sims, to Joseph W. Preuher, with insight focusing particularly on leadership skills in the 
operational and strategic arenas, was sponsored by the Naval War College’s College of Operational and 
Strategic Leadership.   
 
** “As the [NWC] faculty ... look ahead and ask what the characteristics will be for naval leaders in the operational and strategic realm, historians can be 
of some assistance by asking what these characteristics have been in the past.  The idea of strategic and operational leadership as a specific type of leadership 
has not been developed fully among naval scholars.  …. Questions:  
 
To what degree are the characteristics of good operational and strategic leaders unique, personal, and inborn qualities?  
….  
 
To what degree do education and training develop these leadership characteristics?  …  
 
To what degree does the experience of previous naval assignments play a role in developing these leadership 
characteristics?” 
 
** “Sims … the unprecedented intimacy of his cooperation with the Royal Navy established a model for World War II.  ….. At the height of its 
power, Sims’s London Flagship oversaw one of the largest assemblages of naval striking power in U.S. history: 370 ships of 
all classes, 5,000 officers and 70,000 enlisted men were distributed among forty-five bases in the British Isles and on the 
Continent.  …. Winston S. Churchill: “the harmony and success of this cooperation form a new precedent, and one which is of the highest value to the 
future in which such vast issues hang on unity between our two countries in ideals and in action.” 
 
** “From October 1902 until the end of Roosevelt’s second administration in 1909, Sims savored his position as a protected insurgent.  He 
leveraged friendships developed with British officers in China to confer with such senior gunnery enthusiasts as Admiral 
John Fisher, the First Sea Lord, and Admiral John Jellicoe, the Director of Naval Ordinance. 
 
** When Fisher unveiled his stunning technological marvel, the Dreadnought, in 1906, Sims felt even more justified in 
proclaiming American warships obsolete … Sims challenged Mahan … in November 1907, Roosevelt appointed Sims to be 
his naval aide.  From center stage, Sims for the next 15 months underscored Roosevelt’s determination to construct a fleet 
centered on American derivatives of the Dreadnought.   
 
** “Lead[ing] the Atlantic Torpedo Flotilla from 1913 to 1914 … Sims forged a Nelsonian brotherhood with his officers… They 
developed a coherent plan for using destroyers, a new class of fast but small vessels.  To enhance destroyer performance and interoperability with 
larger warships, Sims, with the invaluable help of Newport alumnus Dudley W. Knox, promulgated a doctrine for its wartime roles and missions.  
Destroyers became the workhorses of the fleet, and destroyer commanders influenced by Sims cultivated an esprit de corps 
among their crews.  This gunnery enthusiast and advocate of powerful battleships had recognized the importance of 
smaller, lightly armed warships to naval warfare.  In less than three years, he would test his new understanding of the 
destroyer’s importance when he was unexpectedly ordered to command all U.S. naval forces in the European war.   
 
** “He died … just as the Navy was beginning actively to plan for innovative combat deployment of submarines and aircraft carriers.  And so it was that 
the full flowering of Admiral Sims’s influence came posthumously.  It was in death, not in life, that the perennial outsider 
in the ultimate insider’s organization finally came in from the cold.  … His credibility as an insurgent derived from repeatedly championing 
the causes that advanced the Navy’s modernization and operational readiness. … The astuteness of his strategic leadership was much less 
well recognized by contemporaries than by his successors and by historians.   
 
** “Sims perceived the importance of an Anglo-American alliance long before most of his naval brethren.   … Sims’s destroyer decision … was 
inspired principally by his dispassionate strategic assessment that the war hinged on achieving victory at sea; a “go-it-
alone” approach by the Americans would hinder this predominantly British effort. 
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** “What made Sims an exemplary strategic leader was his demonstrated ability to rise above the common human trappings of pride and provincialism, and 
prevail against a conservative service culture that harbored deeper suspicions of Britain than of Germany.  
 
** “He perceived security in international terms and felt no inhibitions about combined operations with other Western 
powers – even if that meant the U.S. Navy was the junior partner.   
 
** “Sims was not merely a theater commander but an ambassador-in-uniform whose responsibilities included the 
cementing and maintenance of an unprecedented transatlantic coalition. 
 
** “As the ranking U.S. naval officer in Europe, Sims, more than his seniors in Washington, was willing to accede to British operational 
control of his ships because it directly enhanced the prospects for victory.   
 
** “At all levels of command – from the presidency of the Naval War College, from the bridge of the Minnesota or the Atlantic Torpedo Flotilla, to the 
wartime headquarters of the London Flagship – Sims esteemed above all a small, highly efficient, and dedicated staff to whom he entrusted 
responsibility for planning, operations, and management.  To some, the ideal naval officer was an aggressive iconoclast and 
eminently adaptable to the variegated demands of the service.  He invested heavily in his subordinates’ professional development, confident 
that their indoctrination and esprit de corps would produce great results.  His unlimited faith in their capacity was matched by an inability to tolerate 
incompetence at any level of seniority. 
 
** “It was his Nelsonian “take the fight to the enemy” approach that his officers idolized. … It was no coincidence that Sims’s 
staunchest partisans were veteran members of his many staffs.  His band of brothers remained true.  Of all his characteristics, they most admired 
Sims’s readiness to sacrifice his career for unpopular causes that would contribute to the greater good of the navy and the 
nation.  Such strength of character and patriotic altruism should never be allowed to become a thing of the past.” 
 
2 - Ballard C Campbell (ed): The Human Tradition in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 2000.  231 
pages; Chapter 12 [21 pages] is “William S. Sims – Naval Insurgent and Coalition Warrier”; by Kenneth J. Hagan. 
[Note: Professor Hagan is also the co-author, with McMaster, of the chapter on submarine warfare in 
Commerce Raiding.] 
 
** “Sims’s prediction [1922] about the battleship’s demise was born out on December 7, 1941 when … one of the battleships sunk … was the old Nevada, 
of which Sims had been the first commanding officer.  The tragedy forced the U.S. Navy to depend almost exclusively on carrier-launched aircraft to fight the 
monumental and tide-turning World Waer II battles in the Pacific – Coral Sea, Midway, the Philippine Sea.  In the entire four-year panorama of 
the Japanese-American war there would be but one solitary battle-fleet engagement conforming to the ideal that Mahan 
had ordained for the twentieth-century American navy… Like the Battle of Jutland in the previous war, its strategic impact was minimal.  At 
the same time, unrestricted American submarine attacks on Japanese shipping proved once again that an island nation could not hope for maritime victory if it 
did not convoy its tankers, cargo vessels, and troopships.   
 
** “In the Atlantic, the British and Americans – unstintingly reinforced by the Royal Canadian Navy – once again instituted a well-coordinated system of 
transoceanic convoys.  Countless naval escorts protected the vital shipments of materiel flowing from North America to England 
and the Soviet Union, and a highly sophisticated campaign of antisubmarine warfare steadily depleted the numbers of U-
boats sent to sea by Nazi Germany.   
 
** “The Anglo-American naval coalition first forged by Admiral Sims in 1917 was revived and solidified into another 
historic victory at sea.  Today, on the eve of the twenty-first century, it is the bedrock of American foreign policy and naval 
strategy. 
  
** “To use a nautical term, the transatlantic partnership is “180 degrees out” from what Passed Midshipman Sims knew on board the Tennessee, when the 
Royal Navy loomed as the world’s most lethal threat to American national security.  That William Sowden Sims helped in ways small and 
large to end a century of mutual hostility between the two major English-speaking powers, is certainly the most significant 
and lasting transformation brought about by a man who always sought change while wearing a uniform that symbolizes 
permanence, conservatism, and tradition.  He was the perennial outsider in the ultimate insider’s organization.  As he himself said of the navy at 
the height of his power and prestige: “I have never liked it.  I would rather have been in a productive occupation.  There has never been a time when I have not 
been uncomfortable in a uniform.”  Paradox defined the man.” 
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The three published, or in-press articles by David Kohnen are: 
 
1 – Kohnen 2016: “History MOC Warfighters Should Know, The “London Flagship:” Estimate of the Situation for U.S. 
Navy Operations in a World at War” – online article (NWC) accessed 03-20-17 at 
https://www.usnwc.edu/mocwarfighter/Article_M.aspx?ArticleID=41.  This 9,000 word (~28 page) essay is 
a superb summary, background, and geo-strategic overview for the questions our panel is considering.  It is 
richly referenced primarily to books and other secondary sources, and contains 14 photographs or 
illustrations.  ‘Sims’ is mentioned 140 times; King 56 times, Knox 31 times, London Flagship 27 times, Mayo 
27 times, Jellicoe 17 times, Benson 14 times.  Major headings address the evolution of the organizational 
structure of the US Navy to coordinate new global responsibilities in the early 1900’s, the creation of the 
CNO role, the “War College Afloat”, the “London Flagship”, the “Grand Fleets”, the “Victory at Sea”, 
“unresolved questions of control shaping the organizational relationship between the Royal Navy and the 
U.S. Navy, and the impact of World War 1 on naval professional education at the Naval War College and 
beyond, including the “Knox-King-Pye board and report. 
 
** “Within the U.S. Navy, many thought that the “Chief of Naval Operations”, in the form passed by Congress, represented the ashes of a once good idea.”  
… As the U.S. Navy sailed into the uncharted waters of coalition warfare, the relationship between the CNO and the seagoing fleet 
organizations … remained ambiguous. 
 
** Carrying wardroom traditions from the age of sail into an era characterized by technologically advanced warships of steam and steel, Sims presided over 
spirited historical debates to examine the nexus between strategy and tactics.  …. From these foundations, Sims and his staff developed 
totally new tactics for maneuvering destroyers in unison using a wireless communication system of fewer than thirty-one 
words.  Following the flag of Sims, the Atlantic Fleet destroyers developed tactics which the U.S. Navy eventually adopted 
for application in larger warships. 
 
** Sims concluded that “the only way to throw the weight of the U.S. Navy into the war without delay was to use its available units 
to strengthen the weak spots in other Navies and thus effect a more vigorous conduct of the war already so thoroughly underway in all areas.  
There would have been much wasted effort and time if any attempt had been made to take over any particular area and 
operate it entirely with U.S. Naval Forces.” 
 
** “First World War adventures in European waters fueled strong professional alliances among U.S. Navy veterans of the London Flagship and Atlantic 
Fleet.  Common wartime experiences inspired U.S. Navy professionals to address underlying questions of strategy and command.  Similarly, the ASecNav, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, drew clear conclusions from his experiences on the European front during the First World War.  He 
frequently interacted with members of the London Flagship and CinCLant staffs.  Significantly, Roosevelt remained very interested in the 
careers of Knox, Stark, and King.  As President of the United States, Roosevelt solicited advice from Knox on questions of American naval policy 
after 1933.  As the CNO after 1939, Stark also shaped the Roosevelt naval strategy of Anglo-American collaboration.  After 1941, Roosevelt empowered 
King to execute American maritime strategy, coordinate combined operations on a worldwide scale, and establish the U.S. Navy as the underlying foundation 
for the American concept of a United Nations after the Second World War. 
 
2 - Kohnen 2016: "The US Navy Won the Battle of Jutland" (NWC). 
 
For this richly-referenced, 22-page article published by the Naval War College, David Kohnen examined ~17 
years of correspondence between Sims and Jellicoe following their first meetings in China during the 1901 
Boxer Rebellion.  The correspondence revealed a deep relationship between the two, who had strong 
common interests, and also special expertise in gunnery, ordinance, and ship-design experts.  The article 
details the evolution of the Jellicoe-Sims relationship during the 1910 Royal Navy’s hosting of the battleship 
USS Minnesota and its fleet in London, subsequent annual visits by Sims to England, and, most importantly, 
early access by Sims to detailed descriptions of the battle of Jutland written by Jellicoe and others.  Of critical 
importance is how Jellicoe’s ‘special information about Jutland’, provided to Sims soon after the battle, 
enabled Sims to analyze the battle and to argue against proposed American modifications of its ship 
construction program, which would have reduced the number of battlecruisers in favor of more battleships.  
In addition, the article details how Sims made the study of Jutland a prominent component of the NWC 
curriculum, as early as November 1916.  Sims’s critical contributions to the American analysis of Jutland 
cemented his reputation and credibility with Assistant Secretary of the Navy F.D. Roosevelt, earned him an 
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opportunity to testify before Congress on the fleet construction program, and further to be given the 
Presidency of the Naval War College in 1917, and soon thereafter, the assignment to London, to liaise with 
the Royal Navy, with promotion to rear admiral. 
 
** “Seizing on Sims’s assertions [lessons of Jutland with respect to the effectiveness of battlecruisers], Assistant Navy Secretary Roosevelt fostered a political 
alliance with Virginia senator Claude A. Swanson.  Together, Roosevelt and Swanson circumvented Daniels in their effort to continue 
the construction of battle cruisers for the U.S. Navy.  In the winter of 1916, Roosevelt used Sims and the findings of the 
Naval War College war-game report on Jutland to frame future American naval policy. 
 
** “Following his testimony on Jutland in Congress, Sims received orders to the Naval War College.  In February 1917, he assumed duty as the President of 
the College.  Sims then received secret orders to sail for London with verbal authorization to assume rank as a rear admiral on 21 March.  Concurrently, 
Navy Secretary Daniels and CNO Benson directed Sims to act as the Navy Department liaison to the Admiralty in London.  The United States declared 
war on Germany while Sims was at sea in April [6th, 1917].  Shortly after their first meetings in London, Sims and Jellicoe built on 
their personal friendship to facilitate the broader collaborative relationship tween the Royal Navy and U.S. Navy.” 
 
3 - Kohnen 2017: "The Navy's Great War Centurion" (Naval History, April 2017).  This 5-page article has the 
sub-heading: “Against the background of a disjointed U.S. Navy hierarchy, Rear Admiral William S. Sims 
arrived in London in the spring of 1917 and pioneered how U.S. naval officers would approach multinational 
command.”  Sections of the article are titled: “The Selection of Sims”; “The Mysterious Mr. Davidson”; “Taking 
Stock of the Situation”; “Bespoke in Savile Row”; “American Revolution in Naval Command”; “SIMSADUS”. 
 
** “Sims shattered the Navy Department’s organizational routines, first by articulating the unspoken strategic reality of an Anglo-
American naval alliance and then by pioneering operational ties between the British and U.S. navies.  
 
** “At a critical turning point in maritime history, Sims tested and at times acted beyond the limits of his rank in dragging the U.S. 
Navy onto the international stage.  He referred to U.S. naval headquarters in Grosvenor Square as the “London Flagship,” which by 
implication asserted command over operations at the front. 
 
** “Although the U.S. Navy largely muddled through in World War I, Sims and his London Flagship set the precedent for 
how U.S. naval officers evaluate questions of multinational command.  Having served on the Atlantic Fleet staff during the war, Ernest 
King later claimed in memoirs that he had never been “one of the group of Sims’s devoted disciples and followers.”  In fact, Sims was one of King’s 
true mentors and clearly shaped his approach to questions of combined and joint command.  His World War I experience enabled 
King to understand the challenges involved with synthesizing Anglo-American strategy as Chief of Naval Operations during World War II.   
 
** “The generations of Sims and King set the foundation for the U.S. Navy of the 21st century.  For these reasons, 
contemporary naval thinkers may draw from the rich perspectives found I the past while framing the future history of the 
U.S. Navy and its maritime partners in global strategic affairs.” 
 
 
Notes: 
 
1 http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/0/ww1/25768752 
2 http://www.bbc.co.uk/guides/zxsppv4#zycggk7 
3 https://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/special-report-100-years-on-cork-region-remembers-arrival-of-us-fleets-during-great-war-442325.html) 
4 http://www.britishlegion.org.uk/remembrance/ww1-centenary/jutland-100/ 
5 http://www.jutland1916.com/ 
6 https://www.usnwc.edu/mocwarfighter/Article_M.aspx?ArticleID=41 [Sims – 139 mentions] 
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PANEL 3: ECHOES OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 
 
NAVAL HISTORICAL EDUCATION AS A FUTURE STRATEGY 
__________________________________________ 
 
David Kohnen 
U.S. Naval War College, Maritime History Center 
 
The Naval War College holds the unique mission of educating service professionals about concepts of sea 
power and the military policy of the United States. In his lectures, Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce warned 
Naval War College students to study history for their own professional good. He worried that the “examples 
of history which inculcate these lessons are being disregarded every day by nearly all maritime powers, and by 
none more than our own.”  Luce also argued that “all naval operations are strategic.”  He might warn against 
the contemporary doctrinal focus on operations in the absence of a clearly achievable strategy, which could 
be sustainable over the longer term and would be worthy of the effort in terms of resources and personnel. 
 Navies traditionally required personnel with technical expertise in the sciences, rather than in the 
humanities, for the practical purposes of operating and maintaining ships. Drawing from the ideas of British 
historians like Sir John Knox Laughton and Spenser Wilkinson, Luce encouraged other historians affiliated 
with the Naval War College to look beyond problems of technology and engineering. Recalling the character 
of naval education in the late nineteenth century, a future five-star admiral recalled that the “average 
midshipman, reluctant to admit his ignorance, would stand at the blackboard chewing chalk rather than ask a 
question.” 
The service placed higher value upon following rules and personal reputation, often suppressing 
creativity within the ranks. War required decisiveness, providing no time for reflection. Luce challenged such 
assertions by suggesting “naval strategy is more comprehensive than military [land] strategy.”  “Military 
strategy is called into play only during war,” he argued in 1896 that “[n]aval strategy adopts some of its most 
important measures during peace.”  Luce stood out among his contemporaries, challenging the norms of the 
service by recruiting younger officers to join in a professional revolution within the ranks of the U.S. Navy. 
Army lieutenant colonel Emory Upton largely inspired Luce to recognize the strategic role of 
education in military affairs. Having studied the Prussian model, Upton and Luce also drew heavily from the 
teachings of Dennis Hart Mahan at the Military Academy at West Point. Sensing an opportunity to recruit a 
protégé, Luce recruited Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan to assist in developing historical case studies for the 
purpose of educating American naval and military professionals to understand the nexus between peace and 
war. Rather than the sciences, Luce and Mahan relied primarily upon historical studies to place the military 
policy of the United States into a global context under the new American concept of “sea power.” 
The approach favored by Luce and Mahan sparked debate about the functional value of history for 
U.S. Naval professional education. Engineers within the ranks favored clearly framed processes and solutions, 
for which historians frequently failed to offer in their writings. Indeed,  
Mahan lamented in 1890 that many U.S. Naval officers suffered from a “vague feeling of contempt for the 
past, supposed to be obsolete, combines with natural indolence to blind men even to those permanent 
strategic lessons which lie close to the surface of naval history.” 
Mahan attained an international reputation as a historian, although his readers failed to fully 
understand the underlying argument within the historical narrative. His emphasis upon attaining 
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concentration of force and decisive battle have proven to be widely misunderstood among readers of 
Mahan’s work. As John Tetsuro Sumida warns in, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic 
Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered, contemporary readers of Mahan must take care in avoiding such 
oversimplified interpretations of the underlying ideas found in the collected works of Mahan. 
Maritime historians recognize the practical importance of understanding history within the context of 
the past, although frequently fail to understand the more immediate needs of naval practitioners. To this 
point, Andrew Lambert highlighted the strategic role of historians in naval affairs in, Foundations of Naval 
History: John Knox Laughton, The Royal Navy and The Historical Profession. As Lambert demonstrates, Luce and 
Mahan relied very heavily upon the teachings of Professor Laughton at the University of London, King’s 
College. Building from Laughton’s work, Luce and Mahan in framed an American maritime vision for the 
twentieth century.  
History enabled the Americans to prove the value of sea power, not as means to conduct war but as 
a means to preserve peace and stability on the global commons. Thus, professional education in history 
provided means by which naval practitioners recognized the maritime arena as a global stage, unrestricted by 
the inherent constraints on military operations ashore. The ideas of Laughton, Wilkinson, Luce, and Mahan 
remained important in the era preceding the First World War. The deaths of Mahan in 1914 and Luce in 1917 
also marked a period of transition, which continued at the Naval War College. Among the new generation of 
rising naval professionals, Royal Navy Captain Sir John R. Jellicoe and U.S. Navy Captain William S. Sims 
maintained a close correspondence – trading ideas on the future of naval strategy and, ultimately, recognizing 
the existence of a transatlantic alliance between the British Empire and the United States. 
Combat experience in a dirty and widely ignored campaign in China first inspired the special 
relationship of Jellicoe and Sims. Having suffered severe wounds in battle, Jellicoe met Sims through mutual 
associations with American naval officers Joseph K. Taussig, Dudley W. Knox, and Bowman McCalla. As 
Jellicoe rose quickly within the ranks of the Royal Navy, Sims followed a very different path. He consistently 
bucked the system with such provocatively framed essays, which appeared in Proceedings under titles like, 
“Cheer Up!! There is No Naval War College.”  Sims challenged fellow naval professionals to recognize the 
limitations of training and experience at sea – pressing them to understand the strategic benefits derived from 
education at the Naval War College. 
Sims remained a controversial figure within the ranks of the U.S. Navy, upon assuming the 
presidency of the Naval War College. On the first board for promotion by selection, he also held status as a 
rear admiral select in the spring of 1917. Sims remained the most senior captain in the U.S. Navy when, on 11 
January, the British intercepted an encrypted wireless transmission between Arthur Zimmermann, the 
imperial German foreign minister, and Heinrich von Eckardt, the German representative in Mexico. British 
cryptographers within the Admiralty subdivision, “Room 40,” partially solved the message five days later.  
The deciphered text revealed an outlandish German plan to sponsor a Mexican insurgency against 
the United States. The Germans also discussed a prospective alliance with the Imperial Japanese to attack 
American interests in the Pacific. In February, the British shared the information with the United States 
shortly before passing the full contents of the “Zimmermann Telegram” to American newspapers, leaving 
President Woodrow Wilson with few options. In April, the Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels preferred 
to send another naval officer, but settled upon sending Sims on a secret mission to organize U.S. naval efforts 
in Europe in the event of an American war declaration. Four days after Congress formally ratified a 
declaration of war on Germany, Sims held rank as the most junior two-star admiral in the U.S. Navy upon 
arriving in London on 10 April 1917. 
Through the good offices of the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John R. Jellicoe, Sims became the 
preeminent American naval strategist of the First World War. Jellicoe first entrusted Sims with cybernetic 
intelligence, as obtained through the cryptographic methods employed within the Admiralty “Room 40.” 
Drawing from methods employed by the Royal Navy, Sims then established the so-called “London Flagship” 
and pioneered contemporary strategic concepts of combined and joint organization. By June, Sims assumed 
the function of senior U.S. Naval commander with the American Expeditionary Force in Europe, 
coordinating joint operations at sea and ashore with his U.S. Army counterpart, General John J. Pershing. 
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That same month, Sims became the first U.S. Naval officer to hold combined command over foreign naval 
forces. 
At the invitation of Jellicoe, Sims served on the Allied Naval Council and established new precedents 
for future American naval practitioners to examine for use in framing future strategy. In essence, Sims 
pioneered contemporary concepts of the Combined / Joint Maritime Component Commander as the ranking 
U.S. Naval representative to the Allied Naval Committee and the American Expeditionary Force during the 
First World War. Having earned four-star rank by 1918, Sims requested demotion to his permanent rank of 
two-stars in order to return to the presidency of the Naval War College in 1919.  
The First World War inspired reforms within the U.S. Navy, which originated on the campus of the 
Naval War College. In a second tenure as president of the Naval War College, Sims carried forward the 
visions of Luce and Mahan in efforts to educate future American naval professionals about the importance of 
understanding history. Among other radical initiatives, Sims drew inspiration from the Admiralty “Historical 
Section” of Sir Julian Corbett, which served as an adjunct to the Naval Intelligence Division at the Admiralty 
during the war. In 1919, Sims empowered his chief of staff, Captain Dudley W. Knox, to establish a 
“Historical Section” at the Naval War College for the specific purpose of supporting the departments of 
Strategy, Operations, and Intelligence in educating U.S. Naval professionals about the practical value of 
historical research. 
Knox championed efforts to use historical studies as a strategic vehicle for fusing operations with 
intelligence. Drawing from the ideas of Luce and Mahan after experience in the First World War, Knox also 
observed that “navies provided unique means, “not to make war but to preserve peace, not to be predatory 
but to shield the free development of commerce, not to unsettle the world but to stabilize it through the 
promotion of law and order.”  In his classic study, Naval Genius of George Washington, Knox further explained 
that the “supreme test of the naval strategist is the depth of his comprehension of the intimate relation 
between sea power and land power, and of the truth that all effort afloat should be directed at an effect 
ashore.” 
Drawing from wartime experience, Sims and Knox enhanced the curriculum and placed  
the U.S. Navy on course to meet the challenges inherent with the steady demise of the British Empire after 
the First World War. Sims first organized a panel chaired by Knox and comprised of Captain Ernest J. King 
and Commander William S. Pye. With the endorsement of Sims, the Knox-King-Pye Board determined that 
the highest-ranking U.S. Navy officers suffered from being educated only to the “lowest commissioned 
grade.”  Given such assertions, the Knox-King-Pye Report caused significant controversy within the Navy 
Department. Although the original Knox-King Pye Report supposedly disappeared, the text mysteriously 
appeared in the Naval Institute Proceedings in 1920.  
As published, the report forced the Navy Department to enact reforms that ultimately fueled 
strategic thinking within the American military and naval services in the interwar period. Acting upon the 
Knox-King-Pye Board recommendations, Sims recruited his former intelligence officer in London, Tracy 
Barrett Kittredge, to serve as librarian and chief archivist. Knox also served in retired status as the Naval War 
College chief of staff. Together, Sims, Knox, and Kittredge expanded the library collection from roughly 
7,000 to an estimated 45,000 books between 1919 and 1924. Among other works, he acquired the maritime 
writings of British theorists like Sir John Knox Laughton, Spenser Wilkinson, Sir Philip Columb, Sir Charles 
Callwell, Sir Julian Corbett, and Sir Herbert Richmond. 
From wartime experience in London, Sims knew personally many prominent British strategic 
thinkers. Sims introduced their works into the Naval War College curriculum, using history as the foundation 
for fostering debate and innovation. Through this approach, Sims inspired U.S. Naval professionals to pursue 
a deeper understanding of maritime strategy. Seeking to broaden the perspectives of Naval War College 
students and faculty, Sims hosted a number of foreign naval professionals on the Naval War College campus. 
He invited Jellicoe and Corbett in 1920. The following year, Royal Navy Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly delivered a 
lecture on antisubmarine warfare and the future of Anglo-American naval collaboration. Other visitors to 
campus included German Vice-Admiral Paul Behnke and Japanese Vice-Admiral Funokoshi Kajishirō. In 
retirement, Sims returned to campus when an Imperial Japanese Navy delegation visited the Naval War 
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College in the spring of 1924. Among these visitors, Vice-Admiral Ide Kenji and his aide, Captain Yamamoto 
Isoroku, gained a firsthand perspective on the Naval War College and its influence upon the U.S. Navy. 
Given the strategic focus of the Naval War College, Sims expanded the curriculum on tactics to 
include focused historical case studies for use in war gaming and chart maneuver exercises. Before the First 
World War, students attending the Naval War College examined the 1805 Battle of Trafalgar, selected 
campaigns from the American Civil War, and the 1904 Battle of Tsushima. After 1919, Sims introduced the  
Battle of Jutland as a prominent feature in the menu of historical case studies delivered at the Naval War 
College. Sims used Jutland to examine questions of command and organization, issues of intelligence, the role 
of logistics, and the emergent influence of new technologies like wireless, submarines, and aviation. 
Jutland remained obscure in the educational curriculum of the Royal Navy, as the results of the battle 
proved difficult and politically charged as portrayed in the British media. Unlike the British, the Americans 
relied very heavily upon critical studies of Jutland to examine the transcendent strategic problems of 
operational objective, command, communications, and intelligence. In their theses on tactics, Jutland loomed 
large in the postwar Naval War College educations of U.S. naval professionals like William D. Leahy, Ernest 
J. King, Harold R. Stark, Chester W. Nimitz, and William F. Halsey, Jr.  
In classroom discussions of history and by reconstructing the decisions made in past battles on the 
war gaming floors of the Naval War College, the U.S. Navy arguably won the Battle of Jutland. Because of 
Sims, the Battle of Jutland influenced the perspectives of U.S. naval officers of the 1920s and 1930s. In 
compiling their “Thesis on Tactics,” students like Captain Ernest J. King observed that Jutland provided an, 
“ideal illustration of how future commanders may use radio to increase the flexibility of strategy.” 
Commander Chester W. Nimitz mused that the Battle of Jutland had “no equal in history [and that] it is 
doubtful if the total forces engaged in the Battle of Jutland will be exceeded at any rate during our time.”   
Nimitz recalled studying the battle in such detail that he “knew every commander intimately” and committed 
to memory every decision they made “by heart.” Twenty years later, King commanded at the strategic levels 
Nimitz orchestrated the operations during battles that far exceeded the Battle of Jutland, such as at Coral Sea, 
Midway, Guadalcanal, and Leyte Gulf. 
Sims presided as the first graduates of his revised curriculum entered new phases in their careers 
following studies at the Naval War College. Among many others, these included U.S. Marine Lieutenant 
Colonel Holland M. Smith in 1922. The following year, the Naval War College produced U.S. Navy Captain 
Thomas Hart with commanders Harold R. Stark and Chester W. Nimitz. Ernest J. King completed the Naval 
War College correspondence course in 1924, having qualified in submarines and designed the distinctive 
submarine insignia that remains an important symbol of the American “silent service.” After he qualified as a 
naval aviator in 1927, King completed the senior course of the Naval War College. As a Sims protégé, King 
arguably stood among the best graduates of the Naval War College as the U.S. Navy sailed into uncertain 
waters in executing an American neutrality strategy after 1937. 
First World War experience inspired an educational revolution within the U.S. Navy, which centered 
upon the Naval War College campus. Following the Sims curriculum of the 1920s and 1930s, U.S. Naval 
professionals sought a strategic advantage with detailed studies of naval history. War gaming historical battles 
inspired innovative solutions for application in war planning, as exemplified in such theoretical studies as 
those produced under the War Department caveats ORANGE, RED, and BLACK. These plans later 
informed the development of the RAINBOW series before 1941. Given this rich First World War history, 
the Naval War College arguably provided the critical foundations, which enabled the U.S. Navy to secure 
decisive victory in the Second World War and beyond. 
History remains a foreign country for many naval thinkers, as the problems of the past appear to be 
remote and unconnected to the challenges of the present. In his ironically titled 1992 treatise, The Lessons of 
History, Sir Michael Howard argued that there are no applicable “lessons of history.” That same year, Peter 
Paret suggested in his anthology, Understanding War, that “the greatest threat to historical scholarship remains 
where it always has been: in the coercive intent and power of orthodoxy, whether old or new.” Given these 
assertions, contemporary practitioners and strategic policymakers should be reminded about the problem of 
war. Doctrinal solutions and variables of technology frequently fail to measure against the fundamental fact 
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that war is essentially a human invention. In reconsidering the longer historiography of strategy, Luce, Mahan, 
Sims and their associates clearly recognized the fact that war is not a “desired end state” in considering the 
role of “sea power” and the military policy of the United States. 
As the U.S. Navy and its global partners sail into the hazy uncharted waters of the future, history 
remains clearly visible in the phosphorescent wake. Reconsidering the influence of the first “great” war upon 
the second “good” war in relation to the “cold” war of the twentieth century, contemporary strategic thinkers  
must recognize the underlying historical continuities that have fueled recent conflicts in the greater Middle 
East and in the Asiatic. Given our connections with the past, 2017 marks the centennial of formal American 
involvement in the First World War. The educational opportunities found in the future historical study of the 
First World War also resonate within the vision articulated within A Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-First Century 
Sea Power, which proposes the development of a “global network of navies that brings together the 
contributions of like-minded nations and organizations around the world to address mutual maritime security 
challenges and respond to natural disasters.”   
A century ago in London, Jellicoe and Sims pioneered the Anglo-American special relationship in 
global naval affairs. For our present discussion almost exactly to the day 100 years later, we have the privilege 
of witnessing the first meeting of their grandsons, Nick Jellicoe and Dr. Nathaniel Sims. Both offer very 
unique perspectives on their grandfathers. Both have also produced their own historical studies of Jellicoe 
and Sims, which highlight their importance within the context of contemporary discussions of future naval 
strategy. From the Laughton Naval Unit at King’s College London, doctoral candidate James Smith offers a 
fresh historical perspective on the First World War as a means to examine the current state of naval 
professional education and coalition warfare. Commander Benjamin J. Armstrong, PhD, of the U.S. Naval 
Academy similarly builds upon his past books on Mahan and Sims to offer an important contemporary 
perspective on future strategic opportunities in the grander maritime arena. 
Reflecting upon the riches of the past, contemporary naval strategic thinkers should strive to draw 
new perspectives from the solid foundations of history. The centenary of the First World War provides 
contemporary context for this discussion. Just 100 years ago, the U.S. Navy stood in the shadows of the 
European navies as American forces learned how to operate within the context of modern coalition warfare. 
After the First World War, the Naval War College helped fuel the educational vision that inspired the 
development of a “navy second to none” before the Second World War. Given the riches of history, the 
Naval War College remains a fundamental contributor in shaping a future course for global maritime strategy 
into the twenty-first century and beyond. 
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PANEL 3: ECHOES OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 
 
NAVAL HISTORY AND NAVAL LEADERS 
__________________________________________ 
 
James W.E Smith 
King’s College London, Department of War Studies, Laughton Unit 
 
The close relationship between Sims and Jellicoe identifies that these were leaders who were equipped with 
the knowledge of how to win the First World War. The ‘special Anglo-American relationship’ between them 
is reflective of the virtuous cycle of how Corbett and Mahan influenced these leaders through the study of 
naval history. Mahan was greatly influenced by Professor John Laughton who while at the Royal Naval 
College and Kings College London began the development of ‘scientific’ naval history as the means for the 
‘higher education’ of naval officers in matters of strategy and tactics, from theory to practice. 
By pulling on threads and echoes of the First World War that can be found in the 21st century, we 
can reflect on the roots of naval education and the role that naval historians have in the education of naval 
officers and civilian decision makers. Just as Laughton was vital to the education of naval officers in an age of 
absence of large-scale naval warfare where actual practical experience could not be had but technical change 
was taking place, today historians seek the next generation intellectual revolution that protects the 
institutional wisdom gathered in a navy’s past experiences. They can do this by creating and encouraging an 
environment through scholarly practice where naval history and the study of maritime strategy can deliver the 
thinking and leaders ready for the challenges of today and tomorrow.  
Drawing together examples from the Great War, to the 1982 Falkland’s War and beyond, examples 
can be found of challenges that naval historians warned of where fluctuating doctrine, overabundance of 
terminology and excessive, often unjustified, planning was due to the ‘parachuting’ of personalities and ideas 
from history to create strategy, tactics and doctrine with little or no evidence of understanding of these 
perspectives. This potentially resulting in the risk of a fundamental maritime disconnect, lackluster 
organizational self-reflection and reform just as historians have seen before. In recent times, these processes 
being no longer influenced by naval historians, has undermined the thinking environment and introduced 
numerous dangers such as rigidity into planning and doctrine, which could and has before, come back to 
haunt naval officers at critical junctures as events and changes in the world around them unfolded. This is in 
stark contrast to how the first pioneers of intellectual naval history, who’s actions prepared and influenced 
naval personnel, resulted in a cadre of forward looking officers such as John Fisher, Sims and Jellicoe who 
were equipped with the necessary qualities to meet the grand challenge of the First World War and ultimately 
how they could deliver victory.   
In contemporary times, historians, whose roles had been reduced in modern navies, started to 
ponder if ‘talking’ history and understanding history where two different methodologies that threatened the 
ability to deliver relevant inquisitive thinkers while ploughing historians, other academic disciplines and 
professionals into disagreement on the direction of naval education and wider spectrum of defense debates. 
This alternative approach convinced naval leaders and defense professionals by the 21st century to expect 
direct answers from history to modern issues whereas they could have been analyzing the subject in breadth, 
depth and context, just as Corbett and Mahan did over a century ago, to seek better understanding of our 
naval past and create the new solutions for the era they need to operate in. Laughton, Luce, Corbett, Mahan 
and others, melded perspectives on the sea as a strategic environment which in turn could deliver individuals 
who could innovate and think for whatever challenges they faced, rather than being placed in a system of 
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easily discredited and stagnating mantras where events, tempo of operations, tactics and technology may have 
already been over taken by unchallenged theory and practice. The more recent approaches resulted in 
ignorance to often uncomfortable and inconvenient similarities of challenges our forebears had faced and the 
isolation of the study of history. In addition to this, historians, past thinkers and leaders are regularly 
dismissed as products of their times or the eras they study, rather than being acknowledged as educators of 
the repository of naval experience and wisdom they guard for practitioners, thinkers, fighters, leaders and 
scholars alike, who should be all too often, inseparable.   
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PANEL 4: GEO-ECONOMICS AND MARITIME SECURITY 
 
MARITIME SECURITY: FROM PHYSICAL CONTROL TO ‘GEOECONOMIC 
ENDOWMENTS’ 
__________________________________________ 
 
Jennifer M. Harris 
Council on Foreign Relations 
 
 
It would be tempting to believe that a host of forces—many of them happy for the United States—lessens the 
U.S.’ overall economic and security rationale for picking up the world’s tab in securing maritime transit routes.  
After decades of relying on Middle East energy imports, the United States is now a net energy exporter. In 
fact, now sources around over 60 percent of its oil domestically; of what oil the U.S. does import, the overwhelming 
majority derives from the Western Hemisphere (primarily Mexico and Canada). Many of the energy producer nations 
(Iran, Saudi Arabia) once primed to disrupt either energy supplies or the transit lanes needed to move them to make a 
geopolitical point are now more economically reliant on those exports and shipping lanes than is the United States; 
this, together with an Iran Deal that President Trump seems inclined to keep, suggests that odds of intentional, state-
led disruptions from Iraq, Iran, and the Gulf States are lower than they have been in years.  
Looking eastward, the same holds true in Asia. China, now reliant on imports for close to 70 percent 
of its oil demand, is hardly looking for trouble in the transit routes that might threaten these imports. 
Likewise, China remains heavily dependent on these same routes for its exports, which still comprise some 25 
percent of Chinese GDP. Suffice it to say, no country stands to lose more from any threat impinging on 
maritime routes in Asia than China. U.S. allies in East Asia – especially Japan, Korea, Thailand and the 
Philippines—are finally stepping up their own naval spending, which should translate into greater ability to 
share in the burdens of policing the maritime commons in that region.  
Beyond the realm of state actors, the prolonged fall in oil prices, combined with savvy offensive 
strategy from the United States has contained piracy off the coast of Somalia down to more a moderate 
annoyance than a significant transit problem; even if outright eradication is too much to hope for, the U.S.’ 
regional partners can now come in, offering their support for a comfortable status quo (piracy off the coast of 
West Africa has remained more of a problem, albeit not one that poses the same caliber of threat to critical 
sea routes). ISIS, for all its threats, poses low risk of morphing into a maritime threat.  
More generally, the U.S. is far less reliant on trade as a percentage of its GDP than many other countries – 
especially many NATO countries (including Germany and the UK), Japan, and China—meaning that these 
countries have far more to lose from a disruption affecting maritime trading routes.  To the extent we do trade, it is 
far more in the realm of knowledge economy and technology services – much more the stuff of executives 
hopping planes and adding to frequent flier accounts than widgets crossing the seas in containers.  
On this view, then, the risks of disruption to critical supply routes are lower than in recent years, and 
the U.S. is better insulated from energy-related disruption that might occur than in decades.  
If only it were that easy….  
 
The reality of today’s global supply chain networks, together with China’s ability to gain near-monopoly 
control of certain industries at various points along a given supply chain – mean that the risks to these global 
trading patterns remain as great, in many cases greater, as ever; they have merely migrated upstream, 
occurring well before cargo or oil is ever loaded onto ships.  
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This in turn forces the U.S. to rethink some of its most basic operating assumptions animating its 
maritime security posture. Today, it is the reins that a given state holds over certain factors of economic 
production—or what I call “geoeconomic endowments” that matter most. I identify four such endowments:  
 
1. Ability to control outbound investment. First is a state’s willingness and ability to put domestic capital 
to geopolitical use—be it outbound portfolio investment or outbound FDI, debt or equity. Across 
several of today’s rising powers, governments control not just vast sums but a growing array of 
mechanisms for channeling this investment: state-owned investment vehicles for deploying reserve assets, 
sovereign wealth funds, state-owned banks, and state-owned enterprises, to name a few. These 
mechanisms also tend to be mutually reinforcing.  
 
2. Domestic market features (overall size; degree of control over one’s domestic market, both in dictating 
terms of entry and in controlling import levels from a given sector or country; asymmetries in economic 
relationships with other states; perceptions of future growth).  Size may still matter, but this is less true in 
geoeconomics than in traditional geopolitical and military realms. Singapore and Qatar are two of the 
strongest examples.1 Singapore punches far above its weight with its two primary SWFs, Temasek and the 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC), accounting for 60 percent of the $23 billion in 
cross-border deals by global SWFs in early 2014. Along with the country’s central bank, the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore, the two SWFs generate the financial returns necessary to sustain the tiny city-
state’s nearly $10 billion defense budget.2 Qatar—a country smaller in size than the state of Connecticut 
and with a population (of 260,000 citizens) on par with JPMorgan’s workforce—emerged as a pivotal 
player in nearly every violent revolution to unfold in the Middle East since 2011.3 
Beyond sheer size, sums, and growth rates, four more variables help explain a country’s ability to 
translate its domestic market into geopolitical leverage: ability to exercise uniquely tight rein over access 
to domestic markets, capacity to redirect domestic import appetites to make a geopolitical point, actual or 
perceived consensus that a country’s domestic market is too large to ignore (this, of course, especially 
applies to China and is merely a regional dynamic in the case of Russia), and a growth trajectory that 
makes other countries see rising future costs to opposing its foreign policy interests today. These so-
called ‘domestic market features’ are probably most relevant in determining how fruitful particular trade 
and investment policy and sanctions efforts will be in producing geopolitical benefits. 
 
3. Influence over commodity and energy flows. There are three basic variables that determine how 
successfully a country can, through its energy policies, influence its geopolitical standing: monopoly 
power (market ownership, as with OPEC members), monopsony power (purchasing power, as with the 
United States and China), and centrality as a transit point between major buyers and sellers (e.g., the Suez 
Canal, as a major international oil route, enhances Egypt’s strategic relevance). All three are undergoing 
serious shifts. The shale revolution generally, and the ascendance of the United States as a net energy 
exporter in particular, places new pressures on an already strained OPEC that could ultimately dissolve 
the cartel.4 As growing energy appetites in China, India, and elsewhere come to absorb sizeable shares of 
a given country’s exports—and as these deals take the form of multiyear bilateral contracts between 
states—this purchasing power can come with new sources of geopolitical leverage for the importing 
country. Consider the 2014 deal between Russia and China finalizing the terms of a thirty-year gas supply 
contract: it was Beijing’s purchasing power and geopolitical importance to Russia that ultimately gave 
China the upper hand, finally steering the agreement to completion after a decade of negotiations. Finally, 
long-standing transit arteries—the Panama Canal, the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, gas 
thoroughfares in central Asia—may become more or less strategically important as new sources of supply 
begin to redraw existing trade and demand patterns. 
 
EMC	Chair	Conference	Paper 
 
48 
The	views	expressed	in	this	paper	are	those	of	the	author	and	do	not	reflect	the	official	policy	or	position	of	the	Department	of	the	Navy,	
Department	of	Defense,	or	the	U.S.	Government.	 
 
4. Centrality to the global financial system (e.g., reserve currency status, some forms of financial 
sanctions).  The reason that the dollar’s global footprint carries greater geopolitical benefits for 
Washington than, say, the Peruvian nuevo sol does for Lima is the same reason that U.S. sanctions carry 
greater bite than would similar sanctions from Peru: a vast share of global transactions directly touch, or 
at least rely upon, the U.S. financial system in some way. But this is changing.5 Countries that have large, 
systemically vital financial sectors also tend to have a relatively easier time raising and mobilizing capital at 
low borrowing costs, and relatively greater ability to impact another country’s borrowing costs.6 At the 
same time, the link is easily exaggerated, as policy choices (e.g., fiscal health) and asymmetric 
dependencies (e.g., banking exposure) can of course also weigh heavily on a given geopolitical landscape. 
And again at the opposite end of this spectrum, North Korea has proven how a lack of financial market 
integration can be advantageous, at least for countries on the receiving end of geoeconomic coercion. In 
early 2015, after President Obama leveled new sanctions on North Korea following the cyberattack on 
Sony Pictures, U.S. Treasury officials privately admitted that their newfound power to implement 
sanctions would amount to little; their problem was not a lack of power but a dearth of targets. North 
Korea has shown itself highly resilient and creative in the face of sanctions, ironically aided by its own 
self-imposed isolation from global markets.7 
 
Notes: 
 
 
1 For commentary on how the geographies of capital, land, and labor shape Singapore (and neighboring Malaysia and 
Indonesia), see Matthew Sparke, James D. Sidaway, Tim Bunnell, and Carl Grundy-Warr, “Triangulating the Borderless 
World: Geographies of Power in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle,” Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 29, no. 4 (2004): 485–498. As illustrative commentary touting the geoeconomic prowess of Qatar, see, for 
instance, press reports surrounding the June 2014 prisoner exchange between the U.S. government and the Taliban, 
including Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt, David E. Sanger, and Helene Cooper, “Behind P.O.W.’s Release, Urgency and 
Opportunity: Concern for Health of Bowe Bergdahl Drove Prisoner Exchange,” New York Times, June 4, 2014: “At the 
same time, much of the fate of the administration’s strategy was now in the hands of Qatar, the tiny wealthy emirate that 
in recent years has used its riches to amass great influence in the Middle East and Central Asia.” 
2 Devadas Krishnadas, “Sovereign Wealth Funds as Tools of National Strategy: Singapore’s Approach,” CIWAG Case 
Study on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups, U.S. Naval War College, 2013; Jeremy Grant, “Singapore Leads the Pack 
in Sovereign Wealth Deals,” Financial Times, November 3, 2014; Jon Grevatt, “Singapore Announces SGD12.56 Billion 
Defense Budget,” HIS Jane’s 360, February 24, 2014; Dhara Ranasinghe, “Singapore, the Tiny State with Military Clout,” 
CNBC, February 9, 2014. 
3 Qatar was an early supporter of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, providing $8 billion in grants and loans to the 
short-lived Morsi government in Egypt. See, e.g., Khan, “The Gulf and Geoeconomics.” 
4 Selina Williams, “BP Says North America Shale Oil Boom Will Pressure OPEC,” Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2013; 
Clifford Krauss, “OPEC Split as Oil Prices Fall Sharply,” New York Times, October 13, 2014; “The Future of OPEC,” 
Forbes, December 5, 2013. 
5 As new financial hubs emerge, financial centers are becoming capable of transacting large-scale deals without requiring 
dollars or touching U.S. banks. Mike Bird, “Putin’s Revenge: Russia and China Try to End the Dominance of the 
Dollar,” Business Insider, November 10, 2014; Paoala Subachi and Helena Huang, “The Connecting Dots of China’s 
Renminbi Strategy: London and Hong Kong,” Briefing Paper, Chatham House and RUSI, September 2012. 
6 “International Finance System and Development, Report of the Secretary-General,” United Nations General 
Assembly, July 2014, www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/69GA_SGR_IFSD_AUV_250714.pdf. 
7 See Scott Snyder, “Sony Hack: North Korea’s Toughest Counteraction to Obama’s Proportional Response,” Asia 
Unbound blog, Council on Foreign Relations, December 24, 2014. 
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PANEL 4: GEO-ECONOMICS AND MARITIME SECURITY 
 
STRATEGIC MARITIME CHOKEPOINTS: GLOBAL SHIPPING AND MARITIME 
INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES 
__________________________________________ 
 
Rockford Weitz 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 
 
Although the world ocean covers over 70 percent of the globe, commercial shipping routes are remarkably 
concentrated.  Strategic chokepoints are narrow waterways where sea routes converge due to geography.  
Examples include the Malacca Straits, the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, and the 
Panama Canal. 
Global shipping companies do not view maritime chokepoints as strategically important, but rather 
as a geographic reality for their businesses.  In contrast, global port operators, bunkerers, ship repairers, and 
other maritime support services view having a physical presence at maritime chokepoints as a competitive 
advantage because such waterways create a geographic concentration of global shipping routes.  This paper 
examines why strategic chokepoints are important to certain maritime industries but not others. 
Over 90 percent of international trade is carried by sea, but global shipping and maritime industries 
have received little attention in scholarly journals and books, including those focused on maritime security.  
Martin Stopford has examined global shipping from a maritime economics perspective1 and Marc Levinson 
has written about how containerization reshaped the global economy.2  National Defense University’s 
Institute for National Strategic Studies has published insightful articles on strategic chokepoints, such as those 
by John Noer3 and Donna Nincic,4 but only Daniel Coulter’s piece on the rise of hub ports5 starts to provide 
the maritime industry perspectives offered by this paper. 
 
Global Shipping Industry 
 
The world’s commercial shipping industry is diverse and includes businesses ranging from container lines 
following a fixed schedule to bulk carriers transporting commodities, including wet bulk cargoes such as 
crude oil and refined petroleum products and dry bulk cargoes such as iron ore, coal, and grains.  
Furthermore specialized shipping companies transport heavy machinery, oil rigs, livestock, automobiles, and 
many other cargoes that cannot easily fit in 20-foot or 40-foot containers. 
For this paper, the most important difference among global shipping businesses is between container 
carriers, which operate a fixed liner schedule with planned stops at various container ports, and bulk carriers 
and specialized shipping companies, which often operate on demand.  Container shipping lines depend on 
reliable delivery times and face monetary penalties for delays within their control.  They operate in a global 
hub-and-spoke system of container ports, with large transshipment hub ports connecting to smaller regional 
container ports. 
In contrast to container lines, bulk carriers and specialized shipping companies usually operate on 
demand, carrying goods from one port to another, sometimes with stops a multiple ports.  Bulk shipping 
companies range from large to small and have diverse business models.  Some  
bulk ship owners operate their own vessels, while others charter their ships to vessel operating 
companies.  Certain bulk shipping businesses have long-term contracts with shippers, particularly in 
specialized bulk cargoes such as liquefied natural gas.  These bulk carriers with long-term contracts operate 
scheduled services similar to container lines. 
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In general, global shipping companies do not derive any competitive advantage from strategic 
maritime chokepoints.  Shipping lines operating a fixed schedule may have a minor business interest in having 
a physical presence at chokepoints, but only if there are limited transshipment ports in the general vicinity.  
Rather, the global shipping industry approaches strategic chokepoints as a geographic reality to take into 
account when planning voyages. 
 
Global Port Operators and Maritime Support Services 
 
Global port operators have consolidated over the last two decades and three companies now dominate the 
industry:  (i) Singapore-based PSA International, (ii) Hong Kong-based Hutchison Port Holdings, and (iii) 
Dubai-based DP World.  All three of these global port operators have invested in container terminals and 
transshipment hubs along the world’s strategic chokepoints.  Given the hub-and-spoke nature of 
containerized shipping, the geographic consolidation of global sea routes in strategic chokepoints presents a 
business opportunity and securing deep water ports near such waterways is a source of competitive 
advantage. 
Maritime service providers supporting the global shipping industry also derive competitive advantage 
by locating near maritime chokepoints.  Bunkering is one example.  Large cargo ships use bunker fuel, the 
least-refined variant of oil akin to asphalt.  Bunker fuel is a byproduct of oil refineries.  Due to easy access to 
numerous oil tankers, many large oil refining complexes have mushroomed near strategic waterways, such as 
in Singapore.  The Port of Singapore and the Port of Fujairah on the Arabian Sea coast of the United Arab 
Emirates are the world’s two largest bunkering ports, selling 42 million metric tons and 24 metric tons of 
bunker fuel, respectively, in 2015.6  Their strategic locations near the Malacca Straits and Strait of Hormuz 
provide a concentration of passing ships that require bunker fuel. 
 Modern shipyards compete on technical expertise, quality, price, and turnaround time. Geography 
remains a competitive advantage for ship repair and facilities providing routine ship maintenance.  Singapore 
has world-renowned ship repair and maintenance facilities, including companies such as Keppel and 
Sembcorp Marine.  Gibraltar also has a thriving ship repair sector, largely due to its geography near key 
shipping lanes. 
 There are numerous other maritime support industries, including freight forwarding, classification 
societies, insurance, financing, maritime law, and maritime arbitration.  On the surface, it would seem that 
these other industries would be unaffected by the geography of strategic chokepoints.  Administrative work, 
in theory, can be done anywhere in the Internet age.  But these other maritime support industries often 
gravitate toward seaports with proximity to global shipping lanes, including ports near strategic chokepoints. 
 
Conclusion 
 
At the dawn of the 20th century, Mahan recognized the strategic importance of key waterways as a means of 
facilitating the concentration of naval power.7  From a maritime industry perspective, the geographic 
concentration of global shipping through strategic maritime chokepoints is a business reality for shipping 
companies and a potential business opportunity and source of competitive  
advantage for global port operators and other maritime support services.  Perspectives from the global 
shipping and port sectors offer another way to analyze the strategic importance of maritime chokepoints.  
 
Notes: 
 
1 Martin Stopford, Maritime Economics (Routledge, 2009). 
2 Marc Levinson, The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger (Princeton 
University Press, 2006). 
3 John H. Noer with David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia (Institute for National 
Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996). 
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4 Donna J. Nincic, “Sea Lane Security and U.S. Maritime Trade: Chokepoints as Scarce Resources,” Chapter 8 in Sam J. 
Tangedi, Globalization and Maritime Power (Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2002).  
5 Daniel Y. Coulter, “Globalization of Maritime Commerce: The Rise of Hub Ports,” Chapter 7 in Sam J. Tangedi, 
Globalization and Maritime Power (Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2002). 
6 “6 Countries are Responsible for Almost 60% of All Bunker Sales.” Ship and Bunker. 
http://shipandbunker.com/news/world/608701-6-countries-are-responsible-for-almost-60-of-all-bunker-sales 
7 A.T. Mahan, The Problem of Asia and its Effect upon International Policies (London: 1900), 72. 
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PANEL 4: GEO-ECONOMICS AND MARITIME SECURITY 
 
U.S. SHALE IS BACK AND THE CRUDE MIGRATION TO THE EAST RESUMES 
__________________________________________ 
 
Sarah A. Emerson 
President, Energy Security Analysis, Inc. 
 
What a Difference a Year Makes 
 
At the end of 2014, Saudi Arabia, with its OPEC partners, opted to lift crude oil production and pursue 
greater market share in the face of rising U.S. shale production and the expected removal of sanctions on 
Iran.  By the end of 2015, crude oil prices had tumbled under $40, Saudi and Iraqi production had risen by 1.5 
million b/d, a nuclear deal was indeed struck, and Iran was gearing up to raise exports.  U.S. shale producers 
had worked furiously to cut costs and stay in business, but their production had finally crested and was 
declining. Ironically, in this market of low oil prices and falling U.S. production, the U.S. government lifted 
the ban on crude oil exports.  
 
Then a Quick Course Correction 
 
The low prices of 2015 persisted in 2016 and led Saudi Arabia and OPEC to reverse course, concluding an 
historic production deal that included Russia, cutting crude oil production by close to 1.5 million b/d. Crude 
oil prices rose a bit and stabilized around $50 as 2017 began.  
 
Resource Plenty 
 
Developments in the oil markets from the end of 2014 to the end of 2016 were dramatic, especially in terms 
of price, but with OPEC back in the role of swing producer there is a sense that these two years were little 
more than a discreet episode in the long history of the oil markets. That is not, however, an accurate 
interpretation.  The U.S. shale boom, the OPEC response, the unshackling of Iran, the investment in Iraq, 
and the ensuing period of low oil prices have revealed more clearly than ever the resource plenty that defines 
the oil markets. At the same time, the ongoing effort to mitigate air pollution locally and climate change 
globally are continuing to pull renewable fuels into power generation and making transportation more energy 
efficient, albeit perhaps not for the moment in the U.S. This means the expansion of global oil demand is 
slowing. Peak demand is an overstatement, but slowing demand growth is a certainty.  
 There are two implications of ample supply and weak demand growth. The first is that oil will stay 
relatively inexpensive absent a significant geopolitical event or events. Consuming countries will hang on to 
oil even if the pace of demand growth is slowing.  Oil’s place in the energy mix is a more secure than it was at 
$100 per barrel. The second is that oil investment will cluster in the sweetest spots with investment dollars 
pooling in the regions were costs are lowest. In short, oil will be an affordable source of energy that still 
requires waterborne transport between key production and consuming regions.  
 This is true not only for crude oil, but also for refined petroleum products. With modest demand 
growth and tremendous refining capacity across the globe, refining profit margins will remain under pressure. 
This means petroleum products will be made in the most efficient refineries in the regions with marginal 
crude price advantages, such as the United States and the Arab Gulf. The U.S. has become and will remain a 
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significant petroleum product exporters. Arab Gulf product exports are likely to grow. Even Asian countries 
may see their petroleum product exports grow. 
 
Impact on Waterborne Flows 
 
At a high level, crude oil flows will continue to shift from West to East as North America produces more 
crude oil and Asia does not. The story of crude oil imports being pushed out of the U.S. (and even Europe) is 
well known. With the lifting of the U.S. crude export ban and the slow expansion of pipeline capacity from 
Alberta, North America’s exports can only grow, not only backing out crude from the Atlantic Basin, but 
encouraging flows to other regions. If not for a bit of vertical integration in US refining, one could literally 
see the end of Middle Eastern exports to the U.S.  
 
How much crude ‘from” the U.S. 
 
The potential for higher U.S. crude exports complicates any estimate of crude oil flows backed out of the U.S. 
In 2016, the U.S. imported 7.875 million b/d of crude, according to the Energy Information Administration.1  
Crude oil exports averaged 520,000 b/d, but have been as high as 1.0 million b/d in early 2017. If we hold 
exports constant at 1.0 million b/d, then, given expected increases in U.S. crude oil production, crude oil 
imports can easily fall by 2.0 million b/d by 2025.2 The combination of exports and avoided imports means 
as much as 3.0 million b/d of crude oil will flow away from the U.S.  
 Higher Canadian crude exports will gradually be added to that as adequate pipeline capacity is built. 
By 2025, expansion of the TransMountain pipeline and the construction of either Keystone XL or Energy 
East will bring more crude to coastal ports. The more likely pipeline route is Keystone XL because it would 
carry Canadian crude to the US Gulf Coast refineries, contributing further to the backing out of crude 
imports described above. Exporting additional barrels  beyond the U.S. Gulf Coast is likely, but will remain a 
relatively small volume given the questionable economics of producing and transporting Oil Sands output 
longer distances. 
 
Where Do Latin American Crudes Go 
 
As U.S. imports fall, the sources of remaining imports will change. Exports from Mexico will rise as Mexico’s 
energy reforms attract foreign investment and lift production. Given the proximity of U.S. refineries, U.S. 
imports from Mexico should rise by at least 200,000 b/d by 2025. The rest of Latin America may not fare so 
well. Latin American production will rise enough to increase the flow to Asia perhaps by as much as 600,000 
b/d, but is unlikely to target the amply supplied U.S. market. Latin American flows to Asia are an additional 
volume leaving the Western Hemisphere. In sum the combined volume of backed out imports or additional 
exports from the Western hemisphere should be on the order of 3.6 to 4.0 million b/d by 2025. That 
represents a minimum of 2 additional tanker departures per day. Note, there are some very aggressive U.S. 
production estimates that hint at even bigger outgoing flows.  
 
Asia with a Target on its Back 
 
As barrels are diverted away from the Western Hemisphere, more African, Latin American and even North 
American crude will head East, looking for a market in Asia. The obvious question is how much can be 
absorbed there and what happens to the traditional suppliers in the Arab Gulf?  Asia’s net crude imports can 
easily rise by 3.0 million b/d by 2025. With crude oil sources other than the Arab Gulf sending at least 2.0 
million b/d, this leaves only 1.0 million b/d of Asian market share for the Arab Gulf producers. Over 10 
years, this is quite a small volume of annual growth, underscoring greater competition for the Asian market, 
which will encourage even softer crude oil prices.  
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 In sum, after a market hiatus in U.S. shale growth, recovering oil prices have led to new estimates for 
U.S. growth, indicating the resumption or acceleration of crude oil’s migration to Asia. Latin America, Africa, 
CIS, and the Middle East are all looking to Asia to absorb their plentiful supplies of crude oil. Asia certainly 
will grow its crude appetite, but within a global market of ample supply chasing modest demand.  In the 
meantime, greater volumes of waterborne petroleum products and liquefied natural gas will add to the 
transport of energy by sea. 
 
Notes: 
 
 
1 Petroleum Supply Monthly, multiple issues or EIA database 
https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/data.cfm 
2 Note, a VLCC tanker can hold about 2 million barrels, so this would impact one tanker per day. If 
a long-haul tanker voyage is 6 to 8 weeks, then the change in direction for tanker traffic would 
amount to anywhere from 42 to 57 tankers per day rerouted away from the U.S. by 2025. US 
exports of 1.0 million b/d would reroute another 21 to 28 tankers by 2025. 
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PANEL 5: TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION, AND FORCE STRUCTURE 
 
CONTEXT OF DESIGNING THE FUTURE FLEET 
__________________________________________ 
 
Philip Sobeck 
OPNAV N501 
 
	
Looking forward, it is clear that the challenges the Navy faces are shifting in character, are 
                   increasingly difficult to address in isolation, and are changing more quickly.  This will  
                      require us to re-examine our approaches in every aspect of our operations. 
- A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 
 
The world and its maritime domain are changing in profound ways.  Automation, digitization, the global 
commoditization of tech, a rising Asia, resource nationalism, expanding maritime infrastructure -- each is 
playing a role in redefining contemporary identities, values and associations of individuals and their nations.  
Each in its own right would be of historic consequence.  Combined, they may well lead to revolutionary 
change and a new era in geopolitical maritime affairs. 
What will this mean for the U.S. Navy and the Fleets it puts to sea?  It is impossible to predict with 
any precision, but that should not dissuade us asking, and where possible preparing, for the uncertainty ahead.  
For naval history teaches us one enduring certainty:  the United States is, by geography and character, a 
maritime nation with global interests.  And as long as there remains competition for those interests with other 
maritime nations, its naval officers must continuously look ahead for indicators of change in the character of 
that maritime competition and ask what that change could mean for how, who and where their reliefs will 
need to operate and fight in the future.   
The Navy, as a Fleet and as a bureaucratic organization, has been here before.  Those that have read 
Secretary Danzig’s 2011 report Driving in the Dark know that trying to predict the future for precise bets to 
make in national security will be a recipe for failure.  So what does The Design do differently?  It starts with the 
organization and a change from within.  A change that empowers new thought that is outside the current 
budget process.  Last fall, a new organization has been created to do just that: think outside the “linear” 
budget driven process.  The Navy staff has changed, and it has moved toward a strategy led vice budget led 
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process.  The change has led to an interdependent role for all of 
the staffs in OPNAV to support each other in a way that is driven from inside vice niche (one time) 
organizations that work outside of the day to day process.  The process if done correctly, creates a “fast” 
learning cycle that is agile enough to get it wrong, but not fail.      
The Future Fleet Design and Architecture (FFDA) 2045 Team has been asked to look ahead 28 years 
into the future, past the lifecycle of most present US Fleet assets.  It is an attempt to purposefully look far 
beyond the horizon and project the contours of a future operating environment that is presumed to be on the 
far side of the norm-shaping revolutions outlined above.  It asks, what do these changes suggest for how, 
who and where the future US Fleet will need to operate to sustain US maritime superiority in our next era?  
How will they reshape the means by which the next generation of US Sailors is tasked to deter threats to US 
interests at sea, project US power abroad, establish sea control when and where needed, advance maritime 
security in the global commons?  And finally, how do we design the future Fleet and adapt our Fleet 
architecture to assure they have the operational advantage from start to finish of any operation against any 
foreseeable adversary they may face. 
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Trends of the Future Operating Environment – Factors and Actors 
 
 
Those factors re-shaping the security environment include: 
- Global proliferation of high-end commercial and military technology, to include nuclear capabilities. 
- Demographic and environmental changes shifting global competition for resources. 
- Expansion of mobile and fixed international infrastructure. 
- Growing information interdependence among disparate global hubs of population and production. 
- New socioeconomic, demographic and environmental stresses on geographic borders and global 
maritime commons. 
 
Trends among actors in the geo-political sphere include: 
- Regional competitors pursuing and proliferating military capabilities to contest U.S. military and 
commercial freedom of access and maneuver; posturing to advance resource nationalism and 
geographic leverage; and innovating to augment state-sponsored coercive campaigns through cyber, 
information warfare, and grey/hybrid warfare. 
- Sustained geo-economic interconnectivity enabling developing state actors to rapidly mass 
commercial and military industrial economic capacity. 
- The resurgence of great-power geo-politics and imperial age posturing for relative geographic 
leverage.  
 
These trends delineate the array of factors and actors postured to usher in a new era of maritime 
competition and contest.  The competition will be shaped by factors of change in technology and resources, 
infrastructure and information, and borders and commons that impact the maritime domain.  The contest will 
be shaped by actors with sufficient military capabilities, economic capacity, and geographic leverage to shape 
the maritime domain. 
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PANEL 5: TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION, AND FORCE STRUCTURE 
 
FUTURE FLEET ARCHITECTURES: BUDGETARY, TECHNOLOGICAL AND 
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL RESTRAINTS ON FUTURE NAVAL STRATEGY 
__________________________________________ 
 
Peter Dombrowski 
U.S. Naval War College 
 
On the campaign trail Donald Trump proudly proclaimed that he would build a 350-ship navy.  Naval 
enthusiasts cheered loudly while skeptics wondered where the nation would find the resources to build the 
largest Fleet since the Reagan buildup in the late 1980s.  Existing plans proposed only to increase the size of 
the fleet from the current figure, 272, to 308 ships over the next thirty years.1  
 Even before candidate Trump shined the spotlight on the Navy, the service was, of course, planning.  
The Navy had released its latest vision statement, A Design for Maritime Superiority, in January 2016.2 It 
resoundingly defended the idea that the United States is a maritime nation and a premier naval power, 
specifically naming China and Russia as potential aggressors on the high seas.  It did not specify a target 
number of ships or other aspects of a future fleet. But conceptually it did justify the sort of growth proposed 
by Trump. Moreover, senior naval leaders, including Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Bill Moran 
were straightforward about the Navy’s needs, “One thing is clear, we will not be able to keep up this pace [of 
operations and deployments] forever unless something changes. Arguably, this involves a larger and more 
capable fleet, resourced to be ready and manned to win whenever the nation calls us into action.”3 
 During the last year of the Obama administration some members of Congress worried that 
sequestration and the Budget Control Act of 2011, had weakened naval readiness and discouraged many, 
including defense hawks, from contemplating the possibility that the Nation’s Navy was insufficient to meet 
maritime challenges posed by a resurgent Russian Navy and the China’s increasingly large and sophisticated 
PLA(N).  Encouraged by naval enthusiasts (navalists) like Representative Randy Forbes (R-FLA), then chair 
of Seapower and Power Projection Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, added language 
to the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act that mandated studies involving three alternative future fleet 
architectures.4 The Navy proposed its own alternative, while the Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessment and the MITRE Corp contributed independent studies.5 Interestingly, none of the three 
alternatives, propose anything like a 350-ship fleet by 2030.6 Rather they focus on new warfighting concepts 
(e.g., distributed maritime operations), types of platforms including unmanned systems and a revived arsenal 
ship (now the “magazine” ship), new technologies (line of sight communications using the Tern UAV), and 
various ways to maximize both the Navy’s forward presence (more forward basing) and its ability to defeat all 
potential foes. Capacity and fleet size are obviously not the same thing, despite the pundits’ focus on numbers 
of ships. 
 This essay will consider whether costs, technological and defense industrial factors will constrain the 
ability of the Trump build a 350-ship navy or some variant based on the Future Fleet Architecture alternatives 
produced by the U.S. Navy, CSBA and the MITRE Corp. 
 
Budgetary, Technological and Defense Industrial Constraints  
 
Before navalists assume that President Trump or the Navy will be able to deliver on campaign promises or 
the USN’s fondest hopes for a transformed naval force, it is important to look carefully some of the most 
significant obstacles to implementing alternative visions for a larger, more capable Fleet.  
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S&T and RDT&E.   
Each of the alternative architectures features several or more innovative platforms and systems that 
are either entirely notional or whose components will require substantial investments to bring them to 
fruition in the 2030-time frame. While these investments are smaller than acquisition and O&M costs 
addressed below, they are likely to be significant in view of the desired pace of change, the range of 
technologies and engineering challenges to be met, and the relative size of government and military S&T 
budgets. A full assessment of each architectures relative cost should examine these costs carefully. After all, if 
Congress does not provide sufficient S&T or RDT&E budgets, the risks to the USN’s future fleet will be 
high. Many necessary innovations are not even fully discussed by the three alternatives mandated by the 2016 
NDAA. For example, to make distributed operations possible and ensure that all the platforms and systems 
implied by the alternative architectures work as promised, will require vastly improved battle management 
systems.  Yet, experts agree that while relatively modest battle management innovations are in already in 
development a much broader and resource intensive effort will be required. In effect, the USN will ask for an 
architecture, which cannot be achieved without sustained investments in science, technology and engineering 
research.  
 
Acquisition.   
As a recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report analyzes in detail alternatives that rely on 
large increases in the number of platforms deployed over time will require significant and sustained increases 
in the top-end USN procurement budget.7 Moreover, nuclear modernization as currently envisioned (in terms 
of numbers and types of platforms and weapons (such as the SSBNX) will require and increasingly large share 
of USN procurement accounts unless Congress provides relief by creating a national, non-service budget for 
new nuclear systems.8 To implement any of the FFAs may require significantly more procurement funds than 
are currently available.  
This observation may understate the nature of the funding problems the USN is likely to encounter 
regardless of which of the existing FFA or some hybrid variant is chosen.  The reason is the new presidential 
administration, some members of Congress and some camps within the USN recommend that the future 
fleet reach 350 or 355 platforms. The CBO suggests that a fleet of this size will require procurement budgets 
60 percent higher than historical funding pinnacles. Aside from whether this level of funding is affordable for 
the American taxpayer, short of an enormous increase in overall defense spending, such a large procurement 
budget would almost assuredly result in reallocations amongst USN accounts or even more likely, the 
procurement accounts of the other Services. 
 
O&M and Sustainability.   
As the CNO and other military leaders have noted, sequestration and the Budget Control  
Act of 2011 (BCA) have reduced fleet readiness and led to deferred maintenance that may eventually reduce 
the service life of various naval platforms. Virtually all naval analysts recommend that the Fleet needs its full 
pre-BCA, budgetary authority restored-- just to restore fleet readiness over the coming years.  But this raises 
another important issue. If the FFA required larger numbers of platforms and greater numbers of sailors, 
there must be consequent increases in the USN readiness budget. Otherwise, the USN risks a hollowed out 
future force (with insufficient munitions in its magazine and shorter platform lives due to the cumulative 
effects of deferred maintenance) regardless of which independent architecture or hybrid variant is chosen. 
Moreover, larger numbers of platforms will increase political and budgetary pressure on the Navy, especially 
if the global security environment requires a high operating tempo in the maritime domain. In brief, will 
future congressional leaders be willing to maintain the O&M required to operate a substantially larger Fleet? 
The dangerous analogue here is to the fate of the so-called 600-ship Navy of the late-1980s. 
 
Personnel.   
Larger numbers of platforms, even if unmanned, generally require greater number of sailors to 
operate and maintain. In general, this remains true even given long-standing efforts to reduce manning (LCS 
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and various unmanned systems) and outsourcing various maintenance functions to civilian personnel 
including contractors. Although too complex for this short essay, relevant personnel issues include the ability 
to attract new recruits, the ability to retain highly skilled sailors and officers, the need to educate and train 
navy personnel in ways that differ from historical norms, and, finally, subsidiary issues like health care costs, 
retirement policies, and the full range of challenges in caring for navy families, especially given expected 
deployment lengths and more forward basing of ships, naval air, and shore support systems. 
 
Technological Feasibility 
 
Each of the three independent Future Fleet Architectures, any blended version or yet created alternative will 
rely on new technologies. In the face of uncertainties about how quickly these new capabilities will mature 
(even given reasonable large S&T and RDT&E budgets) and how successfully they can be should base its 
next Fleet Design on a careful analysis of the risk and rewards associated with the three Future Fleet 
Architectures. 
 
Risk.  
There are well-understood techniques for managing technical risk both within the DoD community 
and the commercial sector.9 Again, this issue is far too complex for a short essay so I will not examine risk 
directly with one exception—a simple observation. The wild card in naval procurement is that program 
advocates, vendors and members of Congress often have incentives (financial and political) to downplay risk. 
Thus, several suspect acquisition practices have been developed over the past two decades (i.e., spiral 
development).10 Further, procurement techniques have been used to acquire platforms before mission 
packages have been developed much less tested (i.e., LCS).  It is incumbent on the USN to make realistic, not 
optimistic assumptions—otherwise, especially, if fiscal constraints or technical difficulties arise with a specific 
platform or system, the future warfighter will be left to fight with a less capable force. 
 
Reward   
It does not appear that any of the existing FFA rely on, or propose, specific “war-winning” 
technologies or weapon systems. In these architectures, there are no equivalents to Jackie Fischer’s 
dreadnought class of battleship or Mitchell or Douhet’s extravagant claims for strategic bombers. FFA 
authors are quite modest about what they hope to achieve with their visions. In terms of technologies, for the 
most part each works a within the baselines laws of physics, economics and law.  This is significant because 
the American way of war is largely predicated on a system-of-systems approach that is predicated less on 
individual weapons or platforms than on the integration of many individual capabilities within the battlespace, 
the region, and, indeed, the entire world.11 It would be surprising if the three author organizations came up 
with a weapons system or even idea that was so powerful or unusual in its capabilities as to change the world 
as we know it.  
On the other hand, each FFA proposes a variety of often incremental technologies that offer, when 
aggregated, major rewards to the service and nation that manages to deploy them in sufficient numbers.  
Hence the rewards for assuming technological risk, as above, are great.  Traditional economists are quite leery 
of “picking winners;”12 rather they believe that market competition will sort out the successful from the 
unsuccessful. Unfortunately, for the USN, there is not market but rather the unforgiving “audit of war.”  
 
Defense Industrial Issues 
 
It appears to date that the naval industrial base is both ready and willing to support whichever future fleet 
architecture is chosen by the Navy. Indeed, if op-eds and paid analysts are to be believed, they are ready and 
willing to support the maximalist fleet architectures proposed by analysts outside the government or uttered 
by the President (e.g., 350 ships). As far as the analysis goes, this is largely true. It is obviously the case that 
shipbuilders, aircraft manufacturers, and the providers of the vast range of equipment, hardware and software  
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required to outfit a future fleet architecture will, for the right price, do what is required.13  
As a practical matter, there are several seldom acknowledged constraints on the ability of the naval 
Defense Industrial Base (DiB) to perform as advertised.  First is the question of timing.  Given the long 
period of yard consolidation, the one or perhaps two active American aircraft manufacturers, the existing 
number of shipyards, slips, and so forth place an upper limit on production, at least in the short term. In the 
long term, with enough money, the private firms and even the government can acquire the factories, machine 
tools and so forth necessary to increase the numbers of platforms coming of the lines. It should be 
mentioned, however, that the number of yards and the availability of production facilities may not even be 
the long pole in the tent.  As many experts have warned over the past two decades, we have a limited pool of 
experienced and highly trained workers (e.g. welders) available, especially to build the most technologically 
sophisticated platforms desired by several of the FFAs.  Industrial technology (like for example, robotic 
welding machines) offers a partial way out of the difficulty, especially once production rates rise high enough 
to achieve economies of scale, but again this will still increase the cost per unit and per program of the 
equipment and platforms purchased. 
The second DiB question is, of course cost. To varied degrees, each of the FFA makes efforts to 
reduce costs—the means vary from advocating for shifting the composition of the fleet (e.g. from smaller 
numbers of higher technology systems to larger number of lower technology and, it is hoped lower costs 
systems) to introducing larger number of unmanned systems on the (often) discredited theories that fewer 
sailors in the cockpit will save on personnel costs and, even, introduce the possibility that such platforms are 
expendable. Many of these assertions have yet to be proven, have been disproven by evidence dating back 
decades, or lead to unintended consequences (e.g., taking the man out of the cockpit sometimes leaders to 
higher accident rates, at least initially and/or the tooth-to-tail ration shifts—i.e. there is no one in the cockpit 
but the logistical chain required to maintain and operate an unmanned system may be greater and perhaps 
even more expensive). 
 Finally, DiB experts are familiar with and often joke about Augustine’s laws (Number 16 is that “In 
the year 2054, the entire defense budget will purchase just one tactical aircraft. This aircraft will have to be 
shared by the Air Force and Navy 3½ days each per week except for leap year, when it will be made available 
to the Marines for the extra day”). Joking aside the cost growth for individual naval systems is very real and 
any FFA should include cost as a criterion and consider how each alternative deals with DiB realities. 
Congress, the Obama administration and presumably the Trump administration have worked long and hard 
on acquisition reform; if past is prelude, they will continue to work on it without notable success. 
 
Conclusion 
 
An obvious but nagging question remains: what is the new fleet, whether 350-ships or some smaller number, 
complete with the full range of high technology capabilities for?  What great global threats or causes will 
justify spending a large portion of the $54 billion dollar increase in defense spending on new ships, naval 
aircraft, unmanned systems and all the sundry systems needed to operate a vastly expanded Navy?  The 
question nags especially because buying more ships and naval systems clearly will entail trade-offs.  The 
President’s budget proposes to offset new defense spending with similar cuts in non-defense, discretionary 
spending including foreign aid and the Environmental Protection Agency budget.14  
 The answers to the query remain unknown and are likely to remain mysterious for some time to 
come.  The Trump administration has not yet filled many of the key leadership positions in the Navy and the 
Department of Defense that would help transform the President’s campaign promises into action. 
In the end, then what is missing from the President’s vision of a 350-ship navy is an underlying 
strategy – one that links what is proverbially called the “ways, means and ends.”   Working outward, the 
national security community, the nation, and indeed America’s allies and adversaries need to understand the 
logic underlying any historic naval buildup.   A clear statement regarding of the primary the threats facing the 
US, the types of adversaries it will face, and the nature of future conflict would help explain why the  
American taxpayer is investing so much national treasure in the military service. 
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PANEL 5: TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION, AND FORCE STRUCTURE 
 
TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION, AND R&D ALIGNMENTS FOR ENHANCED 
RESEARCH TRANSITION 
__________________________________________ 
 
Isaac Maya, Ph.D., PE 
DHS S&T, Office of University Programs Detailee to the U.S. Coast Guard 
 
Given the accelerating pace of breakthrough technologies and paradigm-shifting innovation (T&I), the 
research and development (R&D) process must similarly be accelerated to leverage this T&I, and further 
developed to enable enhanced research transition into effective solutions for the military enterprise. This 
paper examines three forms of alignment necessary to achieve this enhancement, namely technical alignment, 
organizational alignment, and financial alignment. A fourth alignment, Legal/Contractual, is also necessary, 
but is the subject of a future paper. This paper also highlights the immense amount of R&D being conducted 
by Other Government Agencies (OGAs) external to an organization, but supporting its goals and needs, that 
is not being effectively leveraged due to the inability of the R&D community to make the case for the value 
of R&D. 
Whether called technology transfer, research transition, dual-use, commercialization, spin-off 
formation, or a number of other terms, the federal government is interested in demonstrating the value of 
research investments for the public good. With efforts in this area dating back to the late 1950s, DARPA 
probably has the longest history of technology transfer, in response to the 1957 Sputnik launch and other 
associated events, with a mission of making investments in “breakthrough technologies for national 
security.”1 Since 1964, NASA too has a long and successful history of technology transfer and spinoff 
formation, in response to a congressional mandate to facilitate the process.2 NASA’s technology transfer 
program is “focused on creating benefits for society through transferring the Agency’s inventions and 
innovative knowledge to outside organizations.”3 This focus was motivated by the “Presidential 
Memorandum -- Accelerating Technology Transfer and Commercialization of Federal Research in Support of 
High-Growth Businesses.”4 The NASA focus is in contrast to DoD’s, which is focused on developing 
technologies to support the warfighter or field dual-use technologies. 
To facilitate a quantitatively uniform discussion of R&D and technology transition, reference is made to 
the DHS Technology Readiness Level (TRLs).5 Originally developed in 1974 by NASA researcher Stan 
Sadin6, the TRL definitions have evolved over the years, reflecting increased understanding, greater 
sophistication and advanced applications of the TRLs by R&D transition practitioners from the various 
agencies, such as DARPA, NASA, and others. Given the diversity of these efforts across government 
agencies, it is no surprise that the pathway from research to transition also varies widely. A summary of 
transition programs and planning tools is provided in Manager’s Guide to Technology Transition in an 
Evolutionary Acquisition Environment.7 Importantly, 
DOD has long noted the existence of a chasm between its science and technology community and its 
acquisition community that impedes technology transition from consistently occurring. This chasm, 
often referred to by department insiders as “the valley of death,” exists because the acquisition 
community often requires a higher level of technology maturity than the science and technology 
community is willing to fund and develop. In 2007, DOD reported  
that this gap can only be bridged through cooperative efforts and investments from both communities, 
such as early and frequent collaboration among the developer, acquirer, and user.8 
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This paper supplements previous studies of research transition by examining the additional factors of 
R&D alignment necessary to achieve enhanced research transition success. Specifically in this effort, 
enhanced research transition success means increased use of R&D outputs, whether software, hardware,  
technology and/or knowledge products, by the intended warfighter, regardless of whether an R&D 
project’s output is otherwise commercially viable, licensed by an industrial partner for dual use, or spun-off 
completely for other non-military uses. 
This study has identified three forms of alignments and coordination to guide the “early and frequent 
collaboration among the developer, acquirer, and user”9 that are necessary for maximizing R&D transition 
success, and developed challenges and options for R&D project selection process implementation 
consideration as described below.  The three forms of alignments and coordination studied in this effort are: 
o Technical Alignment of all applicable R&D projects, including both a) projects internal to the 
organization, and b) externally funded R&D programs, both sources being presented with the same 
clear organizational strategies, requirements, needs and gap (RNGs) targets, developed using 
quantifiable metrics. 
o Organizational Alignment, both a) within and across the extended organization’s divisions and 
components, as well as b) with the external organizations’ management structures conducting the 
relevant external R&D. 
o Financial Alignment to a) merge and synchronize with government funding cycles and processes, 
and b) cost data gathering and allocation across the organizational missions, assets and activities to 
enable return-on-investment (ROI) and benefit-cost ratio (BCR) calculations and assignments to 
specific programs, projects and results. 
It is also worth repeating that the fourth alignment of the legal/contractual issues associated with R&D 
projects should also be addressed in their early stages. 
 
To overcome technical alignment challenges, an organization would benefit from 
o Improved development processes for and better-defined RNGs, as these serve as the targets for the 
R&D projects to address; 
o Increased analytical, modeling and simulation (M&S) support for project impact and ROI/BCR 
evaluations and ranking processes; 
o Increased use of metrics, Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), both performance-based and BCR-
type, with appropriate decision-making visualization dashboards; 
o Integrated/increased use of data science methods in evaluations, M&S analyses, rankings and 
decision-making. 
 
To overcome organization alignment challenges, an organization would benefit from 
o Quantitatively developing the case for the value of R&D to improved operations and decision-
making; 
o Demonstrating the value in organizational communication of needs and “buy-in” for the supporting 
effort and resource investment needed to conduct and improve review and evaluation of ideas; 
o Demonstrating the value obtained from leveraging external R&D; 
o Demonstrated examples of how R&D has been / is being applied and used; 
o Quantifying the value to the organization of transition success. 
 
To achieve financial alignment, an organization would benefit from 
o understanding the time scales for the phases of project solicitation, review and ranking, selection and 
budgeting across the candidate participating OGAs with relevant external R&D programs; 
o organizing its own cost data collection efforts to support their subsequent use in ROI/BCR 
calculations of effectiveness; 
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o increased and more refined use of Metrics, M&S and Data Analytics to make the “Case for the 
(Financial) Value of R&D”. 
It is important to note that financial alignment data is essential to supporting the above-listed technical and 
organizational alignments. 
 
The Federal Government’s investment in R&D is large and distributed among numerous agencies.  
The total R&D funding greatly exceeds that focused strictly on the warfighter’s needs.  Thus, there is 
generally a very large upside potential for leveraging external R&D. However, the effort to leverage R&D is 
very labor-intensive, requiring intensive literature review and searching, researcher and leadership contacts 
and outreach, cultivation of relationships, matching to organizational RNGs and their corresponding 
organizational alignment personnel, etc. The relative magnitude of R&D investments internally versus 
externally should motivate allocation of internal resources specifically directed to this external outreach and 
leveraging effort, which could then yield extraordinarily high returns. 
 
 
Notes: 
 
 
1 http://www.darpa.mil/about-us/about-darpa , accessed February 2017. 
2 http://spinoff.nasa.gov/about.html , accessed February 2017. 
3 http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/709314main_NASA_PLAN_FINAL.pdf , accessed February 2017. 
4 The White House, “Accelerating Technology Transfer and Commercialization of Federal Research in Support of High 
Growth Businesses,” Presidential Memorandum, October 28, 2011. 
5 https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Product%20Realization%20Guide.pdf  (2013), accessed 
February 2017. 
6 https://www.nasa.gov/topics/aeronautics/features/trl_demystified.html  , accessed February 2017. 
7 DoD, “Manager’s Guide to Technology Transition in an Evolutionary Acquisition Environment,” Defense Acquisition 
University Press, Fort Belvoir, VA, 2005. 
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DALEK DYAD: THE TWONESS OF TECHNOLOGY 
__________________________________________ 
 
Scott M. Smith 
PCU Michael Mansoor (DDG-1001) 
 
 
Our Profession’s ability to incorporate technology should be viewed through the lens of today’s larger societal 
technological trends. Numerous studies have examined technology’s economic effects; historically, these 
studies showed increased productivity and job creation, but more recent analyses are finding wage stagnation 
alongside productivity gains. This apparent dichotomy is, in part, the product of the so-called “Second 
Economy” where transactions occur without human intervention.  
Other studies have examined interpersonal dynamics and found that as technology becomes more 
anthropomorphically humanlike, an Uncanny Valley1 exists in which people find the interactions simply 
“too creepy.”  One of the most interesting hypotheses to emerge from this line of research is the Threat to 
Human Distinctiveness, which opines that lifelike robots “…trigger concerns about the negative impact of 
this technology on humans, as a group, and their identity more generally because similarity blurs category 
boundaries, undermining human uniqueness.”2    
This paper extends the Threat to Human Distinctiveness Hypothesis to examine the element of trust 
as an existential consideration for our Profession. In this view, our ability to embrace future technology will 
ultimately depend less upon how we define war and more about how we define ourselves. 
In Philip Dick’s book The Defenders, the Leadies - robots built to wage war on behalf of mankind - 
conduct an analysis of war to determine its purpose. Their sole finding: war is a human need.  
As a computer replaces much of his crew to operate and fight the USS ENTERPRISE, the fictional 
CAPT Jim Kirk ponders the meaning of command in this brief soliloquy: “There are things men must do to 
remain men.”   
This ubiquitous theme, from Frankenstein to Dr. Who, is emerging in our profession as we seek a 
Third Offset Strategy. While still lacking coherence, this strategy’s pursuit of revolutionary technologies is 
well understood. Technology is welcomed as a means to deliver consistent outcomes at ever-decreasing costs 
while simultaneously imposing costs on our adversaries. When compared to lifecycle personnel costs – 
recruiting, retention, sustainability through health care and pensions – there is a lot to like. 
At the tactical level, where users interact with technology daily, there is a very different range of 
reactions. Automated systems, where the output is always the same based on if/then logic, potentially 
threaten the livelihood of those with particular skillsets. Autonomous systems, on the other hand, make 
determinations about multiple outcomes based on probability calculations and thus more closely resemble 
human decisions. Despite the overwhelming evidence that human decision-making is laced with biases and 
heuristics that often produce suboptimal outcomes, we deem this process as the sole purview of humanity. 
Autonomous systems therefore become existential threats to our Profession because they attack what makes 
us distinct. 
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This variance between the strategic and tactical levels in the efficacy of technological solutions reveals 
an inverse relationship to that of interpersonal trust (Figure 1). Surveys completed by the Army War College 
for more than 30 years consistently find that trust is proximate: the more distant the relationship (e.g. a 
private’s relationship to a general officer), the less trust exists between the two.  
 
The findings of greater trust in closer proximity is also consistent with the threat to human 
distinctiveness hypotheses. At the tactical level, there is a homogeneity of purpose, be it mission or survival, 
which each person subscribes to. Homogeneous behaviors follow: to protect each other for each other’s sake, 
not for the general or the admiral. The unwillingness to distinguish outcomes from valorous behavior drew 
the ire of many during the drone warfare medal rollout.  
A friend and colleague penned a piece wherein he noted the wisdom and need of the medal, 
but questioned its precedence above the Bronze Star. He wrote,  
Capt Dick Winters, of Band of Brothers fame, earned a silver star for his actions to silence the guns 
at Brécourt Manor in June of 1944. The remainder of his team earned bronze stars. They thrust 
bayonets into the beating chests of an enemy intent on skulling them with a rifle, shovel, or rock and 
watched their sweat-soaked friends bleed out and turn cold in nameless, muddy fields….  
In the end, we should be wary of what the [Drone Warfare] medal signals. Culture is changed with 
rewards and punishments. There are those that accuse our largely sedentary and overweight society 
of pursuing sanitized push-button warfare for fear of taking casualties. They accuse our Profession of 
lacking the will to locate, close with, and engage the enemy. Do we really want to say to the men and 
women who wear the uniform, the citizens we protect, the allies with whom we partner, and the foes 
looking for chinks in our armor that a medal is more important than mettle itself? 
 
In short, an acknowledgement of technology’s effectiveness was surpassed by the need to 
acknowledge our humanness. It is this very definition of who we are that slows the acceptance of technology, 
especially technology that approximates human attributes – either real or perceived. Understanding this fact 
yields a few general guidelines for avoiding the uncanny valley of military technology:  
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1) Place revolutionary technologies on alternative platforms to avoid the bias towards legacy systems; 
2) Introduce revolutionary technologies that accomplish different missions or approach an existing mission in 
an entirely different way; and, 
3) Screen those who would work alongside the technology to determine their level of acceptance/resistance 
to technology.  
 
 The Daleks from Dr. Who lost their distinctiveness as a species in pursuit of greater combat 
efficiency. As we continue to gain insights from technology’s impact on society, more guidelines will likely 
emerge that create the distinction between the man and the machine. Our profession demands that we 
remember war is a human endeavor and that technology is a means, not an end.  
 
Notes: 
 
 
1  Mori, M. (2012). The uncanny valley (K. F. MacDorman & Norri Kageki, Trans.). IEEE Robotics and Automation, 
19(2), 98–100. 
2 Ferrari, F., Paladino, M.P. & Jetten, J. Int J of Soc Robotics (2016) 8: 287. 
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PANEL 6: SEA CONTROL 
 
PREPARING TO GO AND REMAIN IN HARM’S WAY AGAIN 
__________________________________________ 
 
Rear Admiral Chris Parry, CBE (Royal Navy) 
University of Reading 
 
 
In 1944, fast carrier task force and task group concepts and operations enabled the U.S. Third and Fifth 
Fleets to assert sea control at will and for extended periods not only around themselves, but also in sustaining 
a defensive zone within which other tasks, such as massed air attack against the land, amphibious assault and 
surface action, could be undertaken. U.S. carriers had previously been obliged to raid Japanese positions and 
then depart rapidly before being exposed to retributive attack by enemy land-based air and other sea-based 
assets. Conversely, in the Falklands conflict of 1982, British carriers were unable to assert continuous sea 
control around the islands and had to settle for episodic sea and air control, limited in time and place, that 
supported specific tasks, such as amphibious assault and the support of land operations.  
The prospect today is that sea control and access will be threatened by states (notably, but not 
exclusively, China, Iran and Russia) and sub-state groups that will attempt to contest the freedom of the seas, 
both for geo-political and economic advantage. The navies of the United States and its allies will be 
confronted by state-based, hybrid and irregular opponents, acting in both conventional and asymmetric ways. 
On the one hand, state-based opponents will deploy progressively more sophisticated platforms and systems 
designed to deter entry into designated sea space by all but the most capable navies and to provide coercive 
options. Meanwhile, irregular actors, hybrid opponents and status quo rejectionists are likely to benefit from 
technology leakage and capable systems acquired from both failing and flailing states. The situation will be 
complicated by the increasing prevalence of unmanned and disruptive applications, allowing both regular and 
irregular opponents opportunities to conduct attacks in all environments, with the advantages afforded by 
anonymity and deniability. Together with the introduction of networked and distributed concepts of 
operation, these will blur familiar spatial boundaries and concepts. 
In this environment, most operations, especially involving presence and power projection, are likely 
to involve ‘encounter’ actions in the margins of disputes or claims to jurisdiction and sovereignty. They are 
likely to take place between primarily between individual units, both in the air and at sea. This means that 
individual units will need to have the capability and confidence, in terms of systems and training, to stand toe-
to-toe with their counterparts in the navies of potential opponents. In cases of escalation, they will also need 
to have the ability, proportionate to the threat, to choose ‘fight’ or ‘flight’ once the ‘fright’ reflex has been 
activated and to call on and coordinate reinforcement if they are to stand their ground in maintaining 
presence. In future, this back-up will probably take the form of direct, but more distant group support or be 
derived from new concepts associated with ‘distributed lethality’. In the meantime, the doctrinal thrust for 
detached units will need to reflect the motto, ‘if it floats, it fights’, with the presumption that readiness levels 
of all combatants must be maintained at a high level. The contrasting fortunes of USS MASON and the 
HSV-2 SWIFT when faced by separate missile attacks by hybrid opponents off the coast of Yemen in 
October 2016 graphically demonstrated the validity of this approach in relation to individual units.  
 
Three further considerations are relevant. Each ‘encounter’, especially in state-on-state 
confrontations, will be viewed, both by the countries concerned and the international media, as an indicator 
of national prestige and commitment to the objectives at stake. Secondly, sea control and presence is likely to 
 
EMC	Chair	Conference	Paper 
 
69 
The	views	expressed	in	this	paper	are	those	of	the	author	and	do	not	reflect	the	official	policy	or	position	of	the	Department	of	the	Navy,	
Department	of	Defense,	or	the	U.S.	Government.	 
 
impose disadvantageous cost ratios on the US and its allies in deterring and defeating the range of anti-access 
and area denial systems that they are likely to have to face. When scarce dollars (and pounds) and opportunity 
costs are involved, this aspect needs addressing with some urgency if the political will to commit naval and 
other forces in encounter actions is to be sustained. The opportunities presented by novel technologies, such 
as directed energy, offer possibilities in this regard.  
To be credible, sea control capabilities will demand a range of active and passive defensive systems, 
capable of dealing with the diverse capabilities of likely opponents and confrontational situations that seem 
certain to proliferate. Gun and missile systems need to be capable of intercepting threats at sufficient range to 
prevent damage or catastrophic loss, but it is doubtful whether most naval systems are proof against the air, 
surface and sub-surface launched missiles that are already deployed by potential opponents and peer 
competitors, especially when fired in salvoes. Similarly, current decoys, design features (characterized as 
‘stealth’) and active counter-measures, such as electro-magnetic disruption, have only limited effect. New 
applications, principally involving off-board, unmanned and stealth technologies need to be explored and 
implemented, including the use of semi-submersible hull forms, electronic disruptors and swarming decoys. 
These considerations make modularization, allowing tailored mission packages of personnel and equipment, 
as well as regular technology insertion to cope with innovation and invention, increasingly attractive. 
Nevertheless, for a fighting service, an understanding is required among political authorities and public 
opinion that individual platforms must be considered ‘lose-able’, if they to be ‘use-able’ in situations involving 
marginal risk and brinkmanship. 
Finally, there will be a pressing need to gain definitive technical intelligence about the systems and 
platforms of likely opponents while denying them access to the parameters and capabilities of our own 
technologies, with which we have been notably profligate since the end of the Cold War. We also need to 
understand the concepts and tactics that accompany opponents’ systems, while concentrating on what 
potential opponents could do rather than we judge they intend to do – a key lesson from the Pacific in World 
War II. As the Naval War College report into the disaster at Savo Island in August 1942 assessed: ‘A 
commander, in making his plans, should follow the method of enemy capability rather than the method of 
enemy intentions […] which has been discarded by the United States Armed Forces’.1  We must also seek 
counters to the latent, but potent potential of electro-magnetic interference and disruption of our networks 
and systems alongside the familiar cyber threat, while improving our own offensive capabilities in these areas. 
All in all, it is time to mine the corporate memory about how operations at sea used to be conducted 
during the Cold War, with its overriding commitment to containment, forward presence and defence in 
depth. Depending on individual situations, our future aspirations for sea control are likely to lie somewhere 
between that demonstrated in the Pacific in World War II and in the Falklands. Success will depend on the 
political will, the level of resource allocation and the degree of technological superiority that can be 
maintained in relation to opponents. Most importantly, the burden of maintaining access in a rules-based 
international system, in the face of states seeking to subvert both the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and the Grotian concept of the freedom of the seas, cannot be left simply to the United States, in 
terms of either political commitment or capability investment. All those countries that have an interest in the 
sea as the primary strategic medium for access and exchange will need to step up to the plate, assist in 
conducting freedom of navigation transits and deploy capabilities that will enable them to provide persistent 
presence where there is risk. Our politicians also need the will to send them there. 
 
Notes: 
 
1 Commodore Richard W. Bates, USN (Ret) and Commander Walter D. Innis, USN, The Battle of Savo Island August 9th, 
1942, Strategical and Tactical Analysis, Part 1 (Newport RI: Naval War College, Department of Analysis, 1950), p. 348. 
Spruance in a letter to E. B. Potter stressed that ‘We found that there had been a tendency to decide what an enemy was 
going to do and lose sight of what he could do. I have seen just this happen in fleet problems at sea, and it is very 
dangerous’. 
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PANEL 6: SEA CONTROL 
 
THE U.S. NAVY AND THE FUTURE OF SEA CONTROL: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
__________________________________________ 
 
Peter D. Haynes 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 
 
How the Navy adapted to the immense strategic, operational, technological, and political challenges of the 
Cold War and the post-Cold War shaped a distinctive way of thinking about U.S. naval strategy and sea 
control, which will structure how the Navy is defining and solving the problems associated with sea control, 
which, in turn, will shape what new technologies, operational concepts, and doctrine are researched, 
developed, and operationalized and which ones, however promising, are moved to the margins of 
institutional consideration. 
For the first time since the Cold War, the U.S. Navy has to contend for control of the seas. 
Operationally, the challenge is how to address the anti-access/area denial systems employed by China, Russia, 
and Iran. Strategically, it is about how to confront the rise of a revisionist China as a maritime power, one 
capable of deploying a powerful and far-ranging fleet built to deny U.S. regional access, ensure China’s access 
to its resources, and protect its global commercial empire—and, in time, project power around the globe. For 
the United States, sea control—the ability to use the seas while denying the adversary the same—is 
indispensable. It is a prerequisite if the United States wants to employ its unique ability to project power 
globally to protect its security and economic interests and maintain leadership of its rules- and alliance-based 
international system.  
However, the long lee of the post-Cold War era left the Navy unprepared materially and conceptually 
to address the problem of ensuring sea control in an era of great power competition. In the post-Cold War 
era, precision strike warfare lay at the heart of the Navy’s strategic approach and was fiscally supported as 
such. In contrast, sea control was marginalized. Skills that had been honed over the Cold War atrophied, 
while many of the capabilities needed for sea control withered. While the United States was engaged in wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, China, Russia, and Iran, among others, caught up technologically and began fielding 
access-denial capabilities to offset the United States’ ability to project power.  
As the gap between what the fleet has and what it needs to ensure sea control widens, Navy leaders 
have elevated sea control’s standing and some have organized plans to close that gap. However, in a period 
marked by fiscal constraints (compounded by the need to fund the expensive recapitalization of the SSBN 
and carrier fleets) and the rise of a illiberal, revisionist great power capable of contesting the seas—all of 
which is bringing about a reappraisal of U.S. naval strategy—finding institutional consensus on how to close 
that gap may prove difficult.  
As it did in the 1970s, when the Navy was dealing with a remarkably similar set of issues, the attempt 
by Navy leaders to rebalance the fleet for a greater emphasis on sea control may ignite a debate within the 
Navy, particularly between the advocates of sea control and power projection. At issue during such a debate 
would be how much of the fleet’s portfolio of capabilities should be rebalanced for sea control and what 
concepts the fleet would employ to ensure sea control. Much of that determination rests on how the Navy 
will operationally relate and therefore programmatically prioritize the capabilities and weapons systems of the 
essential elements of sea control—undersea warfare, strike warfare, surface warfare, electronic warfare, mine 
warfare, and ISR.  
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The determination also rests on how the Navy manages the competition for resources between its 
warfare communities—surface warfare, submarines, aviation, and NSW. Historically, decisions on platforms 
and weapons systems have not been based on a holistic long-term plan coordinated across the communities. 
Those decisions are presented to Navy leaders when the need arises and are made on the merits of the case at 
hand. In the absence of a plan, day-to-day programmatic decisions tend to be shaped more by shared 
institutional beliefs and assumptions that underlie decisions on how fleet should be balanced, employed, and 
rationalized, which is how Navy leaders understand “naval strategy.” 
At issue would also be how much of the funds needed to close the gap would come at the expense of 
the Navy’s other primary missions—strategic deterrence (i.e., SSBN), forward presence, and power 
projection. During the Cold War, funding for strategic deterrence and forward presence were largely 
unassailable—and remains so. As the nation’s only survivable second-strike platform, the SSBN was the 
United States’ primary means of deterring the Soviets, and was fiscally supported by the administrations as 
such, and continues to be. For its part, forward deployment was and remains an institutional imperative. Its 
members understand “operations” as the Navy’s raison d’être. Tying up the fleet in port threatens not only 
the institution’s relevance, but also the fleet itself; forward presence requires three ships to keep one deployed 
overseas. 
Consequently, in times of fiscal constraint and strategic reappraisal, Navy leaders had to make hard 
decisions between sea control and power projection capabilities, which were shaped by assumptions and 
beliefs on how the fleet should be employed and balanced. The Navy had emerged from the Second World 
War with a distinct style of warfare that shaped and was reshaped by its Cold War experiences. The style was 
not the sea control-oriented one used to win the Battle of the Atlantic in the Second World War, which did 
not require a broadly capable, and a balanced, carrier-centric fleet (balanced in the sense that it included air, 
surface, and subsurface forces) nor did it require Marines to seize territory.  
Instead, the style that emerged from the Second World War was the offensive-minded power-
projecting one that enabled victory in the institution’s seminal event, the Pacific War against Japan. As the 
Navy learned during the Pacific War and throughout the Cold War, a balanced, carrier-based fleet 
demonstrated unprecedented versatility across a much broader range of missions than one based on 
battleships, for instance, or one designed for nuclear retaliation or sea control. It packed far more striking 
power and longer-ranging firepower and offered more range, mobility, and flexibility than any fleet before. 
While battleships, submarines, and carriers can clear the seas, only the latter can fully exploit control of the 
seas.  
In the late 1960s, the Soviets deployed a large and powerful fleet designed for sea denial and nuclear 
retaliation. The Soviet naval threat and the need to recapitalize the U.S. fleet in a period of fiscal austerity 
brought about a reappraisal of naval strategy, which meant trading power projection capabilities for sea 
control capabilities, which, in turn, set off a fierce decade-long debate inside the Navy. On one side were 
those that advocated for a sea control-centric fleet, and saw the Navy’s purpose in terms of general war. On 
the other were the proponents of carrier-based power projection, fresh off of their Vietnam experience, who 
argued to maintain a fleet comprised of flexible and adaptable—yet expensive—multi-mission platforms, a 
fleet optimized to be effective across the spectrum of conflict, not just general war. 
Perhaps because it is so pervasive, the influence of the Navy’s experiences in the Cold War  
and post-Cold War era on its institutional thinking on strategy, emerging technologies, and 
operational concepts tends to escape notice. In general, the Navy is far from having mastered its Cold War 
and post-Cold War experiences. If the Navy is so inclined to study history, it could apply its lessons to more 
effectively address how to deal with institutional as well as operational challenges to ensure control of the 
seas. One can, however, be certain that how the Navy has approached sea control in the past will not escape 
the notice of its rivals.  
 
	
 
 
EMC	Chair	Conference	Paper 
 
72 
The	views	expressed	in	this	paper	are	those	of	the	author	and	do	not	reflect	the	official	policy	or	position	of	the	Department	of	the	Navy,	
Department	of	Defense,	or	the	U.S.	Government.	 
 
 
 
PANEL 6: SEA CONTROL 
 
COMMONS CONTROL AND COMMONS DENIAL: FROM JAM-GC TO AN 
INTEGRATED PLAN 
__________________________________________ 
 
Sam J. Tangredi 
U.S. Naval War College 
 
The ability to access and freely utilize the global commons is the primary enabler of the globally-deployable 
military power of the United States.  It is also, not coincidentally, the key facilitator of international trade and 
the source of global prosperity.  An opponent with the capability to significantly degrade or deny American 
use of the global commons could impede the ability to deploy U.S. military forces, challenge the future 
prosperity of the United States, and reduce U.S. political and economic influence throughout the world. 
 
Defining the Commons 
 
The global commons are the spaces and dimensions on, above, or throughout the earth which are the 
territory of no one nation, but can be used by all in accordance with international law and political custom.  
Global commons are usually defined in a legal sense.  However, they can be functionally defined as mediums 
humans use for communications, transportation and commercial and information exchange, but cannot 
normally inhabit.1   
The most physically accessible global commons are the oceans, which include the air above it, as well as most 
(but not all) of the seabed below it.  Airspace is a commons only above the oceans, which is why it is 
considered a part of the maritime commons rather than a separate dimension.  Beyond the oceans, outer 
space (once termed “ocean space”) is also a global commons, but is obviously less physically accessible.  
Cyberspace can conceptually be considered a global commons, but is obviously not physically accessible even 
if it utilized by more individuals than the others, albeit for information exchange rather than trade, discovery, 
or the transport of military forces.2 
 
Access and Control Today 
 
Fortunately, no single nation today has the capability to significantly challenge U.S. access to the global 
commons—in which access to the maritime commons is the most critical—except in regions close to their 
national periphery, utilizing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies. 
Anti-satellite weapons could interfere with U.S. dominance in space, but it is still difficult to deny general 
access.  Cyberattacks could interfere with U.S. use of the internet, but again, although damaging in the near 
term, U.S. vulnerabilities in this dimension are the result of choice and convenience.  Not only is U.S. access 
to the commons difficult to deny, U.S. ability to exert “control” over these commons and deny their use to 
others—through its global naval, space launch, and coding and information technology management 
capabilities—remains largely unequalled.       
This is a long-standing reality that has become a modern assumption and military tradition.  In the Second 
World War, Imperial Japan could initially deny U.S. access to the maritime commons of East Asia, but it 
could not prevent the U.S. from deploying its forces into the Western Pacific and  
building up its power to eventually break through the Japanese wall of islands.3  During the Cold War, Soviet 
forces attempted to deny U.S. access to it maritime periphery and postured some forces (such as in Cuba) that 
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could interfere with direct U.S. access, but it could not sustain the Soviet Navy on a globally-deployed basis.  
(Access to space also remained unchallenged until the development of anti-satellite weapons late in the Cold 
War.) 
Current U.S. military dominance of the commons is demonstrated by the fact that (for example) it 
can contest the People’s Republic of China’s efforts at sea control/sea denial within the so-called first island 
chain—extending roughly 500-800 nautical miles from mainland China, but the People’s Liberation Army-
Navy. Missile and Air Force cannot contest the movement of U.S. forces from Hawaii to Guam—roughly 
4000 nautical miles—or from San Diego to Guam—roughly 6000 nautical miles.  U.S. naval forces also 
possess the power to prevent the PLAN and Chinese maritime commerce from transiting beyond the first 
island chain, effectively cutting it off from the majority of the maritime commons.  This “command of the 
commons” is the source of, in the words of MIT professor Barry Posen, “the military foundations of U.S. 
hegemony.”4   
In the same way as the term “command of the sea” can be distilled to “sea control,” the concept of 
“command of the commons” can be termed “commons control.”  Such a term does not necessarily imply that 
such control is absolute (although it could be).  As Winston Churchill maintained concerning command of 
the seas: “When we speak of command of the seas, it does not mean command of every part of the sea at the 
same moment, or at every moment.  It only means that we can make our will prevail ultimately in any part of 
the seas which may be selected for operations, and thus indirectly make our will prevail in every part of the 
sea.”5 
From that perspective, the United States possesses command of the commons or commons control 
today.        
 
Future Challenge: From A2/AD to Commons Denial 
 
Yet, despite conditions today, it is conceivable that a near-peer opponent could attempt to deny U.S. access 
and full utilization of the global commons, perhaps by 2050.  Such an opponent would not necessarily be able 
to replicate America’s commons control.  Rather, it would seek a robust capacity for commons denial (in the 
conceptual manner of sea denial) within the 4000-6000 nautical mile extent that is currently unchallenged, as 
well as in space and cyberspace. 
Although they has been some recognition that rising powers could contest U.S. dominance of the 
global commons, a future trans-global commons denial threat with substantial military effects has not yet 
been examined in detail.  In an influential article, then-Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele 
Flournoy and co-author Shawn Brimley maintained that the relative balance of global power was shifting in 
ways that allow the commons to be “contested,” but discussed the potential challenges in relatively modest 
terms, largely within the reach of current A2/AD systems closing the peripheries.6  The authors did suggest, 
however, that “these developments challenge us to think creatively about how DOD can best develop the 
strategy, concepts of operations, and capability mix needed to meet this challenges.”7  With that in mind, now 
is the time to contemplate how U.S. forces in the 2050 time-frame could achieve “assured access” in the face 
of a severe commons denial threat. 
It is not impossible, impractical or inappropriate to examine a potential 2050 threat—because 
strategies, tactics and systems will largely be extensions of and advances in A2/AD strategies, tactics and systems 
that exist today.  Anti-access warfare is a strategy existent throughout history intended to cut off the 
opponent’s use of the global commons, conducted at the level of technology  
available in the particular historical era.  The principles of the strategy remains the same, and will remain the 
same in 2050, even as technology evolves.  Moreover, much of the U.S. joint force—and certainly much of 
the U.S. Navy—available in 2050 will consist of platforms existing today or built in the years 2018-2030 
(which means they will be based on designs and technologies emerging today).  This is also true of emerging 
peers. 
One can therefore discern an outline of the nature of this potential threat: undersea forces that can 
linger but a dozen miles from the ports of San Diego or Long Beach; conventionally-armed anti-ship ballistic 
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missiles that can reach 2000-3000 nautical miles; anti-satellite satellites that can be positioned within the 
launch trajectories of Kennedy Space Station or Vandenberg Air Force Base; an alternative global internet 
network to which American access could be cut; and global norms that close off regional seas to non-regional 
military vessels, as a few examples. 
In a commons denial strategy, the targets of the enemy may be extensively re-prioritized: combat 
logistics force and sealift first, aircraft carriers second.  Potential opponents, if they intend to win, will not 
wait like Saddam Hussein in 1991 for the U.S. to build an “iron mountain” of power in their region.  Today 
they construct A2/AD systems to deny U.S. access to their region.  Tomorrow they will attempt to attack U.S. 
power before it moves outside our region.                                     
 
Efforts Thus Far 
 
As noted, these are threats that have hardly been intellectually examined, even by those tasked with assessing 
the future security environment.  Postulating the extension of A2/AD systems into a commons denial 
construct is simply not part of the planning focus on “the fight tonight.”  At the same time, those examining 
the future appear fixated on the search for that fabulous beast, the “game changer”—the technology that 
makes “everything all different.”  Game changers are rare, possibly non-existent; the tools of commons denial 
can just as easily creep up as dramatically emerge. 
The Naval Services do have a glimmer of the commons denial threat as reflected from the anti-access 
strategies it currently recognizes.  The March 2015 revision of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower 
adds the “essential function” of “all domain access” to four previously enunciated functions (the previously 
fifth function of humanitarian assistance being subsumed into the category of missions).  All domain access is 
defined simply as “the ability to project military force in contested areas with sufficient freedom of action to 
operate effectively.”8  The primary context is of operations within the range of existing A2/AD systems, and 
the document imports the concept of “cross-domain synergy”—the centerpiece of the 2012 Joint Staff Joint 
Operational Access Concept (JOAC)—as the required capability.   
This context should be expanded beyond the focus of the JOAC to examine the practical 
requirements of all domain access in a future commons denial environment.  Unfortunately, the follow-on 
joint document, Joint Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), released 19 October 2016, is but an 
anemic shadow.  Organizationally, JAM-GC evolved out of the Air/Sea Battle Office, an unfortunate victim 
of political-academic alarmism and the cult aspect of jointness ideology.  Instead of focusing, however, on 
assessing the operationally capabilities needed, the JAM-GC concludes that U.S. forces must be 
“distributable,” “resilient,” “tailorable,” on a “sufficient scale,” and of “ample duration” to ensure operational 
access to the global commons.  Of course they should—but hopefully for any and all types of operations, whether 
dealing with the global commons or not.  A recent description of the JAM-GC notes that “JAM-GC puts 
forth an evolutionary approach to joint force operations that centers on enhanced all-domain integration 
across Services and component lines…”9  That may be a great description of the goal of all jointness; but it 
does not come to grips with the full challenge that denial of the commons would present to the joint force.           
 
What is Needed        
 
Now is indeed the time for military and civilian strategists to begin a more detailed examination of the 
potential of global commons anti-access and options for countering it.  Some of the issues that should be 
examined include: (1) vulnerability of CONUS deployment ports and nodes, (2) effects of creeping “lawfare” 
efforts to de-legitimize freedom of the seas, (3) over-reliance on space and cyberspace for C2, (4) potential 
development of access denial/sea denial systems (such as modern strategic naval mining) than can confine 
our enemies, (5) ensuring stockpiles of strategic materials, (6) surge capacities in defense industries, and 
others.  The eventual goal should be an integrated plan to ensure commons access.  Since these issues have 
yet to be examined in the detail they deserve (due to our focus on “the fight tonight,” the hope of a game 
changer, etc.), we are not yet ready to build such a plan.  It is time to step beyond the platitudes of joint 
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concepts.  We cannot wait for 2050 to find that access to the global commons is too difficult to be the 
foundation of our global military power.  In fact, without access to the global commons, we have no military 
power.   
 
Notes: 
 
 
1  For a more detailed explanation of the logic behind this definition, and how it relates to navies, see Sam J. Tangredi, 
“Beyond the Sea and Jointness,” in Thomas J. Cutler, ed., The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2015), pp. 141-150. 
2  It is logical to argue that the internet is a source of trade, or rather a trading platform, since so much of global financial 
exchange is conducted via the internet.  However, financial investment and exchange exists for the purpose of 
facilitating trade in goods and services which cannot in themselves travel by internet.  The cost of manufacturing by 3D 
printing is prohibitive except for plastics.    
3  For a discussion of Imperial Japan’s strategy as anti-access warfare, see Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering 
A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013), pp. 141-149. 
4  Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security 28:1 
(Summer 2003), pp. 5-26. 
5 From a speech in the House of Commons 11 October 1940. 
6  Michele Flounoy and Shawn Brimley, “The Contested Commons,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 135/7/1277 (July 
2009), pp. 16-21. 
7  Ibid, 20.  
8  U.S. Department of the Navy, Forward, Engaged, Ready: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, March 2015, p. 19.  
9  Michael E. Hutchens, William D. Dries, Jason C. Perdew, Vincent D. Bryant, and Kerry E. Moores, “Joint Concept 
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Mission
The United States Navy will be ready to conduct prompt and sustained combat incident 
to operations at sea.  Our Navy will protect America from attack and preserve America’s 
strategic influence in key regions of the world.  U.S. naval forces and operations – from 
the sea floor to space, from deep water to the littorals, and in the information domain – 
will deter aggression and enable peaceful resolution of crises on terms acceptable to the 
United States and our allies and partners.  If deterrence fails, the Navy will conduct deci-
sive combat operations to defeat any enemy.
Introduction
For 240 years, the U.S. Navy has been a cornerstone of American security and prosperity. 
To continue to meet this obligation, we must adapt to the emerging security environ-
ment.  The initiatives laid out in this Design represent initial steps along a future course 
to achieve the aims articulated in the Revised Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century 
(CS-21R) in this new environment.  It’s a tremendously complex challenge.  As we get 
underway, we must first understand our history - how we got to where we are.  Moving 
forward, we’ll respect that we won’t get it all right, and so we’ll monitor and assess our-
selves and our surroundings as we go.  We’ll learn and adapt, always getting better, striv-
ing to the limits of performance.  This cannot be a “top-down” effort; everybody must 
contribute.
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Strategic Environment
On the eve of the 20th century, the United States emerged from the Civil War and 
laid the foundation to become a global power, but its course to continued prosperity 
was unclear.  Navy Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan helped to chart that course, arguing 
that American growth required access to overseas markets, which in turn required a 
preeminent navy to protect that access.  America became a nation with global interests, 
and the seas were the path to new frontiers.  
 
The essence of Mahan’s vision still pertains: America’s interests lie beyond our own 
shores.  What was true in the late 19th century holds true today – America’s success 
depends on our creativity, our entrepreneurism, and our access and relationships abroad. 
In an increasingly globalized world, America’s success is even more reliant on the U.S. 
Navy.
 
In fulfilling our mission, it’s important to start with an assessment of the security 
environment.  It is tempting to define the challenge solely in terms of our allies, partners, 
and competitors – the state and non-state actors on the world stage.  While these are 
critical, it is even more important to understand the dramatic changes that have taken 
place on the stage itself – the character of the environment in which competition and 
cooperation occur.  Fundamentally, the world has become dramatically more globalized, 
and this trend is accelerating.  Our way ahead must account for this new reality.  In 
particular, this Design will address three major and interrelated global forces that 
are increasingly used, increasingly stressed, increasingly important, and increasingly 
contested.  These three forces energize the quickly changing environment in which the 
Navy must operate, and if required, fight and win. 
The first global force is the traffic on the oceans, seas, and waterways, including the 
sea floor – the classic maritime system.  For millennia, the seas have served to connect 
people and societies to help them prosper.  As the global economy continues to expand 
and become more connected, the maritime system is becoming increasingly used by 
the United States and the world as a whole.  Shipping traffic over traditional sea lanes 
is increasing, new trade routes are opening in the Arctic, and new technologies are 
making undersea resources more accessible.  This maritime traffic also includes mass and 
uncontrolled migration and illicit shipment of material and people.  The maritime system 
is becoming more heavily used, more stressed, and more contested than ever before.
 
A second increasingly influential force is the rise of the global information system – the 
information that rides on the servers, undersea cables, satellites, and wireless networks 
that increasingly envelop and connect the globe.  Newer than the maritime system, the 
information system is more pervasive, enabling an even greater multitude of connections 
between people and at a much lower cost of entry – literally an individual with a 
computer is a powerful actor in this system!  Information, now passed in near-real time 
across links that continue to multiply, is in turn driving an accelerating rate of change – 
from music to medicine, from microfinance to missiles.  
2
The third interrelated force is the increasing rate of technological creation and adoption.  
This is not just in information technologies, where Gordon Moore’s projections of 
exponential advances in processing, storage, and switches continue to be realized.  
Scientists are also unlocking new properties of commonplace materials and creating new 
materials altogether at astonishing speeds.  Novel uses for increasingly sophisticated 
robotics, energy storage, 3-D printing, and networks of low-cost sensors, to name just 
a few examples, are changing almost every facet of how we work and live.  Genetic 
science is just beginning to demonstrate its power.  Artificial intelligence is just getting 
started and could fundamentally reshape the environment.  And as technology is 
introduced at an accelerating rate, it is being adopted by society just as fast – people are 
using these new tools as quickly as they are introduced, and in new and novel ways.
 
These three forces – the forces at play in the maritime system, the force of the 
information system, and the force of technology entering the environment – and the 
interplay between them have profound implications for the United States Navy.  We 
must do everything we can to seize the potential afforded by this environment.  Our 
competitors are moving quickly, and our adversaries are bent on leaving us swirling in 
their wake.
And the competitors themselves have changed.  For the first time in 25 years, the 
United States is facing a return to great power competition.  Russia and China both have 
advanced their military capabilities to act as global powers.  Their goals are backed 
by a growing arsenal of high-end warfighting capabilities, many of which are focused 
specifically on our vulnerabilities and are increasingly designed from the ground up 
to leverage the maritime, technological and information systems.  They continue to 
develop and field information-enabled weapons, both kinetic and non-kinetic, with 
increasing range, precision and destructive capacity.  Both China and Russia are also 
engaging in coercion and competition below the traditional thresholds of high-end 
conflict, but nonetheless exploit the weakness of accepted norms in space, cyber and 
the electromagnetic spectrum.  The Russian Navy is operating with a frequency and in 
areas not seen for almost two decades, and the Chinese PLA(N) is extending its reach 
around the world.
 
Russia and China are not the only actors seeking to gain advantages in the emerging 
security environment in ways that threaten U.S. and global interests.  Others are now 
pursuing advanced technology, including military technologies that were once the 
exclusive province of great powers – this trend will only continue.  Coupled with a 
continued dedication to furthering its nuclear weapons and missile programs, North 
Korea’s provocative actions continue to threaten security in North Asia and beyond.  
And while the recent international agreement with Iran is intended to curb its nuclear 
ambitions, Tehran’s advanced missiles, proxy forces and other conventional capabilities 
continue to pose threats to which the Navy must remain prepared to respond.  Finally, 
international terrorist groups have proven their resilience and adaptability and now 
pose a long-term threat to stability and security around the world.  All of these actors 
seek to exploit all three forces described above – the speed, precision and reach that 
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the maritime and information systems now enable, bolstered by new technologies – to 
counter U.S. military advantages and to threaten the rules and norms that have been the 
basis of prosperity and world order for the last 70 years.
 
There is also a fourth ‘force’ that shapes our security environment.  Barring an unforeseen 
change, even as we face new challenges and an increasing pace, the Defense and Navy 
budgets likely will continue to be under pressure.  We will not be able to “buy” our way 
out of the challenges that we face.  The budget environment will force tough choices but 
must also inspire new thinking.
Looking forward, it is clear that the challenges the Navy faces are shifting in character, 
are increasingly difficult to address in isolation, and are changing more quickly.  This 
will require us to reexamine our approaches in every aspect of our operations.  But as 
we change in many areas, it is important to remember that there will also be constants. 
The nature of war has always been, and will remain, a violent human contest between 
thinking and adapting adversaries for political gain.  Given this fundamental truth, the 
lessons of the masters – Thucydides, Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao, Corbett, and, yes, 
Mahan – still apply.  America’s importance to the world holds fast.  Our nation’s reliance 
on its Navy – our Navy – continues to grow.
Why a “Design?”
The scope and complexity of the challenges we face demand a different approach than 
that offered by a classic campaign plan.  This guidance frames the problem and a way 
forward while acknowledging that there is inherent and fundamental uncertainty in both 
the problem definition and the proposed solution.
Accordingly, we will make our best initial assessment of the environment, formulate a 
way ahead, and move out.  But as we move, we will continually assess the environment, 
to ensure that it responds in a way that is consistent with achieving our goals.  Where 
necessary, we will make adjustments, challenging ourselves to approach the limits of 
performance.  
This Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority will guide our behaviors and 
investments, both this year and in the years to come.  More specific details about 
programs and funding adjustments will be reflected in our annual budget documents.
4
Core Attributes
One clear implication of the current environment is the need for the Navy to prepare 
for decentralized operations, guided by commander’s intent.  The ability to achieve this 
end is reliant on the trust and confidence that is based on a clear understanding, among 
peers and between commanders and subordinates, of the risk that can be tolerated.  
This trust and confidence is enhanced by our actions, which must reflect our core values 
of Honor, Courage, and Commitment.  Four core attributes of our professional identity 
will help to serve as guiding criteria for our decisions and actions.  If we abide by these 
attributes, our values should be clearly evident in our actions.
• INTEGRITY: Our behaviors as individuals and as an organization align with our values 
as a profession.  We actively strengthen each other’s resolve to act consistently with 
our values.  As individuals, as teams, and as a Navy, our conduct must always be 
upright and honorable both in public and when nobody’s looking.    
• ACCOUNTABILITY: We are a mission-focused force.  We achieve and maintain high 
standards.  Our actions support our strategy.  We clearly define the problem we’re 
trying to solve and the proposed outcomes.  In execution, we honestly assess our 
progress and adjust as required – we are our own toughest critic.
• INITIATIVE: On their own, everybody strives to be the best they can be – we give 
100% when on the job.  Our leaders take ownership and act to the limit of their 
authorities.  We foster a questioning attitude and look at new ideas with an open 
mind.  Our most junior teammate may have the best idea; we must be open to 
capturing that idea.
• TOUGHNESS: We can take a hit and keep going, tapping all sources of strength 
and resilience: rigorous training for operations and combat, the fighting spirit of our 
people, and the steadfast support of our families.  We don’t give up the ship.
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Maintain and modernize the undersea leg of the strategic deterrent triad.  This 
is foundational to our survival as a nation.
In partnership with the Marine Corps, develop concepts and capabilities to 
provide more options to national leaders, from non-conflict competition to 
high-end combat at sea.  Operations short of conflict should be designed to 
contain and control escalation on terms favorable to the U.S.  Combat at sea 
must address “blue-water” scenarios far from land and power projection ashore 
in a highly “informationalized” and contested environment.  All scenarios must 
address the threat of long-range precision strike.  Test and refine concepts 
through focused wargaming, modeling, and simulations.  Validate these 
concepts through fleet exercises, unit training and certification. 
Further advance and ingrain information warfare.  Expand the Electromagnetic 
Maneuver Warfare concept to encompass all of information warfare, to include 
space and cyberspace.
To better meet today’s force demands, explore alternative fleet designs, 
including kinetic and non-kinetic payloads and both manned and unmanned 
systems.  This effort will include exploring new naval platforms and formations 
– again in a highly “informationalized” environment – to meet combatant 
commander needs.
Examine the organization of United States Fleet Forces Command, Commander 
Pacific Fleet and their subordinate commands to better support clearly defining 
operational and warfighting demands and then to generate ready forces to 
meet those demands.
Examine OPNAV organization to rationalize our headquarters in support of 
warfighting requirements.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Four Lines of Effort
 The execution of this Design is built along four Lines of Effort that focus on warfighting, 
learning faster, strengthening our Navy team, and building partnerships.  These lines of 
effort are inextricably linked and must be considered together to get a sense of the total 
effort.  The corresponding objectives and first year tasks listed under each line of effort 
define how we will begin to move forward.
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 STRENGTHEN NAVAL POWER AT AND FROM SEA: Maintain a fleet that is 
trained and ready to operate and fight decisively – from the deep ocean to the 
littorals, from the sea floor to space, and in the information domain.  Align our 
organization to best support generating operational excellence.
 ACHIEVE HIGH VELOCITY LEARNING AT EVERY LEVEL:  Apply the best 
concepts, techniques and technologies to accelerate learning as individuals, 
teams and organizations.  Clearly know the objective and the theoretical limits 
of performance – set aspirational goals.  Begin problem definition by studying 
history – do not relearn old lessons.  Start by seeing what you can accomplish 
without additional resources.  During execution, conduct routine and rigorous self-
assessment.  Adapt processes to be inherently receptive to innovation and creativity.
 
 
 
 
 STRENGTHEN OUR NAVY TEAM FOR THE FUTURE:  We are one Navy Team – 
comprised of a diverse mix of active duty and reserve Sailors, Navy Civilians, and our 
families – with a history of service, sacrifice and success.  We will build on this history 
to create a climate of operational excellence that will keep us ready to prevail in all 
future challenges. 
 
 
Implement individual, team and organizational best practices to inculcate high 
velocity learning as a matter of routine.
Expand the use of learning-centered technologies, simulators, online gaming, 
analytics and other tools as a means to bring in creativity, operational agility and 
insight.
Optimize the Navy intellectual enterprise to maximize combat effectiveness and 
efficiency.  Reinvigorate an assessment culture and processes.
Understand the lessons of history so as not to relearn them.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Aggressively pursue implementation of the core tenets of the “Sailor 2025” 
program – fully integrated and transparent data and analytics, increased career 
choice and flexibility, expanded family support, and tailored learning.
Accelerate “Sailor 2025” efforts to leverage information technology to enhance 
personnel system and training modernization efforts.
Strengthen and broaden leadership development programs to renew 
and reinforce the Navy Team’s dedication to the naval profession.  Leader 
development will be fleet-centered and will begin early in our careers, focusing 
on character and commitment to Navy core values.  Character and leadership 
will be rewarded through challenging assignments and advancement.
Strengthen organizational integrity by balancing administrative requirements 
with the benefits gained from the time spent.  The goal will be to return more 
time to leaders and empower them to develop their teams.
Strengthen the role of Navy leaders in leading and managing civilian 
professionals as key contributors to the mission effectiveness of our Navy Team.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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 EXPAND AND STRENGTHEN OUR NETWORK OF PARTNERS: Deepen 
operational relationships with other services, agencies, industry, allies and partners – 
who operate with the Navy to support our shared interests.
Desired Outcome
A Naval Force that produces leaders and teams who learn and adapt to achieve 
maximum possible performance, and who achieve and maintain high standards to be 
ready for decisive operations and combat.
Conclusion
We will remain the world’s finest Navy only if we all fight each and every minute to get 
better.  Our competitors are focused on taking the lead – we must pick up the pace and 
deny them.  The margins of victory are razor thin – but decisive!  I am counting on your 
integrity, accountability, initiative, and toughness to execute the lines of effort described 
in this Design, execute our mission, and achieve our end state.  I am honored and proud 
to lead you.  
        
          JOHN M. RICHARDSON     
Enhance integration with our Joint Service and interagency partners at all levels 
of interaction to include current and future planning, concept and capability 
development and assessment.
Prioritize key international partnerships through information sharing, 
interoperability initiatives, and combined operations; explore new opportunities 
for combined forward operations.
Deepen the dialogue with private research and development labs, and 
academia.  Ensure that our Navy labs and research centers are competitive and 
fully engaged with their private-sector partners. 
Increase the volume and range of interaction with commercial industry.  Seek 
opportunities through non-traditional partners. 
1.
2.
3.
4.
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A quarter-century of global maritime dominance by the U.S. 
Navy is being tested by the return of great power dynamics. 
The security interests of the United States and those of our 
allies are increasingly challenged by near-peer competitors, 
confrontational foreign governments, and well-armed, non-
state militant groups. Our Navy must adjust to the changing 
security environment. We are driven by the challenges of these 
state and non-state actors, who may not be as devoted to the 
rules-based system of international norms that have shaped 
our world for the last 70 years. History teaches us the dangers 
to a maritime nation’s security and prosperity when its navy fails 
to adapt to the challenges of a changing security environment. 
From Europe to Asia, history is replete with nations that rose 
to global power only to cede it back through lack of seapower, 
either over time or in decisive battle.
We are entering a new age of Seapower.WWII SHIPS GO HERE
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T.S. Rowden
Commander, Naval Surface Force
As today’s leading naval power, we cannot afford to lose 
our Nation’s seapower edge. The U.S. Navy is responding to 
global challenges under the leadership of the Chief of Naval 
Operations and is guided by the precepts of our “Design for 
Maintaining Maritime Superiority.”  Responding to the call to 
“strengthen naval power at and from the sea,” the U.S. Naval 
Surface Force submits this “Surface Force Strategy.”  The 
strategy describes the return to sea control and implementation 
of Distributed Lethality as an operational and organizational 
principle for achieving and sustaining sea control at will. Sea 
control is the precondition for everything else we must do as a 
navy. Distributed Lethality reinforces fleet initiatives that drive 
collaboration and integration across warfighting domains. 
Distributed Lethality requires increasing the offensive and 
defensive capability of surface forces, and guides deliberate 
resource investment for modernization and for the future force. 
Providing more capabilities across surface forces yields more 
options for Geographic Combatant Commanders in peace and 
war. 
In order to achieve the desired outcome of this strategy, we 
must rededicate the force to attain and sustain sea control, 
retain the best and the brightest, develop and provide 
advanced tactical training, and equip our ships with improved 
offensive weapons, sensors, and hard kill/soft kill capabilities. 
Pursuing these ends will enhance our capability and capacity 
to go on the offensive and to defeat multiple attacks. 
By providing a more powerful deterrent, we will dissuade 
the first act of aggression, and failing that, we will respond 
to an attack in kind by inflicting damage of such magnitude 
that it compels an adversary to cease hostilities, and render it 
incapable of further aggression.
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The objective of the Surface Force Strategy is to achieve and sustain sea control at the time and place of our choosing 
to protect the homeland from afar, build and maintain global 
security, project the national power of the United States, 
and win decisively. It is essential to our Nation’s security and 
prosperity that we maintain the ability to maneuver globally on 
the seas and to prevent others from using the sea against the 
interests of the United States and our allies. Additionally, sea 
control is the pre-requisite to achieving the Navy’s objectives 
of All Domain Access, Deterrence, Power Projection and 
Maritime Security.
Forward 
Operating forward, Naval Surface 
Warships execute military diplomacy, 
across a wide geography, building 
greater transparency, reducing the risk of 
miscalculation or conflict, and promoting 
a shared maritime environment.
Visible 
A persistent visible presence, Naval 
Surface Warships assure allies and 
partners and promote global stability by 
deterring actions against U.S. interests.
Ready 
Providing credible combat power, Naval 
Surface Warships are ready to respond 
when called upon in times of crisis 
providing operational commanders 
options to control increased ocean areas 
and hold potential adversaries at risk, at 
range, whether at sea or ashore.
Responding to a 
Dynamic World
  Surface Warfare
76 Return to Sea Control Return to Sea Control
Pressures on the Global Order
America is a maritime nation, and our prosperity is directly 
linked to the freedom of the seas provided by the U.S. Navy. 
Threats ranging from low-end piracy to well-armed non-state 
militant groups, to the navies of high-end nation-states pose 
challenges that surface forces are prepared to counter, and 
when called upon, defeat.
Global competitors will attempt to disrupt freedom of maneuver 
on the seas through the deployment and proliferation of 
sea denial technologies including state-of-the-art anti-ship 
ballistic and cruise missiles, integrated and layered sensor 
systems and targeting networks, long-range bombers, 
advanced fighter aircraft, submarines, mines, advanced 
integrated air defenses, enhanced electronic warfare, cyber 
and space-based technologies, and asymmetric tactics. These 
capabilities are designed to raise the risk to U.S. forces in 
order to undercut confidence among friends and allies of our 
ability and will to operate forward. The surface force must 
adapt in meaningful ways that allow for confident operations 
in contested environments within an acceptable level of risk. 
The most important challenge for the surface force to address 
is the improving technologies, systems, and networks our 
competitors put in place to deter and deny the United States 
access to vital sea areas. These technologies extend from the 
sea floor to space and present surface forces with multi-axis 
and multi-dimensional challenges. 
Countering these advanced sea denial technologies requires 
improved tactics; incremental adaptations to surface force 
weapons, platforms and sensors; and the right talent, properly 
trained to operate, maintain and employ these systems. To 
achieve these requirements, we must think differently about 
how we organize, prepare, and sustain surface forces.
Responding to a Dynamic World Responding to a Dynamic World
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The concept of Distributed Lethality enables the goal of sea 
control at the time and place of our choosing. It is achieved by 
increasing the offensive and defensive capability of individual 
warships, employing them in dispersed formations across a 
wide expanse of geography, and generating distributed fires. 
Distributed Lethality has distinguishing characteristics at the 
tactical and operational levels. At the tactical level, it increases 
unit lethality and reduces the susceptibility of warships to 
detection and targeting. At the operational level, it employs 
warships as elements of offensive Adaptive Force Packages 
that are task oriented and capable of widely dispersed 
operations. Adaptive Force Packages allow operational 
commanders the ability to scale force capabilities depending 
on the level of threat. This manner of employment is designed 
to open battlespace and enable concealment and deception in 
order to inject uncertainty and complexity into an adversary’s 
targeting. 
Responding to a Dynamic World Responding to a Dynamic World
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Our ships must be equipped with the tools necessary to fight 
and defeat highly capable adversaries. When combined with 
the right mix of capabilities and tactics, this concept enables a 
surface force that can deter an adversary with credible combat 
power, challenge the operating space, and gain the advantage 
for follow-on Joint Force operations. 
We will organize, train, and equip surface forces to the greatest effect by using a framework composed of four 
pillars: tactics, talent, tools, and training (T4). The framework is 
designed to enhance the capability and capacity of the surface 
force to achieve and maintain access across all warfighting 
domains.  It is aligned with the Design for Maintaining Maritime 
Superiority and reinforces all of the Design’s lines of effort. 
This comprehensive organizational approach combines the 
ways and means to deliver combat-ready warships in the near 
(2017-2021), mid (2022-2030), and far terms (2031-2040) in 
order to control the sea and project power.
is composed
of three tenets
Increase the offensive lethality of all warships.
Distribute offensive capability geographically.
Give ships the right mix of resources to persist in a fight. 
Many strategists point to America’s long operational lines as 
a vulnerability, but Distributed Lethality makes geography a 
virtue. It spreads the combat power of the Fleet, holds targets 
at risk from multiple attack axes, and forces adversaries to 
defend a greater number of targets. This challenges an 
adversary’s decision making cycle and material investment 
scheme by forcing that adversary to account for lethal threats 
from multiple domains.
We must upgrade the defensive resilience of our warships to 
improve the ability to fight through attacks from space, cyber, 
air, surface and the undersea domains. We must capitalize on 
the improved mutual defense among ships through evolving 
networks and tactics. Lastly, we must be able to fight through 
battle damage and sustain operations in a degraded command 
and control environment. 
Improving 
the Combat 
Capability of 
Surface Forces
Responding to a Dynamic World
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We must strive for tactical excellence and 
rededicate ourselves to provide sea control for our 
Nation. Under the leadership of the Naval Surface 
and Mine Warfare Development Center (SMWDC) we will 
develop and teach effective tactics that also unite thought and 
action to develop fast and cohesive warfighting. We will also 
deepen our warfighter’s expertise through continual critical 
analysis of our tactics and ingrain warfighting and tactical 
prowess into daily shipboard life.
We will harness the powerful impact of engaged 
leaders and remain committed to the importance 
of warfare tactics experts. We will manage the 
extraordinary talent that exists within our surface force with a 
view towards building depth, breadth, and experience for the 
future. Tomorrow’s challenges demand we engage the most 
creative and influential minds and attract and retain the best 
and most qualified people. 
In addition to current ship construction plans, we will 
design, procure and build the future Fleet to raise the 
combat capability of surface ships. We will apply a 
prioritized road map to synchronize investments that adds 
long-range offensive weapons to our warships and increases 
resilience in combat. 
We will invest in realistic and integrated 
training and create environments that replicate 
the challenges of operating and sustaining 
warships in complex scenarios. This will enable Sailors to 
gain the warfighting proficiency and confidence required to 
accomplish the mission during a combat encounter.
T4 A Design for MAintAining MAritiMe superiorityOrganizing Surface Forces For Enhanced Combat Power
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Surface Force Investment Objectives
Implementing Distributed Lethality to achieve sea control will 
require skillful management of the planning, programming, 
budgeting, and execution process. A prioritized and aligned 
investment plan will inform programming decisions across 
multiple resource sponsors. A surface force investment plan 
becomes even more imperative with the emerging “domain-
centric” programming process. This process allocates 
capability and functionality across and within domains. We 
must work together to achieve kinetic and non-kinetic effects 
in the surface, undersea, air, land, cyber, and electromagnetic 
domains. The surface force has four investment objectives 
spanning the pillars of tactics, talent, tools, and training.  
The first investment objective is to increase the offensive 
fire power of surface warships.  We will continue to modify 
existing weapons and expand the procurement of improved 
surface launched anti-ship, anti-air and land-attack missiles. 
These improvements are applicable to the cruiser/destroyer 
(CRUDES) force, littoral combat ships (LCS), and our 
amphibious and expeditionary forces. We will also work to 
expand the capability of long range anti-submarine weapons. 
The surface force must also continue to develop and field 
advanced kill chain capabilities, such as the Navy Integrated 
Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA), to enable sea control and 
defeat existing and emerging threats in all domains. 
The second investment objective is to support the Navy’s 
long range shipbuilding plan and modernization strategy. 
This involves increasing advanced, integrated air and missile 
defense capacity through sustained modernization and new 
construction to achieve established force posture goals. This 
objective also calls for improvements to existing Air Defense 
Commander capabilities by extending the service life of CG 
47 class ships through the cruiser modernization program. 
Increased LCS, frigate and amphibious ship lethality and 
capacity is also a cornerstone of our future success.
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By 2030, littoral combat ships and frigates will represent half 
of deployed surface combatants. These ships must be lethal, 
capable, and manned appropriately. Priorities will also focus 
on surface and expeditionary warfare maintenance and 
modernization to ensure Fleet reliability, sustainability and 
relevancy against modern and evolving threats.
The third investment objective is to improve battlespace 
awareness. This objective includes continued development of 
combat systems capabilities with improvements to mission 
planning software, battle management software for Warfare 
Commanders, and tools to manage unit and force level 
emissions. The efforts in this overarching objective are also 
intended to capitalize on advanced Electromagnetic Maneuver 
Warfare (EMW) technologies, such as the Surface Electronic 
Warfare Improvement Program , designed to support a robust 
EMW strategy.
The fourth overarching investment objective is to implement 
high velocity learning across the surface force. This involves 
resourcing Surface and Expeditionary Warfare Training Plan 
continuums. This objective also includes future investments in 
virtual world warfighting lab venues with operator-in-the-loop 
and combat system test bed capabilities to provide feedback 
on weapon system design and develop and validate tactics, 
techniques and procedures (TTPs).
These four investment objectives span multiple resource 
sponsors and several major budget accounts. Through deep 
partnerships, the Surface Force Strategy investment priorities 
build wholeness into the four pillars of tactics, talent, tools 
and training and make the mission capabilities within the 
Distributed Lethality concept a reality and, in turn, harness the 
full measure of combat power from the surface force.
Distributed Lethality provides an effective response to the tactical, operational, and strategic challenges posed in 
denied or contested environments. The operational construct 
to control the sea is centered on the tactical training and 
capabilities that allow commanders to deceive, target, and 
destroy an adversary. These operational functions provide 
Geographic Combatant Commanders options for employment 
of surface forces across the spectrum of conflict and serve as 
a foundational paradigm for our community’s approach to sea 
control.
Improving the Combat Capability of Surface Forces Reinvigorating 
Sea Control & 
Power Projection
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Forward and ready conventional surface forces must be able 
to deter aggression, deny aggressors the prospect of achieving 
their objectives, establish and maintain sea control, and project 
power.
Deter Aggression with Forward and Ready Conventional Forces
The ability to sustain operations far from our shores provides 
a distinct advantage to the United States. A persistent forward 
presence backed by credible combat capability can prevent 
aggression and limit regional crises from escalating to full-
scale war. 
On a daily basis, surface forces are distributed across the 
globe.  Surface warships protect freedom of maneuver, secure 
the sea lanes for global trade and economic growth, defend 
key interests of the United States, and prevent adversaries 
from leveraging the world’s oceans against us. Distributed 
Lethality gives options to Commanders to deliver credible 
combat power where it matters most. 
A more lethal, distributed force across a greater expanse 
erodes an adversary’s advantage by complicating their 
surveillance and targeting. Similarly, surface forces will have 
both the capability and capacity to fight through an attack 
while being positioned to inflict damage of such magnitude 
that an adversary is rendered incapable of further aggression, 
ceases hostilities and no longer considers force as a viable 
means to achieve its end-state objectives.
Deny an Aggressor Prospect of Achieving Objectives
States that leverage sea denial technologies seek to diminish 
the deterrent value of forward-deployed forces. This negatively 
impacts the assurances the United States provides to partners 
and allies. Distributed Lethality is an effective response to 
deny the prospect of any benefits sought by an adversary who 
chooses to leverage sea denial technologies. It also serves to 
influence an adversary’s decision-making calculus and denies 
them the benefits they seek from choosing to use force on 
the seas as an extension of their national interests. Distributed 
Lethality spreads the playing field for our surface forces at sea, 
provides a more complex targeting problem, and creates more 
favorable conditions to project power where required.
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Establish and Maintain Sea Control 
The purpose of Distributed Lethality is to establish sea control 
and prevent an adversary from doing the same. The concept 
and organizing principles of Distributed Lethality deliver 
surface forces that are capable of controlling sea space at the 
time and place of our choosing.  Surface forces outfitted with 
robust defensive systems and armed with credible surface 
launched stand-off weapons, survivable in both contested and 
communications degraded environments, will help to secure 
sea territory and enable forces to flow for follow-on power 
projection operations.
Sea control does not mean command of all the seas, all 
the time. Rather, it is the capability and capacity to impose 
localized control of the sea when and where it is required to 
enable other objectives and to hold it as long as necessary 
to accomplish those objectives. Surface forces can fulfill this 
crucial role, which is the necessary precondition to ensure 
sea lanes remain open for the free movement of goods and 
to safeguard the interests of the United States and partner 
nations.
Project National Power
Distributed Lethality provides the ability to apply all elements 
of seapower for deterrence, to respond to crises, aggression, or 
conflict, to build readiness to project power to deny or defeat 
aggression in multiple theaters, and to provide a robust ability 
to strike targets with surprise from the sea.
Surface forces provide our Nation with credible combat naval power at and from the sea in order to control the sea 
at the time and place of our choosing for the Joint Force to 
project power. We will do this by providing our warships with 
the tactics, talent, tools, and training to deceive, target and 
destroy enemy forces, and by instilling this warfighting ethos 
in the crews that fight our warships.
Reinvigorating Sea Control & Power Projection Conclusion
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This strategy serves as our call to action to build, organize, 
train, and equip surface forces that can fight and win today, 
tomorrow, and beyond.
Distributed Lethality is changing our Fleet. 
Conclusion
IF IT FLOATS
IT FIGHTS

